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Abstract 
The report studies the acquisition of Consolidated Papers by Stora Enso in 2000. In addition 
to reviewing the historical sequence of events related to the acquisition, the assumptions 
Stora Enso management made when contemplating the acquisition are listed The aim is to 
assess which assumptions proved to be incorrect in order to systematically analyze why the 
acquisition did not bring the benefits intended. 
The assumptions made before the acquisition can be classified into three areas a) mergers and 
acquisitions as a strategic action in general, b) the certain geographical or business area 
where to make the transaction and c) the assumptions specific to the target company. They 
can furthermore be divided into 12 internal or external “dimensions”, which are factors or 
stakeholders whose future reactions or developments should be considered. It is argued that 
some of the assumptions made did not initially seem to be relevant to the deal, but 
nevertheless had an impact on its long-term success. 
 The Stora Enso – Consolidated Papers deal is an interesting case to study because it has 
received widespread media attention for failing to attain its preconceived benefits. Seven 
years after the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, Stora Enso divested its North American 
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operations incurring a significant loss. The report estimates the losses to have accounted to 
2,0-2,7 billion Euros, depending on the method used. 
The research includes 16 interviews with key players involved in the deal, including top 
management of Stora Enso, the chairman and main stockholder of Consolidated Papers, 
advisors involved in the deal as well as competitor representatives. The findings of the 
interviews have been validated using publicly available contemporary documents. 
The conclusion of the study is that four factors were most significant in causing the loss 
incurred by Stora Enso as a result of the acquisition. These were: 
1) The economic cycle turned suddenly and paper demand started to change fundamentally 
2) The increasing presence of Asian paper manufacturers was a market disrupting threat 
3) Consolidated Papers‟ weakening profitability would have required a turnaround in 
operations, and Stora Enso management was overconfident in its ability to halt the company‟s 
declining prospects 
4) The US dollar weakened dramatically increasing the competitiveness of American 
production, but making production optimization, a key motive for the merger, harder. 
Although physical assets had been hedged against changes in currency exchange rates, the 
weakening dollar significantly affected the Euro-nominated valuation of Stora Enso North 
America upon divestment, causing a significant part of the losses. 
Finally, the report discusses the effect of the acquisition on Stora Enso‟s other activities and 
discusses how the deal was supposed to create shareholder value. On a more general level, 
the research shows that the acquisition of Consolidated Papers is a good example of how 
difficult it is for managers to predict the future, although that is what they are expected to do 
when leading a company. 
 
Key words: Merger assumptions, Managerial cognition, Pulp and paper industry 
consolidation 
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1. Introduction 
 
The acquisition of Consolidated Papers by Stora Enso has stirred widespread debate. The 
company was acquired in 2000, and subsequently divested in 2007, causing substantive 
losses for Stora Enso. The deal and its executors have been criticized strongly in the media. 
Furthermore, as Stora Enso is partly owned by the Finnish government, the acquisition has 
been a theme of a political debate as well. 
In this report, which is based on my master‟s thesis submitted in March 2010, I present a 
thorough assessment of the Stora Enso – Consolidated Papers acquisition. I explain the 
original rationale of the deal and show why it did not bring the benefits it was supposed to. I 
assess the deal as a prime example of the similar deals that were going simultaneously in the 
pulp and paper industry at the time. Finally, I also calculate the amount of Stora Enso‟s losses 
as a result of the deal, as this is a subject where public debate has also yet to conclude upon. 
To assess the deal, I have reconstructed the view of the world of Stora Enso management at 
the time of the acquisition by listing 27 assumptions they made, implicitly or explicitly, on 
the industry, the North American market and the acquisition target. I then verify the 
correctness of these assumptions by looking at how they developed during Stora Enso‟s 
ownership period of Consolidated. This enables seeing which ones proved incorrect, and 
above all, which ones were critical constituents of Stora Enso‟s substantial losses resulting 
from the deal. 
I feel confident that I have been able to interview most key players involved in the deal, and 
that the conclusions I draw are based on a balanced view of the situation.  Interviewees span 
from Stora Enso top management, Stora Enso North America management, advisors, 
competitors, to the seller of Consolidated. My sincere thanks are in order to all interviewees 
involved for their time and effort in helping me assess this acquisition, which remains one of 
the most significant corporate transactions in Finnish and Swedish economic history. 
 
1.1. Structure of the report 
The report starts by explaining the research method and presenting the interviewees involved.  
The historical facts related to the acquisition are discussed, by providing an overview the 
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situations of both sides of the deal at the time, reviewing the negotiation process, the 
execution of the deal all the way to the divestment of Stora Enso North America in 2007. 
The reader is then introduced to the research framework, which is justified and explained by 
reviewing literature on managerial cognition and on mergers and acquisitions. 
The literature on managerial cognition helps us to understand how managers sense problems 
and how they react to them. Mergers and acquisitions are one possible strategic response to 
some of the identified problems the company faces in its external environment. The literature 
on managerial cognition also helps in formulating the interview questionnaire used. 
The M&A literature reviewed includes studies on merger motives, factors that make 
companies prone to merger and acquisition activity as well as factors that affect merger and 
acquisition success. The findings from the literature review have been used to justify the 
research framework that lists and classifies assumptions behind a merger and acquisition 
transaction. Literature on pulp and paper specific merger and acquisitions is also reviewed 
and the framework developed is filled out with typical pulp and paper specific M&A 
assumptions. 
The results of the study are reviewed in the order defined by the M&A assumptions 
framework developed. This means going through each assumption made by Stora Enso 
management when acquiring Consolidated Papers, explaining the rationale of the assumption 
and following up on whether it proved correct or not. 
In the analysis section, the interdependency of the assumptions and their proving to be correct 
or incorrect are studied. Chains of assumptions are built which are then joined together with a 
company valuation formula. The most critical assumptions with respect to the value of the 
target company are identified and a list of the most important lessons to be learned from the 
case is formulated. The effect of the acquisition on Stora Enso‟s other businesses is also 
analyzed, and the final amount of losses to Stora Enso‟s shareholders calculated. 
The report ends with a conclusion that summarizes what can be learnt from this acquisition. 
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2. Theoretical approach and methods 
In this section, the research questions of the report are explained along with the theoretical 
background to looking at assumptions Stora Enso management made before the acquisition 
of Consolidated Papers as a way to assess the deal. The methodology of the research is 
explained, and interviewees involved are presented. 
The Stora Enso – Consolidated acquisition is a prime example of a mergers or acquisitions 
that did not bring the benefits it was supposed to. Such cases are not rare, however. Research 
recognizes that a large proportion of mergers and acquisitions do not benefit the acquirer‟s 
shareholders. Instead, usually the target‟s owners benefit the most. Some transactions even 
fail to create any economic value. (E.g. Bruner, 2002) No manager, however, will willingly 
pursue such a transaction if he or she knows that it will fail. Instead, managers that pursue a 
merger or an acquisition assume that they are beneficial. The problem is that managers and 
their advisers are often overly optimistic about the benefits of the mergers they execute. 
(Tichy, 2001) 
What are the decisions to acquire another company based on? Company performance 
depends on a multitude of factors, among the most crucial of which is the way management 
views its environment when contemplating important strategic decisions, such as 
acquisitions. The information upon which the decision to acquire another company is based, 
as well as the way the decision is made are crucial in determining the outcome of the strategic 
action. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that background factors may cause differences 
in assumptions decision makers make and can hence affect decision making. March and 
Simon (1958) argued that each decision maker has bounded rationality and they are restricted 
to several assumptions he or she takes as givens.  Mergers and acquisitions are a significant 
strategic decision, yet studies have not sufficiently looked at the effect of managerial 
cognition on merger and acquisition-related decision making. 
In this report I combine theories of strategic decision making and mergers and acquisitions. I 
argue that the answer to why merger benefits fail to realize may lie in the assumptions 
management has made about secondary or even seemingly irrelevant matters. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate what assumptions, both explicit and implicit, management has made 
and based the acquisition decision on. 
 4 
 
Interviewing the key players involved and examining primary literary evidence provides a 
good way for reconstructing why an acquisition has been carried out and what assumptions 
have been made by acquirer management. This enables us to systematically study the 
correctness of each assumption and determine which assumptions have been critical in 
determining the success of the Consolidated Papers acquisition. 
Assumptions are most likely not independent of each other. Therefore, the report also 
examines the interrelationship between the assumptions, and their link to the value of the 
target company. This enables us to identify the critical assumptions, whose incorrectness 
resulted in the high loss for Stora Enso‟s shareholders. 
The report contributes to existing literature by presenting a framework for gathering and 
following up on assumptions made by management in different stages of a merger or 
acquisition transaction. Looking at assumptions and their sources in such a systematic 
manner provides new areas of analysis to be done in conjunction with M&A decision 
making. 
 
2.1. Formulation of research questions 
 
Figure 1 The hierarchy of the report's research questions 
Why did Stora Enso 
acquire Consolidated 
Papers in 2000?
What factors hindered 
attaining the 
preconceived benefits 
of the acquisition of 
Consolidated Papers?
Primary
research 
questions
Research 
Subquestions
How well did the 
assumptions stand 
the test of reality?
What assumptions 
did Stora Enso 
management make 
when acquiring 
Consolidated 
Papers?
Secondary
research 
questions
What was the extent 
of Stora Enso’s losses 
as a result of the 
acquisition and 
divestment of 
Consolidated Papers?
How did the 2000 
Stora Enso acquisition 
of Consolidated 
Papers proceed?
Filling out of the 
assumptions
framework developed
to systematically
assess the primary
research questions
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In this report, there are two primary research questions, which are based on the research 
approach presented earlier: 
1.1 Why did Stora Enso acquire Consolidated Papers in 2000? 
 
1.2 What factors hindered attaining the preconceived benefits of the 2000 Stora Enso 
acquisition of Consolidated Papers? 
In order to systematically assess these research questions, the assumption framework, 
developed and reviewed later on the report, is used. In order to do this, one must answer two 
research subquestions. 
1.a  What assumptions did Stora Enso management make when acquiring   
Consolidated Papers in 2000? 
1.b How well did the assumptions stand the test of reality? 
Looking at the questions through these two sub-questions provides a way to judge the case 
acquisition objectively. This is important in an interview study where stated views reflect 
opinions and may be biased. 
While the primary focus of the research is to use the case as material for contributing to 
M&A literature, the secondary objective is to document the historical events related to the 
acquisition, which is one of the largest M&A deals in Finnish economic history. The research 
questions of the report related to this goal are:  
2.1 How did the 2000 Stora Enso acquisition of Consolidated Papers proceed? 
2.2 What was the extent of Stora Enso’s losses as a result of the acquisition  and 
divestment of Consolidated Papers? 
 
2.2. Research methods and interviewees involved 
The report uses a case method that looks at assumptions made by management in a single 
acquisition case. The research method has been adapted from a road map presented by 
Eisenhardt (1989). The adapted road map describing the research done on this case study is 
presented first in table 4. Then, the interviews and source of documented evidence which 
form an important part of this study are discussed in further detail. 
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2.2.1. The adapted case method road map 
Acquisitions are complex and involve a multitude of events, developments and factors that 
need to be taken into consideration. The method used must enable a systematic and analytical 
approach to analysis of acquisitions. The theoretical framework developed in chapter 4 
suggests listing and verifying the assumptions acquirer management has made when 
contemplating an acquisition. The research consisted of the following steps, which broadly 
follow the “case method road map” suggested by Eisenhardt (1989).  
 
Table 1 The case method road map, adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
The first column depicts the high-level steps of the research, the second column some 
general guidelines followed in the research design, where as the third column depicts 
research phases specific to this research. The fourth column justifies these phases and 
guidelines. 
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2.3. Semi-structured interviews 
16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with people with different points of view to the 
Stora Enso acquisition of Consolidated Papers. By interviewing the key players involved in 
the deal, one was able to reconstruct the “view of the world” of the management team at the 
time. This method enabled more comprehensive exploration of the merger case than, for 
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example, plain questionnaires would have done. On the other hand, unstructured interviews 
were not used, because then interviewees belonging to the same group could not have been 
interviewed in a sufficiently consistent manner.  
The interviewees were grouped according to their role, so that each group could be asked a 
set of predetermined questions relevant to their roles. Each interview lasted 60-90 minutes 
and revolved around the predetermined set of questions. All were interviewed separately. 
Group-interviews with several interviewees at a time would have been difficult to organize, 
and would have risked bias because of office politics and personal relations. 
The interviews were carried out in several “waves”. Four Stora Enso key management 
interviewees were interviewed first. This made it possible to refine questions for other 
groups. 
The aim of the interviews was to identify both explicit and implicit assumptions Stora Enso 
management had made, and discuss them to get an idea of the correctness of the assumptions. 
Interviews of people directly related to the deal were structured in such a way that the 
interviewee could be able to tell a chronological narrative related to the acquisition. The 
narrative started from events prior and ended in ones that occurred after the acquisition. 
Supporting questions demanding further clarification were asked.  The discussion was 
allowed to roam rather freely, so that new interesting themes could be explored if they came 
up. All in all, the interviews left the interviewee with quite a lot of freedom in bringing up 
factors and events that he/she found most relevant. 
The interviews were taped unless the interviewee requested otherwise, or if the interview 
setting was deemed unsuitable for recording by the author. Three interviews were not taped, 
but rather the author relied on taking accurate notes during the interview. After the interview, 
the tapes were transcribed ad verbatim, or the notes taken were typed out. The data collection 
methods used are well in line with the grounded theory approach, suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), used for example, by Nag, Corley and Gioia (2007). 
A clear problem with the interview method is that interviewees can either remember things 
unclearly or incorrectly, or they might have a biased view on a subject touched upon in the 
interviews. These hinder the reliability of the interviews when looked at individually. These 
problems were mitigated by interviewing a large number of interviewees who had both 
similar and different roles in relation to the case. In addition, statements of fact given by 
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interviewees have been verified using secondary sources whenever possible, so that the study 
would not have to rely on potentially inaccurate accounts of historical facts. The interviews 
have mostly been used to get a sense of what the interviewee has felt at different times, and 
how he/she has viewed different events and actions. The interviews can be regarded as a 
valuable tool for finding out about the mindset and attitude of the interviewee groups at given 
times, especially since most groups have several representatives. The interviews also serve as 
a good tool for marking differences in attitudes and mindset between interviewees. 
All the interviews were conducted by one and the same person. This reduced the possibility 
of attaining data “polluted by” differing ways of interviewing and interpreting the findings. 
Furthermore, the results of the study were shown to four Stora Enso management 
interviewees during the revision process, so that they could point out any factual errors in the 
data. This can also be considered to have improved the reliability of the study. 
 
2.4. Interviewee listing and classification 
The 16 interviewees involved in the research included members of Stora Enso top 
management, a source close to the board, implementing managers involved in post merger 
integration, advisers to Stora Enso in the acquisition, competitor representatives, independent 
industry experts as well as the seller of Consolidated Papers. The interviewees are further 
presented in the following table: 
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Table 2 The interviewees involved in the research 
 
2.5. Literary evidence 
To complement the interviews, data was also collected from literary sources. 
This had two objectives: 
1) Verification and complementation of the assumptions gathered in the interviews 
2) Collection of data to explore the correctness of each assumption. 
In the verification of the assumptions, it was important to find primary sources of evidence. 
For this purpose, Stora Enso‟s own publications were very good because they are usually 
Group Name Title at the time of the acquisition and after Date
Magnus Diesen
Senior Vice President,                                                    
Corporate strategy and investments
22 September 2009
Jukka Härmälä CEO, member of the board 23 September 2009
Esko Mäkeläinen
Senior Executive Vice President,                            
Accounting and Legal Affairs
24 September 2009
Kimmo Kalela
Senior Executive Vice President,                 
Strategy and Business Development
25 September 2009 
Björn Hägglund
Deputy CEO and member of the board - also 
lead integration team following acquisition
10 February 2010
Other interviewees close to 
management:
5 February 2010
Kai Korhonen
Senior Executive Vice President, Stora Enso 
North America, following the acquisition
6 October 2009
Asko Hyttinen
Senior Vice President, Investments and M&A, 
SENA, also member of merger operations team
7 October 2009
Rainer Häggblom
Chairman and CEO of Jaakko Pöyry Consulting 
at the time of the acquisition
6 October 2009
Anonymous An investor banker who advised Stora Enso 7 October 2009
Peter Tague An investor banker who advised Stora Enso 10 November 2009
James Treco An investor banker who advised Stora Enso 10 November 2009
Jyrki Kettunen Former future director, M-Real 22 October 2009
Ainomaija Haarla
Former corporate strategy director,                   
UPM-Kymmene
27 October 2009
Independent pulp and paper 
industry experts
Lech Buzalski Independent pulp and paper industry expert 30 November 2009
The Seller George W. Mead
George W. Mead: Chairman of the board and 
largest stockholder of Consolidated Papers, 
later member of the board of Stora Enso and 
chairman of the Mead-Witter foundation
12 November 2009
with Susan Feith
Susan Feith: Vice-chairman of the Mead-Witter 
foundation and spouse of George W. Mead - 
Contributed significantly to the interview with 
G.W. Mead
Competitor interviewees: 
Representatives of Stora Enso’s 
competitors
A Source close to the Stora Enso board
Implementers:                                       
Stora Enso managers who were 
involved in post merger 
integration
Stora Enso management:     
Responsible for planning and 
executing the acquisition
Advisers:                               
Investment bankers and 
consultants who advised Stora 
Enso in the Consolidated Papers 
acquisition:
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approved, if not done by management. These sources included Stora Enso investor 
presentations, annual reports, SEC filings, as well as direct quotes of Stora Enso executives in 
news articles. These materials were looked through, and examples portraying management 
thinking relevant to the case were picked out. Many of the key examples found are shown in 
this report. 
To verify the correctness of the assumptions, a broader range of sources was used. Each 
assumption provided a small research theme of its own, requiring a tailored approach. Some 
assumptions demanded looking at statistical data, while others required a more qualitative 
approach. Sources for this included the above mentioned primary sources of data, scientific 
publications, US trade commission and FAO trade statistics as well as news articles. 
The sources used can be considered trustworthy for the purposes of this report. The 
statements in Stora Enso‟s own publications are valuable in determining the views of Stora 
Enso management. Stora Enso is a publicly listed company with an obligation to honestly 
disclose its views and information on the market. The company‟s presentations cannot, 
therefore, be intentionally misleading with respect to the views of its management. The news 
articles, in turn, give a bit of historical atmosphere and an idea of what management wanted 
to talk about at a given time. The possibility of journalistic interpretation creeping in was 
minimized. 
 
2.6. Data analysis 
The structure of results and data analysis presented in this study are presented in the figure 
below: 
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Figure 2 Structure of data collection and analysis 
The main results of the study are the assumptions made by Stora Enso management before 
the acquisition of Consolidated, and a verification of the correctness of these assumptions. 
These results were used to draw further conclusions and answer the research questions. 
So
u
rc
e
s
o
f a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
R
e
su
lt
s
A
n
al
ys
is
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
in
te
rd
e
p
en
de
nc
ie
s
/ 
C
h
ai
n
s
Ex
te
rn
al
ad
vi
ce
Ex
te
rn
al
in
te
rl
o
ck
s
Sa
le
s
fo
rc
e
co
n
ta
ct
s
an
d
 
d
is
cu
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
 c
u
st
o
m
e
rs
P
re
vi
o
u
s
e
xp
e
ri
e
n
ce
s
H
is
to
ri
ca
lB
ia
s
Th
e
 e
ff
e
ct
o
f 
th
e
 M
e
d
ia
D
im
e
n
si
o
n
s:
In
d
u
st
ry
st
ru
ct
u
re
C
o
m
p
an
y 
co
m
p
et
en
ci
es
C
o
m
p
an
y 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
st
ru
ct
u
re
D
e
m
an
d
P
ri
ce
s
Su
p
p
ly
G
o
ve
rn
m
e
nt
o
ff
ic
ia
ls
Se
lf
 in
te
re
st
s
B
o
ar
d
o
f d
ir
e
ct
or
s
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 m
ar
ke
ts
Em
p
lo
ye
e
s
Th
e
 S
e
lle
r’
s
si
tu
at
io
n
C
o
n
so
lid
at
e
d
P
ap
e
rs
’ 
co
m
p
e
ti
ti
ve
p
o
si
ti
o
n
Th
e
 O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
al
an
d
 
st
ra
te
gi
c
in
te
gr
at
io
n
 o
f 
SE
N
A
M
ar
ke
t D
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t
P
u
lp
 a
n
d
 P
ap
e
r
in
d
u
st
ry
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Ex
te
rn
al
, i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t 
as
su
m
p
ti
o
n
s
C
h
o
ic
e
 o
f M
&
A
 a
s 
a 
st
ra
te
gi
c
co
u
rs
e
o
f 
ac
ti
o
n
C
h
o
ic
e
 o
f b
u
si
n
e
ss
 /
 
ge
o
gr
ap
h
ic
ar
e
a
C
h
o
ic
e
 o
f s
p
e
ci
fi
c
ta
rg
e
t
Su
p
p
li
e
rs
/ 
R
e
so
ur
ce
s
K
e
y 
Le
ss
o
n
s
Fa
ilu
re
to
 f
o
re
se
e
tu
rn
in
g 
o
f 
th
e
 c
yc
le
Fa
ilu
re
to
 r
e
co
gn
is
e
co
m
p
e
ti
ti
ve
th
re
at
p
o
se
d
b
y 
A
si
an
co
m
p
e
ti
to
rs
O
ve
rc
o
n
fi
d
e
n
ce
in
 
ab
ili
ty
to
 t
u
rn
C
o
n
so
lid
at
e
d
P
ap
e
rs
ar
o
u
n
d
Fa
ilu
re
to
 f
o
re
se
e
su
ch
st
ro
n
g 
w
e
ak
e
n
in
g
o
f 
 
th
e
 U
S 
d
o
lla
r
 13 
 
2.6.1. Derivation of results 
The interview transcripts were used primarily for filling out the assumption framework 
presented earlier. Interview answers were complied by theme (open coding), compared and 
contrast with each other. Differences in answers were sought, and then a balanced view of 
each theme was conjectured. Based on these compilations, a list of assumptions made by 
Stora Enso management was derived. These include both explicit statements of the 
interviewees and some assumptions which the author has read “between the lines”. The 
assumptions, however, were verified using literary data as far as possible. The research 
question “Why did Stora Enso acquire Consolidated Papers in 2000?” could be answered by 
looking at the assumptions made by management, because they include the benefits sought 
after with the acquisition. 
After filling out the framework with the assumptions made by Stora Enso management with 
respect to the Consolidated Papers acquisition, the assumptions listed were followed up on. 
The interview transcripts were re-read and analyzed to find evidence on whether the 
assumptions turned out correct. Other sources of data were also used to verify information 
given by interviewees in the interviews. 
2.6.2. Drawing conclusions from results 
It is important to try to verify where these assumptions came from. Part of the interview 
questions were aimed at finding out what influences management had been subject to, and 
what the role of outside advisers, for example, has been. Thus the analysis part includes an 
assessment of what factors have affected management cognition in this case. 
The assumptions found were not independent from each other, but rather, a certain event 
could affect the correctness of several assumptions. Therefore it was important to analyze 
their interrelations and effect on the valuation of the target company. The assumptions were 
grouped into five “chains” based on the author‟s judgment. These chains had assumptions 
that were inter-related, resulting in a dynamic model that describes the cross-influence of the 
assumptions. Based on this analysis, we could conclude which the most critical assumptions 
that caused the difference between the price paid and the real value of the target company 
were. Hence we could answer the research question, “What factors hindered attaining the 
preconceived benefits of the 2000 Stora Enso acquisition of Consolidated Papers?” This led 
us to a list of four key lessons – What developments did Stora Enso management fail to 
foresee in deciding to acquire Consolidated Papers. 
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3. The Stora Enso acquisition of Consolidated Papers – How did it 
happen? 
 
In this section, the historical events related to the acquisition are presented by looking at the 
situation of both the buyer and the seller before the acquisition, reviewing the acquisition 
process and subsequent developments that ultimately led to the divestment of Stora Enso’s 
North American operations. 
To begin assessing the acquisition, it is first important to understand how the events related to 
it unfolded. The following historical narrative of events has been compiled both based on 
interviews with contemporary Stora Enso management, the chairman of the seller, and 
several advisers of Stora Enso. In addition, Stora Enso annual reports and SEC filings filed in 
conjunction with the acquisition have been used. 
 
3.1. Stora Enso’s background in going to the deal 
According to interviews, the process of expanding to the United States became a relevant 
question after the Stora – Enso merger that had been concluded in 1998. Stora Enso was now 
a major player globally in the P&P industry. Growth was expected and necessary, however, 
organic growth through greenfield investments was largely deemed impossible because Stora 
Enso‟s main markets were already filled with capacity. Growth in Europe through M&A was 
difficult because that would lead to market share growing too large and potential anti-trust 
action. North America was the world‟s largest paper market, but Stora Enso had only one 
factory there including a recently opened SC mill that was inherited from Stora. In addition, 
Stora Enso had exports to the United States as well. Stora Enso was now financially also such 
a strong player, that a large acquisition was finally possible.
1
 Stora Enso‟s strategy of growth 
through M&A was publicly stated. A good example is Stora Enso‟s annual report dated 10 
February 1999 where Jukka Härmälä wrote: “To keep pace with forest industry 
consolidation, the leading players must continue to expand their size in the future. Much of 
this growth will come through acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances.”2 
Stora Enso management agreed that expanding to North America should be further 
investigated and hence formed a strategy team to explore it. This included looking at different 
paper grades, assessing market outlook in each and doing studies on what potential options 
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there were to acquire. This strategy work concluded that printing papers still showed growth, 
as they were strongly linked to economic activity and marketing, which were booming as a 
result of the ongoing IT boom. Stora Enso did preliminary studies with several investment 
banks regarding ideas on which players could be acquired and what the strategic rationale 
would be in each of them.
3
 In addition, Stora Enso had a study done with a management 
consultancy on what the technical condition of various US market players was. These studies 
showed that Consolidated Papers was the best fit for Stora Enso, with other options including 
Donohue, Champion and Mead Westvaco.
4
 Other options also included buying independent 
factories and putting them together, but this option was not considered a quick enough way of 
getting a foothold in the US market and attaining global synergies. Greenfield investments in 
the mature US market were also considered impossible, as market share would have had to be 
fought for using price, and because of the big risks. Stora Enso‟s previous experiences with 
Eurocan in Canada had a negative effect on that option in the minds of managers who had 
lived through that stage. 
Stora Enso management brought up acquiring a company in the US with the board in early 
2000. The board was hesitant to make another move because many members thought that the 
company needed more time to properly digest the Stora Enso merger.
5
 Yet, management 
convinced them that buying a company in the US would be the right strategic action to take. 
Stora Enso made an offer for other paper industry companies in North America, including 
Donohue in the beginning of 2000. Donohue, however, was acquired by Abitibi-Consolidated 
in a deal published on February 11, 2000, as Stora Enso‟s offer had not been sufficient.6 The 
Donohue offer had been made without consulting the board and had been made subject to 
board approval.
7
 Then, in January 2000, Stora Enso was notified by Goldman Sachs 
representatives that Consolidated Papers, of which a large part was owned by George W. 
Mead and his family, was for sale. Stora Enso then hired Citibank as its adviser and decided 
to take part in the upcoming auction for the company. Stora Enso management also 
convinced the board that this was the right course of action.
8
 
3.2. The seller’s background in going to the deal 
According to an investment banker involved in the deal, Consolidated Papers had been 
considered the “crown jewel”9 of the US P&P industry. It had not been for sale, as its major 
owner, George W Mead was still actively in charge and had controlling interest. 
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According to an SEC filing done in conjunction with the acquisition, Consolidated Papers 
started considering its strategic options in late October and November 1999 together with 
Goldman Sachs investment bankers. Opportunities for acquisitions, dispositions and other 
strategic alliances were considered. 
Consolidated Papers‟ board considered a number of global paper industry trends, including 
the development of new low cost capacity, increased price volatility and customer and 
supplier consolidation. A wide range of options were reviewed, focusing particularly on 
whether the company should be an acquirer or should seek to be acquired by a larger 
company. Acquiring other companies was not deemed feasible because in the board‟s view, 
the company‟s stock was undervalued. After discussing alternatives, Consolidated Papers 
concluded that its value as an independent player probably wouldn‟t develop as well as if it 
were acquired. Hence ten major producers in the industry, who were deemed capable of 
attaining synergies from a merger and paying a significant premium were identified as 
potential buyers and were contacted by Goldman Sachs, following a decision to pursue this 
alternative on 4 January. 
10
 
 
3.3. The sale process 
Following an initial contact by Goldman Sachs, six companies expressed interest in buying 
Consolidated Papers. The chairman and president of Consolidated Papers met representatives 
of all these companies. Stora Enso was one of these six, and according to a Stora Enso 
management team interviewee, they had seen the party also visiting UPM headquarters. At 
this time, Stora Enso hired its own advisers in the deal, including Salomon Smith Barney 
(later Citibank) as the investment bank and Pöyry as a management consultant.
11
  
From January 19 through January 28, 2000, Consolidated management held meetings with 
interested parties, after which interested parties were invited to present bids based upon a 
proposed form of merger agreement by February 17, 2000. On February 17, 2000, 
Consolidated received two bids, one from Stora Enso and one from a “publicly-traded 
domestic paper manufacturer”. The other manufacturer's offer was fifty percent cash, fifty 
percent stock bid at a lower dollar value per share. Negotiations continued with both parties. 
The other bidder hinted that they could raise their offer, but never did so. Consolidated also 
tried to raise further the price offered by Stora Enso. Consolidated also asked for but did not 
receive the right to terminate the merger agreement if the value of Stora Enso Series R shares 
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fell below a minimum level. In the negotiations, however, the original terms of the merger 
offered by Stora Enso were accepted. This included buying the shares at $44 a share, with 
50% in cash, 50% in Stora Enso shares. This offer was worth $4,0 billion dollars in addition 
to which Stora Enso would assume $0,9 billion in debt.
12
 
During the deal negotiations, Stora Enso used several external advisers. Pöyry carried out an 
outside-in study of Consolidated Papers, assessing its technical condition and market position 
followed by a valuation which was done interactively with Stora Enso management. In 
addition, Stora Enso received advice from its advisory bank, Salomon Smith Barney (later 
Citibank). Stora Enso top management also heard rumors on the presence of competing 
bidders as well as the approximate levels of the competitors‟ bids.13 
There is some controversy over who the other bidders in the final rounds of bidding were. In 
the SEC filing, the other bidder was identified as an American pulp and paper industry 
player.
14
 According to some interviewed Stora Enso executives, this main other bidder was 
Mead Westvaco.
15
 A consultant familiar with the deal identified the other bidders as an even 
larger North American P&P player as well as a major Norwegian P&P player.
16
 At the time, 
Stora Enso management considered International Paper and UPM Kymmene as its most 
serious competitors. An interviewed UPM-Kymmene representative denied that UPM‟s 
interest in Consolidated Papers had been taken further than preliminary discussions.
17
 At 
Stora Enso, however, UPM was considered to be a serious potential competitor at the time, as 
the board had noted at a meeting that “International Paper and UPM-Kymmene could pay up 
to $47 a share”18 (Stora Enso‟s final offer was $44) 
At the same time, several other acquisitions were also ongoing. Stora Enso management was 
more or less aware of this activity. It turned out that UPM was in the process of buying 
Champion International, which Stora Enso had also identified as a possible target candidate. 
According to interviewees from both Stora Enso and UPM-Kymmene, the fact that the 
acquisitions were published only about a week apart from each other, with UPM being first, 
was a pure coincidence.
19
 It does, however, imply how “hot” M&A activity was in the 
industry at the time, and also gives insight as to why asset prices were so high – There was a 
lot of demand. 
The UPM- Champion merger never realized, however, because International Paper made a 
competing offer in May, 2000 after UPM had publicized the deal in February.
20
 UPM made a 
counter-offer, but after International Paper made its final offer, which was considerably 
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higher than UPM‟s original offer, UPM backed out from the deal and received $200 million 
in compensation because Champion had breached its exclusivity contract. The fact that 
International Paper came into the Champion picture only after the UPM-Champion and Stora 
Enso – Consolidated Papers deals had been made public allows for speculation that perhaps 
International Paper had also been interested in Consolidated Papers, but it had to set its sights 
on Champion after perhaps having lost the bidding war for Consolidated Papers to Stora 
Enso. 
Stora Enso management realized that the Consolidated Papers acquisition was expensive. The 
decision-making process, according to one former Stora Enso management team member was 
such that a core group of 5-6 top executives took care of the deal and did not discuss it 
extensively. The rest of the top management team learnt about the price more in an 
informative manner, rather than as a subject open for discussion. Overall, the top 
management team was not fully in favor of the deal, and according to a manager involved, 
the decision was brought even to the board of directors in a way which acknowledged that the 
deal is strategically beneficial, but its price is too high.
21
 The initially reluctant board, 
however, decided that this step should be taken. Interviewees were of differing opinion as to 
whether there was a sense of urgency in doing a deal right then when there seemed to be a lot 
of US P&P companies for sale. One interviewee claimed that the feeling was that since 
Consolidated Papers was the best option according to studies in terms of its reputation and 
technical condition, it was then or never.
22
 According to a source close to the board, the 
unsuccessful bid for Donohue only a month earlier had increased pressure among 
management to make a high enough offer.
23
 According to another manager, the offer put up 
for Consolidated Papers was the highest that they could justify
24
 and it was considerably 
higher than the independent valuation they had received.
25
 In fact, the price Stora Enso 
offered represented a 69% premium over Consolidated‟s market capitalization preceding the 
offer.
26
 According to an adviser close to the deal, Stora Enso‟s offer was not significantly 
above the next best offer.
27
 
There is controversy over the attitude of the board towards the Consolidated Papers 
acquisition. According to a management interviewee, who also served on the board, the 
decision whether or not to expand in North America was not neutral. Since the other option 
was to divest the Nova Scotia factory which had just been ceremoniously opened in 1998 by 
Stora, the Swedish board members “didn’t require a lot of persuasion” to approve going 
forward with the planning of acquisitions.
28
 According to some management interviewees, 
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the board had been strongly in favor of the acquisition
29
, while newspaper articles and other 
discussions claim that the board had had widespread concern also about the price, the 
truthfulness of the strategic benefits and the ability of the company to absorb such a large 
acquisition when the Stora – Enso merger was still being completed.30. The chairman of the 
board had actually lectured in general terms about the dangers and possibilities of failures of 
acquisitions in the US.
31
 The CEO had attempted to reassure himself of the decision by 
discussing with a famed P&P equity analyst right before deciding on the offer. He had 
concluded that the strategic move is correct, the price is high, but that ultimately the deal is a 
risk worth taking.
32
 Ultimately the board was also convinced likewise and the offer was 
unanimously accepted
33
. 
Hence, on February 22 2000, Stora Enso announced its tender offer for Consolidated Papers 
at a price of $44 per share, or a total of $3,9 billion in addition to $0,9 billion in assumed 
debt. Of the equity price, 50% was offered in cash, and 50% in Stora Enso ADRs which were 
to be listed in the New York Stock exchange as a result of the transaction.
34
 Stora Enso‟s 
share dropped 15% on the day of the announcement, and the deal was considered expensive 
in the press. Overall, however, the decision was treated rather positively in the media. 
The deal was concluded on 31 August 2000. By this time, Stora Enso‟s share had fallen to a 
lower level than in February, and the final equity price was $3,6 billion in addition to around 
$0,8 billion in assumed debt.
35
 Stora Enso gave Consolidated shares that represented 18 % of 
economic interest and 5 % of votes. George W Mead, who became a significant owner in 
Stora Enso, also became a member of the Stora Enso board.
36
 
 
3.4. The Integration process 
Interviewees agreed that the integration of the two organizations went well. Immediately after 
the deal was announced, Stora Enso appointed a five-member “merger operations team”, to 
oversee pre-integration before the deal is concluded.
37
 
In September 2000, when the deal had been closed, Consolidated Papers and Stora Enso‟s 
existing mill in Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, were merged to form Stora Enso North 
America (SENA), a separate legal entity. A management team headed by Kai Korhonen, 
formerly the head of the Newsprint division, and a board of directors, chaired by Jukka 
Härmälä, were appointed to govern SENA.  
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As Stora Enso‟s presence in North America had been limited, there was little to integrate 
apart from marketing and sales offices, logistics from Stora Enso‟s limited exports as well as 
some administrative functions.
38
 The success of post-merger integration in this sense can be 
measured in terms of SENA‟s market share in the North American market, which it managed 
to increase during its first years of operation.
39
 Greater synergies, however, were expected to 
arise from synergies with customers who operated globally. Stora Enso expected to be able to 
optimize its deliveries by producing at the most beneficial place at each given time. In this 
sense, the acquisition could be thought of as a natural hedge against fluctuations in the US 
dollar / euro exchange rate.
40
 In trans-Atlantic profit optimization, however, one interviewee, 
who had been part of the SENA management team, claimed that Stora Enso was not 
successful.
41
 Customers on the East Coast, for example, were reluctant to accept paper 
produced in Europe, as they were used to paper produced in the Midwest by Consolidated 
Papers.
42
 
Customer relationships with global customers did not become as global as expected even 
though customers continued to consolidate their sourcing into global sourcing organizations. 
Orders remained at a local level and hence Stora Enso did not gain the global synergies it had 
attempted obtain.
43
 
 
3.5. Market development 
2000 and 2001 were still reasonably good years for Stora Enso. In 2001, however, the IT 
bubble burst, causing trouble for the IT industry, which was a major advertiser. The economy 
in general went into a recession as well between 2001 and 2003. The result was weakening 
paper demand and falling prices. At first Stora Enso managed to gain market share, but with 
lower prices, profitability was severely hit. In 2001 and 2002, cash flows were still positive, 
but earnings margins were negative due to the heavy burden caused by the high purchasing 
price of Consolidated Papers. 
During 2001-2002, Stora Enso concentrated on integrating sales and marketing forces in 
Northern America and rationalizing production. As prices dropped even further, and no signs 
of improvement were in sight, Stora Enso decided to make a large impairment charge on its 
SENA arm, by writing off  $1,2 billion of SENA‟s book value.44 This also marked the start of 
a major restructuring of SENA, which included closing down unproductive mills, radically 
reducing the number of employees and investing in mills with brighter prospects. These 
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investments caused a lot of down time and onetime restructuring costs, which caused even 
cash flow to be negative in 2003 and 2004.
45
 
Growing the North American platform was a goal, and the North American management 
team constantly searched new acquisition targets through which the original value creation 
idea of buying Consolidated Papers could be realized. By buying more capacity, the company 
could have created greater synergies and cut costs more aggressively. Asset prices, however, 
were deemed unrealistic. According to a Stora Enso North America management team 
member, asset prices still reflected old benchmarks, and were almost at the levels of the 
Consolidated acquisition. Hence no acquisition targets were found.
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Markets started to improve in 2003, and prices started to recover. This enabled SENA to 
produce positive cash flows from 2005 onwards. According to an interviewee, 2005 was a 
year where results were already satisfactory. In 2007, Stora Enso‟s CEO Jukka Härmälä 
retired and was replaced by Jouko Karvinen in March 2007. Under Karvinen, SENA was first 
separated as its own reporting entity, and then quickly divested to NewPage corporation, a 
private equity-owned coated and fine paper producer that had been formed from Mead 
Westvaco. The SENA divestment was completed by the beginning of 2008.
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Although the divestment and specific factors that led to the decision are out of the scope of 
this study, it is worth mentioning that the management interviewees involved in the 
acquisition mostly disagreed with the decision to divest. In 2007, product prices were at good 
levels, and while the company‟s earnings were still close to zero, margins were at even better 
levels than at the time of acquisition. According to an interviewee who had previously 
worked in the SENA management team, the company would have required a couple of years 
of hard work, where costs would have been pursued with a heavy hand, for the results of the 
major restructuring work ongoing since 2002 to start showing. The company was, according 
to interviewees, in very good shape for American standards, and could have been able to 
compete well with other American players such as its acquirer NewPage. 
On the other hand, 2007 also marked the beginning of a severe crisis in the financial markets 
that ultimately led to a recession felt especially hard by the United States and Europe. 
Recovery from this recession is still ongoing at the time of writing and financial results have 
been poor during this time throughout the industry. This in turn suggests that selling SENA in 
2007 was a sensible action, as it enabled improving the company‟s financial position. 
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4. The merger assumptions framework and its literary background 
 
In this section, the framework developed for assessing the Stora Enso – Consolidated 
acquisition is presented. This is followed by a review of the theory behind corporate strategic 
decision making and forming assumptions in relation to mergers and acquisitions.  
In order to assess the success of the Stora Enso – Consolidated acquisition in a systematic 
way, we must decide upon a framework by which to conduct the analyses needed. Mergers 
and acquisitions involve a complex decision making process. In this section, the merger and 
acquisition assumption framework developed for carrying out this research is presented, after 
which relevant literature is reviewed. The literature review consists of three parts: managerial 
cognition literature, M&A literature, and studies specific to the pulp and paper industry 
M&A. 
 
 
Figure 3 Assumption framework - The stages of the M&A decision and the assumption 
dimensions 
 
Choice of M&A as a 
strategic course of 
action
Choice of business / 
geographic area
Choice of specific
target
Assumptions with relation to internal or external dimensions:
Internal characteristics
Assumed external stakeholder behaviour
Industry structure
Company competencies
Company Business Structure
Demand
Prices
Supply
Suppliers / Resources
Government Officials
Self interests
Board of directors
Employees
Financial markets
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A merger or acquisition is rarely a complete success or failure, but rather its success is 
determined by smaller elements. A good way to assess these smaller elements is to look at 
assumptions made by management when carrying out a deal, and later investigating whether 
they proved to be correct or not.  The framework of this research presented above in figure 1 
aims at capturing the complexities of the M&A decision making process. It looks at the 
different stages of the decision making process, and then at 12 dimensions, which aim at 
listing the different factors and stakeholders that should be taken into consideration when 
contemplating an M&A transaction. The framework looks at the assumptions made in each 
stage of the decision making process with respect to each of the dimensions. This provides a 
way to systematically assess the outcome of a deal.  
Looking at the multitude of different merger benefits sought, it is clear that there is no single 
archetype of a merger or acquisition. Hence, the framework may look different for each 
M&A case: All dimensions may not be relevant in every merger or acquisition, and a lot of 
assumptions made by corporate management might not be included in the assumptions found 
in literature. Some assumptions might be made deemed irrelevant at the time of decision 
making, but might later turn out to be decisive for the success of the M&A transaction. 
 
Figure 4 The relation of the assumption framework to M&A success or failure  
The above figure gives an idea on how the M&A assumption model relates to the overall 
success / failure of a merger or acquisition. The other factors listed (negotiation, integration 
and indirect assumption follow-up) all derive from the initial assumptions. They determine 
the price the acquirer is willing to pay, and the integration process itself is also an assumption 
– The acquirer assumes that the post-merger integration can be carried out in a certain 
fashion. 
Assessment of M&A as a strategic tool
and selecting the target
The direct assumptions made about
the environment and the target affect
the valuation of the target company
Negotiation of the acquisition deal:
The strength of theassumptions made
by acquirer management affect the 
valuation of the target company
Integration process
Indirect assumptions made by management
Merger
success / 
failure
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In the following sections, the stages of the decision making process are conjectured through 
literature on managerial cognition. Examples of the significance of the dimensions are sought 
from M&A literature. 
 
4.1. The three stages of the decision making process 
 
Figure 5 The M&A process model at a high level 
The framework is separated into three different areas which reflect a hypothesis of the 
different stages involved in a deal. The reason for this split is that it enables dividing the 
assumptions made by management into these areas, and therefore facilitating the assessment 
of a merger and acquisition case. The different stages may or may not occur in chronological 
order. 
 The first area is the contemplation over whether a merger or acquisition is the right 
course of action.  
 The second part is the finding of a target in a certain geographical or business area.  
 The third part involves assessing the perceived benefits of merging with a particular 
target, which enable setting the appropriate bid.  
 After the merger comes post-merger integration and follow-up on actual market 
developments, which defines whether or not the deal brings the benefits intended. 
Usually this can be measured through the extent of value creation for existing 
shareholders of the acquiring company. 
 The order of the three decision making stages may vary. The region can be chosen 
first, after which a suitable target is searched, or a target may come on offer. In this 
case the company first assesses the target and then the benefits of a merger in that 
area, or the suitability of a merger in the first place. 
Managerial interpretation 
of environmental stimuli
Search for optimal 
solution and assessment
of mergerbenefits
Negotiation with 
potential target
companies
Post-acquisition market 
development and 
integration process –
Did the interpretation 
of environmental
stimuli turn out to be 
correct?
Outcome:
Strategic decision
to carry out M&A 
transaction
Does the M&A 
transaction 
create long-
term value for 
shareholders
Outcome:
Identification of an 
area in which to 
carry out M&A
Outcome:
A dea l with a 
certain target with 
certain terms
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Each stage of the model has a certain end result, which reflects management decisions during 
the stages. The aim of the literature review is to elaborate on how the decisions are arrived at, 
and which factors affect decision making. 
The basis of the model comes from Jemison and Sitkin (1986) who created an M&A process 
model (Figure 4) which assessed the factors that a manager must take into consideration 
before making a decision on an acquisition. These include strategic fit and organizational fit, 
which are assumptions a manager must make. Furthermore, Jemison and Sitkin propose 
considering the acquisition process as a factor, for example, how M&A tasks are divided 
among managers and the different aspects of a the transaction discussed, how secretive 
management must be about the transaction, how expectations are aligned between the buyer 
and the seller, and what the relationship will be between the buyer and the target‟s 
management after the deal. 
 
Figure 6 Jemison and Sitkin (1986) M&A process model 
 
But what influences how managers perceive these different choices and where do managerial 
assumptions come from? 
 
4.2. The effect of managers on corporate performance 
Managerial behavior and cognition have been widely studied. According to one school of 
thought, differences in managerial behavior and responses to the environment are crucial 
determinants of success. This is opposed to the population ecology-based view, according to 
which organizations are swept along by events and basically run themselves (see, e.g. Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977). As this study studies the behavior of top management, it is assumed that 
top management actions matter in determining the success of a company. 
 26 
 
Why are some companies able to adjust to changing circumstances while some do not 
survive? Barr et al. (1992) suggest that the ability for organizational renewal does not so 
much rely on whether managers are able to spot changes in their operating conditions, but on 
how those changes can be linked to corporate strategy and that linkage can be modified over 
time. Companies need to take actions that fit a changing environment. These actions are 
dependent on managerial cognition on causality and consist of three parts, each of which is 
reviewed in more detail: 
 Attention to changes in the environment 
 The interpretation of stimuli 
 The matching of perceived problems with solutions 
The factors that affect managerial cognition and the decision to a) carry out M&A as opposed 
to another strategic action b) choose a certain region or business area c) choose a certain 
target can be summarized into the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 7 The M&A process model – How the decision to carry out a merger or an 
acquisition is arrived at 
 
4.2.1. Attention to changes in the company environment 
According to the concept of bounded rationality, (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 
1963) each manager makes assumptions and decisions based on his or her subjective view of 
Managerial
perception of 
what the 
problem is and 
what strategic
action to take
State of the 
environment
and on going
change
Managerial
perception of 
what is going
on in the 
environment
Attention to 
environmental
changes
The 
interpretation of 
stimuli
The matching of 
perceived
problems with 
solutions
Managerial social capital
Managerial human capital
Managerial problem sensing
Company specific structures for scanning the environment
Industry specific factors
External advice
Assessment of M&A as a strategic
tool
Choosing a region / business area
Choosing a specific target
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reality. A manager‟s cognitive base for decisions consists of knowledge or assumptions about 
future events, knowledge of alternatives and knowledge of consequences of the alternatives. 
Managerial cognition has an influence on strategic decisions and outcomes, including 
responses to changes in the external environment. (Cyert and March, 1963) 
Decisions can also be affected by differences in the dynamic managerial capabilities of 
managers. (Adner and Helfat, 2003) These differences cause differing performance. This is 
opposed to the idea that the external environment would dictate managerial decisions and 
hence all corporate managers in the same industry would make the same decisions. Dynamic 
managerial capabilities consist of three elements that work together: 
 Managerial human capital, i.e. a manager‟s training and experience 
 Managerial social capital, i.e. The social ties a manager has both internally and 
externally. These ties may provide certain information from the outside, hence 
diversifying the manager‟s knowledge base.  This is generally deemed beneficial for 
decision making. 
 Managerial cognition, i.e. A manager‟s beliefs and mental models 
Empirical evidence suggests that differences in managerial cognition may lead to different 
strategic decisions and outcomes, which in turn generally reflect a need for change over time. 
(Adner and Helfat, 2003) 
Other factors that may affect cognition of the environment include: 
 Company specific formal structures for scanning the environment (Hambrick, 1982) 
 External interlocks (Carpenter, Westphal, 2001) 
 Presence of external advisers who may have differing interests in a project than 
corporate management (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986)  
Depending on these factors, management gets a certain view of the environment. Analyzing 
the preceding market situation and managerial interpretation of the market landscape before 
the transaction helps to answer the question why company management believes a merger or 
acquisition in a certain field or geographical area is a beneficial course of action, rather than 
some other strategic action or taking no action at all.  
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4.2.2. Interpretation of stimuli 
Problem sensing consists of noticing, interpreting and incorporating stimuli arising externally 
or internally. (Kieslerr and Sproul, 1982) Individuals have a limited capacity to deal with all 
the information in their environments and to process what they do perceive. (Miller, 1956, 
Simon, 1957) Problem sensing is therefore prone to errors that may be caused by several 
factors:  
 
Table 3 Propositions of social cognition together with associated likely errors 
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982) 
The mistakes managers make in interpreting stimuli can be attributed to their own 
backgrounds, motives and desire to see matters in a certain way. For organizations, this 
means that one should not blindly trust managers‟ insight and judgment as rationality is 
bounded and prone to errors. The key questions arising from Kiesler and Sproull (1982) is 
what environmental stimuli has management noticed, how have they been interpreted and 
furthermore, how have these interpretations been incorporated to corporate decision making. 
Cognition theory Likely errors in problem sensing
1
When managers actively infer causality, exaggeration and 
mono-causal reasoning will dominate their analyses
2
When managers infer causality, then environmental changes 
rather than the actions of the managers‟ organization will 
appear causal
Illusory correction, assume events are 
correlated that in fact are not because they are 
similar
3
When managers infer causality, then vivid events and 
fortuitous associations will overcontribute to causal 
explanations of environmental change
Illusory causation, Assume events are causal 
that in fact are not because they are focus of 
attention
4
Automatic search will influence causal inference based on the 
salience and frequency of events
5
Managers operate on mental representations of the world, 
and those representations are likely to be of historical 
environments rather than current ones
Gap creating, assume events did not occur 
that in fact did because they are schema 
irrelevant
6
Since managers best incorporate information that is mildly 
discrepant, major environmental changes are unlikely to be 
incorporated
Gap-filling, Assume events occured that in fact 
did not because they are schema relevant
7
Only if managers develope schemas for extreme 
environmental change will they be likely to incorporate 
extreme environmental effects
Ignoring overly discrepant information . Fail to 
code or store information that is extreme or 
highly surprising
8
When managers encounter information about the environment 
that confirms their beliefs, they will believe that information is 
diagnostic
9
When managers are heavily invested in any situation, they are 
relatively likely to discount information about environmental 
change detrimental to that situation
10
Only if managers are committed to operating within a rapidly 
changing social environment will they mentally incorporate 
information about extreme environmental events
Preference for ambiguous information - Prefer 
ambiguous information to avoid self-
deprecatory learning                        
Preference for self-enhancing information, fail 
to code or stroe self deprecatory information
Proposition
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4.2.3. The matching of perceived problems with solutions 
Finding solutions to the perceived problems may be affected by industry specific factors or 
issues such as imitation. 
Industry-wide shared beliefs rather than technology-based economic factors are key 
determinants of industry structure. In some industries, industry-wide common beliefs are 
present, while in others beliefs vary. Competitive factors and managerial cognition co-act in 
influencing beliefs and firm-level strategies. Furthermore, they cause performance 
differences within an industry. (Johnson and Hoopes, 2003) 
Sunk costs, or heavy capital investment, make companies less inclined to changing a strategic 
location. As the costs of changing a strategy increase, the more likely are companies to get 
“locked in” to a strategy. In such industries, differences between beliefs in different 
companies are larger, as a result of bounded rationality. In industries where changing costs 
and entry barriers are low, on the other hand, beliefs are highly similar. Socially constructed 
beliefs are not supported, and firms tend to converge to a shared set of „true beliefs‟. (Johnson 
and Hoopes, 2003) 
This research is particularly interesting for the pulp and paper industry, because it is a highly 
capital intensive industry. Having made a costly investment, such as an acquisition or 
opening a new production facility, managers are likely to stick to the belief that the strategic 
direction is correct even though contrary evidence emerges. In an industry with small entry 
barriers, however, companies are freer to experiment with different kinds of strategies until 
they find the “correct one”, which is then easily imitable by competitors. 
Lu (2002) found evidence for institutional isomorphism in market entry. In her study of 
Japanese foreign subsidiaries, later entrants tended to follow the entry mode patterns 
established by earlier entrants. Firms were found to exhibit consistency in entry mode choices 
across time. In addition, a firm's investment experience was found to moderate the effect of 
other institutions on entry mode choice. This is a relevant finding in this case, as Stora Enso 
was not the only foreign company trying to enter the US pulp and paper market at the time of 
the Consolidated Papers acquisition. It is therefore interesting to see if there is evidence of 
corporations imitating each others‟ strategy. 
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Based on these factors, management now has information on its strategic alternatives, which 
may be, for example, doing nothing, carrying out an M&A transaction, pursuing new 
opportunities through organic growth or R&D, among others. 
The important issues that arise from the reviewed literature are how managers attempt to scan 
their environment, and how emerging issues are analyzed. Are they analyzed using a rigorous 
analytical process, or do managers rely mostly on their intuition or previous experiences? 
Furthermore, when looking for solutions, how much time is spent on thinking about the 
implications of actions? Again do managers rely on their experience and intuition or seek 
further opinions from inside or outside the company? 
 
4.3. The assumptions made by management in the different stages of the decision 
making process 
In this section, the discussion focuses on assumptions that management makes in one of the 
three stages of contemplating an M&A decision. The framework, shown in figure 1, has been 
divided into 12 dimensions, which represent areas which have a significant effect on the 
decision to carry out an M&A transaction, but which can also have a significant effect on its 
success. First, each of the 12 dimensions is explained in further detail. Then, typical 
assumptions found in M&A literature related to each dimension are summarized into table. 
Thirdly, a table summarizing typical M&A assumptions specific to the pulp and paper 
industry is presented.  
4.3.1. General assumptions made in conjunction with mergers and acquisitions 
In addition to the specific dimensions, M&A literature includes general assumptions and 
classifications.  
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) classify takeover motives broadly into three categories– 
synergy, agency and hubris. Converting these into assumptions, synergy means that managers 
assume that the combined value of the two companies is greater than the sum of the values of 
the two companies on their own. This may be due to cost savings, sharing of best practices as 
well as increased sales opportunities enabled by a merger or acquisition. The synergy 
assumption relates mostly to the dimensions “industry structure”, “company competencies” 
and “company business structure”, described later on in further detail. Agency refers mostly 
to mergers carried out in order to bring benefit to acquiring company management – 
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Management therefore assumes that it will benefit from the merger itself. Hubris theories 
suggest that mergers and acquisitions result from management overconfidence in its ability to 
create value from mergers, causing systematic overpayment for target companies. These 
kinds of assumptions relate mostly to the dimension “company competences”. 
4.3.2. Internal factors 
The four first dimensions of the framework are classified as internal factors. They have to do 
with the industry‟s fundamentals and acquirer and target companies‟ internal characteristics. 
Industry structure means the fundamentals of the industry a company operates in. Important 
characteristics to consider can be, for example, whether the industry is dispersed or an 
oligopoly, or what the entry barriers are like.  For example, in a capital intensive industry, 
entry barriers can be high and size is often thought to bring benefit. 
Company competencies refer to the know-how located in the acquiring or target companies, 
and their fit with each other. Competencies can be, for example, the know-how the target or 
the acquirer has in technology in a certain area, in which case management could assume that 
sharing these competencies could create value. If the management team of the acquirer is 
experienced with acquisitions, they may assume that their experience will help in 
successfully carrying out future acquisitions as well. 
Company business structure refers to assumptions related to existing resources or 
organization of the acquirer and target companies. These can have to do with, for example, a 
company‟s product mix or the quality of the company‟s production assets. A related 
assumption might also be that a company with significant marketing facilities in Asia could 
be a beneficial target for an American company that is trying to sell more of its products in 
that particular region. 
Employee assumptions have mostly to do with their reaction to the deal and its potential 
consequences. Employee cooperation is crucial in mergers, and several mergers have been 
hindered when acquirer or target company employees or managers have become disgruntled. 
4.3.3. External factors 
In this section, the 8 dimensions classified as external factors are presented along with related 
findings from literature. External factors are ones that acquiring company management 
cannot directly control or influence, but have to be rather taken into consideration as givens. 
 32 
 
Demand-related assumptions are related to, for example, consumption trends for the 
company‟s products, customer behavior and reactions to the merger or acquisition in 
question. 
Price-related assumptions relate to the balance between demand and supply, and hence the 
development of the prices either as a result of the deal being contemplated or due to other 
factors. Price levels can be a significant determinant of merger success especially in capital 
intensive industries with high sunk costs.  
Supply-related assumptions involve the development of competition and their reactions to 
the deal being contemplated. An example of such an assumption would be that competitors 
will launch a price war against the acquirer if it buys a company in the competitors‟ home 
market. Supply related assumptions can also have to do with whether competitors are 
interested in buying the same target. 
Supplier / resource- related assumptions relate to, for example, the supply of a critical 
resource, or the increasing market power of suppliers. 
Government official- assumptions relate to the expected behavior of government agencies, 
such as, for example, anti-trust action or the expectation of trade-barriers for the acquirer or 
its competitors‟ products. 
Self interests relate to the self interests of the company‟s management. Such an assumption 
could be, for example, that the CEO‟s personal prestige in society will increase if the 
company he or she manages becomes bigger as a result of an M&A action. 
The board of directors dimension means assumptions about the expected behavior or 
opinions of the company‟s board, which usually makes the ultimate decision in larger 
acquisitions. Such an assumption could be, for example, that the board is in favor of 
acquisitions and hence the company‟s management may feel more secure about its own 
position if it offers to take on mergers and acquisitions. 
The financial markets dimension relates to the expected behavior or demands of financial 
markets. An assumption might be that, because markets seem favorable towards 
consolidation in the industry, a company‟s share price will rise as a result of an announced 
acquisition. Hence, the company‟s management may feel more secure about their positions. 
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4.4. Summary of merger and acquisition assumptions found in literature 
In order to fill in the assumption framework with typical merger assumptions found in 
literature, three areas of mergers and acquisitions literature have been looked at: 
 Merger motives. This area of strategic management studies the explicit motives 
managers have when they carry out an M&A transaction. It assesses the benefits that 
are sought after. Knowledge on what is typically sought after in mergers will help in 
developing interview questionnaires later on. 
 Factors in the acquirer companies that make them prone to M&A activity. This field 
looks at managers and structural issues to see whether there are certain factors that 
make companies more prone to M&A activity than others. The presence of these 
factors affects management assumptions about their external environment and will 
also be tested for in the interviews. 
 Merger success factors. This field looks at whether there are certain features in merger 
deals that make them more likely to be successful than others. This field is looked at 
in order to test the case acquisition for the presence of these factors. 
Many academic fields have studied mergers and acquisitions because they are very important 
economic phenomena. These fields include finance, strategic management, corporate 
governance, organizational sciences, sociology etc.
48
 For our purposes, the amount of 
literature to be looked at has had to be significantly narrowed down. 
The themes relevant to this case have been identified by looking at comprehensive M&A 
literature reviews such as Parvinen (2003) Furthermore, articles have been sought after by 
looking in scientific search engines such as Google scholar using key words, such as “merger 
motives”, “merger benefits”, “mergers and cognition” etc. 
Assumptions found in literature have been summarized into the table below, which follows 
the order of the M&A assumptions framework developed, shown in figure 1. The formulation 
of the assumption answers the questions “What does management need to believe in order to 
want to make an M&A transaction?”  
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Table 4 M&A assumptions found in literature 
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4.5. Pulp and Paper industry specific motives for mergers 
In this section, the review of general merger assumptions is narrowed down to literature that 
specifically studies the pulp and paper industry. The assumption framework is filled in 
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assumptions necessary for carrying out an M&A transaction are depicted in the following 
table. 
 
 
Table 5 Typical M&A assumptions in the pulp and paper industry 
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5. Results: Assumptions made by Stora Enso Management 
 
In this section, results of the research are presented by explaining the assumptions made by 
Stora Enso management at the time of the Consolidated deal and following up on whether 
they proved correct or not.This is followed by discussion on where the assumptions made by 
management have come from and why. 
The assumptions found have been divided according to the M&A assumption framework 
,presented in the previous chapter, into three parts. The first assumptions are the ones that led 
to the conclusion that M&A is the correct strategic choice. The second group consists of the 
assumptions that the correct market for M&A is North America. Finally, the third group 
consists of assumptions which resulted in the choice of Consolidated as the best target. Each 
assumption is coded according to which dimension it touches upon and whether it proved 
correct or not. 
While stating whether an assumption proved correct or not is not always clear-cut, the color 
coding depicts their general correctness – If the assumption proved correct, it has been 
marked green, if it failed, it has been colored in red. 
5.1. Assumptions made about mergers and acquisitions as a strategic move 
 
Figure 8 The assumptions about M&A as a strategic course of action made by Stora 
Enso management. While stating whether an assumption proved correct or not is not 
always clear-cut, the color coding depicts their general correctness – If the assumption 
proved correct, it is marked green, if it failed, it is colored in red. 
Assumptions made 
about M&A as a strategic course of action
Economies of scale and scope yield competitive advantage in the 
industry
The P&P industry is consolidating with big players increasing 
market share
M&A are preferential to greenfield investments because 
the risk is smaller
Stora Enso had vast competency within  the organization in 
pulling mergers through
Customers are becoming bigger and bigger, and they negotiate 
with fewer suppliers
The owners and board of directors are in favor of STE’s growth 
strategy through M&A
Value creation demands growth
2001 marked the end of the consolidation trend for 
now
With declining prices and falling US dollar, greenfield 
would have made markets worse
Operational integration of CPI went well
Customers became larger, but still kept many 
suppliers onboard
Yes, to begin with but later board rejected global 
strategy and divested SENA
M&As in the industry have generally not proven to be 
very successful
Examples of both large and small successful 
companies exist
Did hold
Did not hold
Assumption Dimension Outcome
Industry Structure
Industry Structure
Industry 
Structure, Prices
Company 
competencies
Demand, Supply
Board of directors
Industry Structure
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5.1.1. Economies of scale and scope yield competitive advantage in the pulp and 
paper industry 
Dimension: Industry structure 
Result: Undecided, as examples of both small and large companies exist 
Investments in the pulp and paper industry are capital intensive and they are always risky. 
According to a Stora Enso management interviewee: “a bigger player is better able to 
tolerate large investments, where it takes a long time to build capacity and enter a market. 
Hence there are long periods with no cash flow.”49 As an example he mentioned Enso‟s 
greenfield investment in Eastern Germany right after the reunification of Germany, Sachsen 
Papier, which “almost took us under”50. According to another  interviewee: You need to be 
big, if you’re global then your big and then you can take on major decisions that would be 
too risky if you were too small.
51
  If the investing company does not have the stability brought 
by size, risky but potentially profitable investments are impossible.
52
 
According to other Stora Enso management interviewees, “Enso or Stora would not have 
gone to the US alone”53 . The merger between Stora and Enso had created a company with 
sufficient size to handle an acquisition in the United States as large as the Consolidated 
Papers deal. For a smaller company, such as acquisition would not have been possible. 
54
 
Stora Enso management thought at the time that large players would be successful in the 
industry in the future, while smaller ones would be left behind. Stora Enso was already 
perhaps Europe‟s largest player in the industry at the time, but did not have a production 
foothold in the United States.
55
 Management thought that the company was large enough to 
try and build a strong player in the United States. This would be done by first acquiring a 
foothold, as it did through the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, and then by strengthening 
it through further M&A transactions. Plans of further acquisitions existed for several years 
after the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, although the plans never realized.
56
 
Stora Enso‟s thinking on the question of size is well depicted in the following investor 
presentation slide from 2004: 
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Figure 9 Stora Enso investor presentation slide from 12 March 2004.
57
 
There are several statements on the benefits of size in the above exhibit.  They mostly have to 
do with market power (as customers grow bigger, a bigger actor has more flexibility in many 
respects), economies of scope (production can be more disciplined, mill specialization 
becomes possible), economies of scale (economies of scale, big company have the resources 
for innovation and asset restructuring) as well as risk tolerance. 
The assumptions on market power overlap with management assumptions on customer 
behavior, which will be covered in a section to follow. 
How good an analysis of the real situation this assumption was is a large fundamental 
question in the pulp and paper industry. There are examples of successful companies both 
large and small. At the moment, when the industry is in trouble, it seems that most of the big 
players (i.e. Stora Enso, UPM-Kymmene, and International Paper etc.) are in a good position 
to survive the crisis.
58
 Other big players, meanwhile, have suffered severely. These include 
companies who have previously engaged in mergers, such as Abitibi Bowater or M-Real, 
which are struggling to survive.
59
 On the other hand, a good example of a small but profitable 
newsprint company is Holmen. It is clear, however, that many of the consolidating actions 
seen in the 2000 have not created value at least directly, with Stora Enso – Consolidated 
Papers and International Paper – Champion being two good examples. On the other hand, 
large companies are generally in a stronger position to survive as independent players 
 
46
Why “Big is Beautiful” in the Forest 
Products Industry
• Customers grow bigger
• Production can be more disciplined
• A bigger actor has more choices in all respects
• Big companies have the resources for innovation and 
asset restructuring 
• Mill specialization becomes possible
• Big companies can take the risks associated with 
geographical and/or businesswise expansion
• Economy of scale
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because the amount of potential buyers is more limited. An adviser to Stora Enso in the case 
acquisition, for example, was of the opinion that without acquiring Consolidated Papers, 
Stora Enso would have remained such a small company that it would have been prone to be 
acquired.
60
 
5.1.2. The pulp and paper industry is consolidating, with big players increasing 
their market share 
Dimension: Industry Structure 
Result: Incorrect, as 2001 marked the end of the consolidation trend for now 
In the year 2000, the ongoing trend was that the pulp and paper industry was becoming 
global.
61
 This led to more M&A transactions that increased the international presence of pulp 
and paper industry players. This is shown clearly in Stora Enso‟s investor presentation at the 
time of the Consolidated deal, where one of the key rationales presented to support the deal 
was the ability to serve global customers.
62
 In addition to increasing global reach, companies 
were seeking increased efficiency through size. One Stora Enso management interviewee 
showed a slide (Figure 9) done by Jaakko Pöyry Consulting, which in 2001 predicted the 
market share of the world‟s top five paper producers to grow significantly by 2005. 
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Figure 10 Stora Enso management slide from 2001 provided by an interviewee
63
 
 
In a contemporary research article studying the future of the industry, Seppälä (2000) 
suggested that the globalization of the industry was proceeding at a high speed. Factors that 
facilitated this development were, for example, moderate transportation costs, diminishing 
trade barriers as well as freer movement of capital. Knowledge transfer had also become 
easier, showing in the decreasing of the knowledge gap between different countries in pulp 
and paper technology. 
Stora Enso, however, was already so large that its growth options in Europe were becoming 
limited.
64
 Therefore it had to reach for other continents. Other players, however, continued to 
reorganize the industry in Europe for a couple of years. UPM-Kymmene and Norske Skog, 
for example, acquired Haindl of Germany in 2001.
65
 Since then, however, the trend of 
regional consolidation in Europe, but also cross-continent mergers has significantly slowed 
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down. Companies have not wanted to invest in a declining market.
66
 According to several 
interviewees, it seems like the leading companies are waiting for weaker competitors to go 
bankrupt and be forced to sell their best assets.
67
 
The reversal of the global consolidation trend is partly evident also in Stora Enso‟s decision 
to divest its North American business. In an interviewee given shortly before the divestment 
of SENA, Stora Enso‟s CEO Jouko Karvinen said: 
”Only a small part of Stora Enso’s customers operate globally. Production sites, costs and 
raw material are local, not counting Veracel [Stora Enso’s Brazilian operation]. That is why 
the company’s size or its global market share are not that important now.”68 
 After seven years of ownership, Stora Enso divested its North American subsidiary in 2007. 
This consisted of Consolidated Papers and Stora‟s old Port Hawkesbury mill in Canada. In 
conjunction with announcing this deal, Stora Enso‟s new CEO was quoted saying that “this is 
not a global business”69, which is totally contradictory to research conducted in 2000, as well 
as the several cross-border M&A transactions that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
divestment of SENA, on the other hand, enabled the creation of a truly large player in the 
North American market, NewPage. This action was a major consolidation event in the 
industry, which has otherwise seen very few large mergers in recent years. 
5.1.3. Value creation demands growth 
Dimension: Industry structure 
Result: Recent M&As in the industry have generally not proven to be very successful 
In response to why growth was so important, a management interviewee said: 
”Creating value depends on there being also growth. It isn’t enough to pay down debt. This 
was a thought supported by the owners as well. Also, all valuation formulas, even basic ones 
require a growth factor”70. 
Another management interviewee said that in retrospect Stora Enso had been criticized for 
allegedly looking only at growth, no matter what the cost, however, he commented that 
growth also had to be profitable.
71
 
This assumption is closely linked to the question of whether size is beneficial in the industry. 
As with that assumption, the answer is mixed – there are examples of both small and large 
pulp and paper companies that have been successful. Almost all paper manufacturers (not 
 43 
 
counting consumer tissue paper), however, have lately destroyed value, if their financial 
results are compared with their costs of capital.
72
 
a) Mergers and acquisitions are preferential to greenfield investments because the risk is 
smaller 
Dimension: Industry structure, prices 
Result: Yes, with a greenfield investment in the US, Stora Enso would probably have done 
even worse 
 
Stora Enso management deemed mergers and acquisitions to be a better way to grow than 
greenfield investments especially in Stora Enso‟s home markets which were mature. 
Management saw increasing signs of structural overcapacity in Europe. In the United States, 
minor growth was still expected, but it wasn‟t sufficient to warrant building new mills.73 
 According to a competitor expert, greenfield investments are always very expensive and 
risky because building a paper mill is not enough. One has to build the entire surrounding 
infrastructure, too. This takes a lot of time.
74
 According to Stora Enso management 
interviewees, greenfield investments in a mature market are difficult. To win market share, 
the new player has to compete with price to begin with, making it difficult to obtain good 
margins.
75
 Major paper mill investments in the United States have not been seen during the 
2000s.
76
 It seems reasonable to conclude that with a greenfield investment, Stora Enso might 
have done even worse. A good example of a previous greenfield investment in the United 
States that went badly for Finnish paper companies was the Eurocan project discussed in 
further detail in chapter 5.2.1. 
5.1.4. Customers are becoming bigger and bigger, and they negotiate with fewer 
and fewer suppliers. 
Customers will expect suppliers to offer “one stop shopping”, packaging different paper 
grades into single deals 
Dimension: Demand, Supply 
Result: Many customers became larger, but still kept several suppliers onboard. 
Several Stora Enso management interviewees noted that publishers, the paper industry‟s 
major customers, had experienced major consolidation, and were getting bigger. They were 
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also increasingly demanding global delivery under a single contract, instead of having local 
contracts in each region. 
”Our deals became increasingly such that once a year we’d meet in New York with News 
Corp. about their paper supplies to Hong Kong, Australia… I don’t know if it was their 
clever tactics, but they gave us the impression that they would very much appreciate it if we 
had local (US) production as well.” 77 
Many publishers would no longer “negotiate with producers with less than a million ton 
capacity”78. It was also assumed that deals would increasingly include several paper grades at 
once. This demanded that paper producers offer a variety of products.
79
 
According to a Stora Enso management interviewee, the acquisition of Consolidated helped 
Stora Enso gain access to sales to major customers it wouldn‟t otherwise have received. 
According to him, the company‟s global position helped to sell to US based customers in 
Europe, because these customers wanted to consolidate their supplier base. 
”Stora Enso had not really had any access to their (Global customers, such as Time Inc) 
European operations, but when we were present also in America, we managed to gain a 
proper foothold”80 
 While this is difficult to verify, because companies do not publish their customer specific 
sales volumes, other opinions about the matter exist as well. According to another 
management interviewee, the aforementioned was not true, but on the other hand Stora 
Enso‟s European production gained new customers in the United States through 
Consolidated‟s customer base. 
According to competitor interviewees, paper industry consolidation can also be a negative 
issue for customers: 
 “Size (of the paper company) isn’t always beneficial to the customer…Customers may have 
guidelines that state that only a certain amount of a critical resource may be purchased from 
one supplier, so in this sense growth can also turn against you”.81 
Many customers intended to make their purchasing more efficient by founding “global 
sourcing organizations”. In spite of this, however, some Stora Enso management interviewees 
claimed that major customers did not manage to consolidate their global purchases. 
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“The rationale of one stop shopping and global service was not a valid argument … small 
customers buy where ever it’s cheap. This is a commodity.”82 
The reason why purchasing did not become global was that, in spite of the signs, paper 
industry consolidation slowed down. In many places local competition did not disappear and 
continued to challenge global suppliers. Hence a competitive situation where global suppliers 
could compete against each other did not emerge, and competition for paper deliveries 
remained local.
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Some interviewees claimed, however, that the trend of customers consolidating their 
purchases is likely to continue. If this is the case, then Stora Enso can be said to have been 
too early in its globalization. When this view is combined with that of the competitor 
interviewees, however, one may question whether this trend will signify additional volumes 
for any players, or whether this will just mean a change in how deliveries are geographically 
distributed among competitors. 
5.1.5. Stora Enso had competency within the organization in successfully carrying 
out mergers  
Dimension: Company competencies 
Result: Yes, the operational integration of Consolidated Papers went well 
During the 1990s, both Stora and Enso had carried out several mergers and acquisitions. 
Stora Enso itself is the result of the 1998 merger between Stora Kopparbergs aktiebolaget, a 
Swedish pulp and paper company with a history that dates back to the 13
th
 century
84
, and 
Enso, a Finnish government controlled company, which itself had carried out a series of 
acquisitions during the major reorganization of the industry in Finland during the 1980s and 
1990s. (Lamberg, 2007) 
Earlier in its history, governmental influence was strong in Enso. The Finnish state still 
remained the largest stockholder in Stora Enso at the time of the Consolidated Papers 
acquisition.
85
 This influence is clearly visible in many of the company‟s actions, which have 
not always been purely based on maximizing profitability as one would expect from a purely 
private capital-driven enterprise. Lamberg (2007) “The mixing of business and politics has 
been a characteristic feature which has separated the government-owned wood-refining 
companies from other forestry blocs. Enso-Gutzeit‟s relationship with party politics has been 
a close one ever since it became government owned.” (Lamberg, 2007) 
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From the 1980s onwards, Enso took an active role in shaping the structure of the Finnish pulp 
and paper industry by taking part in several M&A transactions. The deals included taking 
over Ahlström‟s Varkaus mill in exchange for Enso-Gutzeit‟s metal industry assets, buying 
bankrupt Tampella‟s forest assets in 1993, but above all, the acquisition of state owned 
Veitsiluoto in 1995.
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Veitsiluoto had also invested for other reasons than maximizing profitability. An example of 
politically motivated, “socially responsible” investments was the Kemijärvi pulp mill87, built 
in the 1965. Stora Enso closed the mill with much public and political criticism in 2008. The 
original motives for the investment included reducing unemployment in Eastern Lapland.
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The drag caused by such inefficient investments and political influence on management 
subsided when first Pentti Salmi and later, in 1993, Jukka Härmälä became CEO. More 
thought was given to improving rates of return on investment, and the company was managed 
in a more market-oriented way. The result of the divestments of non-core assets and the 
strategic transactions Enso-Gutzeit took part in was that the company became a profitable 
business after the recession in the early 1990s. An example of this is that productivity, 
measured as turnover per employees, grew by over 125% during the 1990s. These efforts 
enabled merging Enso on equal terms with Swedish Stora Kopparbergs aktiebolaget in 1998. 
(Lamberg, 2007) 
Enso was an active player in shaping the industry at a European level. Major international 
investments included, for example, Enso‟s 1994 greenfield investment in Sachsen Papier in 
Eastern Germany, which produced specialty newsprint made from recycled fiber as raw 
material. This investment was complemented by the 1997 acquisition of a majority 
shareholding in E Holtzmann & Cie AG of Germany. This enabled Enso to take over 
responsibility of the company‟s business operations, while it gradually assumed a 100% stake 
in the company by October 1998. The Eilenburg investment and the Holtzmann acquisition 
were part of Enso‟s attempt to gain access to European recycled fiber and the related printing 
paper markets. By acquiring Holtzmann, Enso expected to gain synergies arising from 
consolidating its operations in Europe. These included the ability to purchase recycled fiber 
in vast quantities. (Lamberg, 2007) 
The main reason for the internationalization of Finnish pulp and paper companies, however, 
was to transfer production closer to the main customers. One rationale of this was to get 
around existing or anticipated trade barriers. In addition, Finnish companies started to 
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increasingly experience problems with sourcing timber from Finland, where there are a lot of 
forests, but forest growth is slow due to the cold climate. (Seppälä, 2000) Therefore, it was 
also important to gain access to Central Europe‟s vast sources of recycled fiber.89 
While Enso‟s cross-border acquisitions and investments transformed it into a major European 
player, Stora‟s experiences with M&A were not that positive. The 1990 acquisition of 
Feldtmühle, for example, was not seen in positive light by management interviewees. Nor 
were Stora‟s previous ventures in North America, which included the Port Hawkesbury mill 
that Stora Enso in the Enso and Stora merger. “Stora’s experiences of North America were 
not favorable, had never been.”90 The merger between Stora and Enso, however, was seen to 
be successful, both by Stora Enso‟s Finnish and Swedish management team members. 
Stora Enso‟s major strategic M&A actions are well depicted in the slide below: 
 
Figure 11 Stora Enso structural change, from 2001 management presentation, 
supplied by an interviewee
91
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Confidence in being able to carry through M&A transactions was clearly visible in the 
interviews with Stora Enso management interviewees. Previous experiences were mentioned 
in positive light by all five Stora Enso management interviewees, giving an impression that 
self reliance in acquisition competencies was really high. 
The largest international merger, the one between Stora and Enso in 1998, had been seen as a 
very big challenge. Despite the differences in business cultures and difficulties, the merger 
was seen to have been a success and calculated synergies had been exceeded.
92
 According to 
interviewees, these factors increased the confidence management had in their ability to pull 
large mergers through successfully, and in their minds, diminished the risks of failure. 
Management was confident that these skills would also help to pull though the Consolidated 
Papers merger and sent its “number one” team over to carry out the post-merger integration. 
According to all interviewees, the operational integration process went well, and major 
clashes with the Consolidated Papers organization were avoided, despite the drastic measures 
that were taken later to reduce capacity and increase operational efficiency. Overall, the team 
responsible for the PMI process had felt proud about their achievement, with the top 
management team also commending them for their successful work.
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“We got a good reaction from management and employees. We rationalized the company a 
lot without creating big problems and turmoil etc. and the company worked as such very 
well.”94 
The operational synergies resulting from the acquisition of Consolidated were estimated to be 
around $110 million a year. These synergies, however, were not realized.
95
 The main reason 
was “difficult market conditions that restricted productivity related gains” following the 
merger.
96
 In addition, there is some controversy over whether the strategic integration 
towards the customer end went well.
97
 
According to Burgelman and McKinney (2005) the phases of the post-merger integration 
process are the following: 
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Figure 12 Burgelman and McKinney's (2005) framework for the different stages of 
post-merger integration 
As seen, there is a clear distinction between operational and strategic integration. In this case, 
one interviewee involved with the integration process thought that the strategic benefits from 
the acquisition were not attained in the customer front. Deliveries from Europe and the 
United States to American customers were not optimized as had been planned, and customers 
also managed to take advantage of differences in sales cultures bringing margins down.  
Europe was Stora Enso‟s home market, whereas North America was a newer and less well 
known territory for the company, as previous acquisitions had mostly been done in Europe. 
This type of strategic integration had not been done before. While the operational (short-
term) integration went rather well, the strategic integration towards the customer end could 
have been done better. One reason was, according to an implementer interviewee, that giving 
equal management attention was more difficult because of operating in different time zones.
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Stora Enso management had trusted their abilities too much.  
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5.1.6. The owners and board of directors are in favor of Stora Enso’s growth 
strategy through mergers and acquisitions. 
Dimension: Board of directors 
Result: Yes, in the beginning, but by 2007, the view of the board had changed 
The general view of management was that Stora Enso‟s major shareholder, the Finnish 
Government, was rather indifferent to Stora Enso‟s strategic questions. It left both the 
running of the company and strategy to management. Stora Enso‟s Swedish institutional 
owners, the most important of which was Investor, and their representatives on the board, 
however, were interested in supported Stora Enso‟s strategy, which formally stated that 
mergers and acquisitions were a source of growth in the future. 
Both the chairman and CEO‟s letter in the 1999 annual report made references to M&A being 
an important source of growth. The chairman, Claes Dahlbäck stated: Stora Enso will 
continue to participate in the expected future consolidation of the forest products industry 
worldwide, while the CEO, Jukka Härmälä, stated: Opportunities for growth will be exploited 
through acquisitions, by seeking simultaneously financial strength and flexibility.
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Naturally, as in any deal of this size, the final decision to purchase Consolidated Papers was 
taken by the board and confirmed by an extraordinary general meeting. In Stora Enso‟s case, 
acceptance by the general meeting and the board were practically the same thing, as its two 
largest owners, the Finnish government and Investor had solid representation on the board 
and a majority of shares.
100
 
While seeking consolidation opportunities was a part of Stora Enso‟s strategy, the price of 
Consolidated Papers was a serious issue for the board of directors. Management was 
convinced that the acquisition was the right move, but convincing the board to pay such a 
hefty premium and take on such a large acquisition was not straightforward. 
According to a management team member who also served on the board:”These matters had 
been talked through in a strategy discussion and the growth strategy was very clear. No one 
challenged it, and in this case (the acquisition of Consolidated Papers) no one challenged it, 
except for the price. It caused a lot of thought, how will we manage with it (CPI, after having 
paid such a high price for it), but whether or not we had the right approach, no one 
challenged that.”101 
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Another management team member, who also served on the board, stated that: “the board 
agreed that this could be a good line of expansion but they also warned us that Nordic 
countries have had historically big problems in North America when they have expanded into 
that area, it’s a very difficult market and, we were told that.”102 
In the media, it has also been noted that especially the Wallenberg family (represented on the 
board by Marcus Wallenberg) were worried about the price of the acquisition.
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The board, however, also had concerns about taking on such a large acquisition in a relatively 
unknown market, when the merger between Stora and Enso that had taken place just two 
years earlier was still being digested. Most board members were not experts in the pulp and 
paper industry, and therefore, regarding industry trends and development, they had to rely on 
what management and their advisers told them. 
The board ultimately agreed to the deal because 
a) Management was convinced that after two years, the effect of the deal on the 
company‟s earnings per share would already be positive 
b) The company would receive significant synergies and strategic benefits 
c) The dilution of shareholdings would not be that great despite the diminished risk 
involved in paying partly with stock.
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d) Management had pushed hard, and in saying no, the board might have risked 
disgruntling management and weakening working relations, which is a common 
problem that boards must consider. 
In the end the board unanimously accepted the deal, but according to a source close to the 
board, the decision was “really not an easy ride. … it could as well have gone the other way 
around.”105  After deciding, the board naturally stood behind its decision portraying strongly 
that the deal is the right move.
106
 
According to media reports even straight after making the deal public, it seems that there is 
some controversy among management and the board of directors as to who the main 
supporters and skeptics of the deal were, and what issues had been raised in the decision 
making process. This debate has been further stirred by the will of some journalists to put the 
blame for the unsuccessful deal on someone. It seems that management was of the opinion 
that the board was strongly in favor of the Consolidated Papers acquisition, although the price 
had initially raised some concern. At the same time, the chairman of the board said he had 
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given lectures about the dangers of acquisitions in the United States.
107
 Many board members 
had warned management about the potential risks.
108
 One might ask if management had been 
so eager to carry out the deal, could they have misunderstood and downplayed the board‟s 
warnings and hesitation. 
During the ownership period, the pulp and paper market changed considerably, as can be seen 
in other sections of this research. The board of directors also experienced member turn-over. 
In 2007, only two members, Claes Dahlbäck and Marcus Wallenberg were still left from the 
board that had served in 2000. By 2007, the attitude of the board towards growth and 
consolidation as a primary means for value creation had changed. Many of the rationales that 
had convinced the board to accept buying Consolidated Papers had disappeared. The dollar 
had weakened and “there was no reason to have … global service presence”109 
According to a source close to the board, the board had realized that Consolidated Papers 
wasn‟t an asset they needed, and the decision to divest was rather straightforward.110  After 
the divestment, chairman Claes Dahlbäck said in the 2008 AGM about the decision to acquire 
Consolidated Papers: “... in hindsight this is undoubtedly the worst decision ever I have 
participated in. But surely, the decision to divest the North American business was the right 
one. The price we received was fair, as the market reaction at the time of the announcement 
indicated.”111 
Assessing the Consolidated acquisition later on, Dahlbäck said: ”It was a very bad deal, but 
several such deals were made in 2000. It was thought that the cycle would continue forever, it 
was a real super boom. We wanted to go to the United States to get good customers and 
because the dollar was high. But it was the wrong deal at the wrong price.”112 
The board‟s view on the company‟s strategy has changed dramatically during the period 
between 2000 and 2008, from one which was strongly in favor of acquisitions, to one which 
supports down-sizing the company and pulling out from its global stance. This has been a 
response to unsuitability of the old expansion strategy to a market which is contracting, and 
where customers are also in trouble. Price has become a more important issue, and the 
overcapacity in the market has ensured that paper is more of a commodity rather than a 
product where one can differentiate with global presence or “a one stop shop”. 
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5.2. Assumptions made when choosing the area where to carry the acquisition  
Figure 13 The assumptions about choice of business/geographic area in which to 
perform M&A made by Stora Enso management. While stating whether an assumption 
proved correct or not is not always clear-cut, the color coding depicts their general 
correctness – If the assumption proved correct, it is marked green, if it failed, it is 
colored in red. 
 
5.2.1. Enso’s previous experiences in the United States were completely different 
and previous mistakes are not relevant here. 
Dimension: Company competencies 
Result: Yes, problems with Stora Enso North America did not have to with location or with 
trade unions 
Consolidated Papers was not Stora Enso‟s first attempt to enter the North American market. 
In fact, Stora Enso already had a presence in North America through the Port Hawkesbury 
mill in Canada, which had been acquired to the company by Stora in the 1960s.
113
 Enso 
(previously Enso-Gutzeit before the acquisition of Veitsiluoto in 1996) also had experience in 
operating in North America. The first attempt to enter the North American market was 
Assumptions made about the US market 
as a region for M&A
Did hold
Did not hold
Unquantifiable
Assumption Dimension Outcome
Company 
competencies
Company business 
structure
Company business 
structure
Demand
Demand
Demand
Prices
Supply
Government 
officials
Government 
officials
Financial markets
Financial markets
Enso’s previous experiences in NA were different and mistakes 
irrelevant here
Having one paper mill in the US is useless
With a local mfg footprint, STE can optimize its deliveries from 
Europe
US magazine and fine paper markets are still growing, although 
growth is slowing down
STE’s biggest customers are American, and STE will benefit from 
being in their home market
The development of the IT industry has a positive effect on paper 
demand
LWC and CWF prices will remain at good levels for at least two 
years
The US competitive situation will not change markedly
Yes, problems with SENA did not have to do with 
location nor trade unions
Yes, the Port Hawkesbury mill would not have 
succeeded on its own due to poor location
Customers were used to receiving CPI paper, and 
did not want European paper
Growth stopped to a large extent when the IT 
bubble burst
Benefit difficult to quantify, but market share did 
grow in the beginning
Technological development has started to reduce 
paper consumption
Prices fell strongly beginning in 2001
Asian players entered the market, disrupting the 
balances between demand and supply
US govt will continue to set up trade barriers
Yes, strong Euro caused no need against Europe, but 
antidumping suits against Asians have been seen
STE could not expand through M&A in Europe due to antitrust 
regulation
True,, EU commission has limited M&A action in the 
industry
Listing in the US provides access  to a more efficient debt capital 
market
Yes, Stora Enso was readily offered credit
The dollar-euro rate will continue to fluctuate and local 
manufacturing presence will provide natural hedge
Yes, dollar-euro fluctuated, and strong Euro made 
American production competitive from 2005 onwards
Financial markets
Pulp and paper companies listed in the United States are worth 
more than their European counterparts 
The valuation gap diminished during the 2000s
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through the rather small Pineville Kraft Corporation in the 1960s – early 1970s, which 
produced kraft liner. Enso-Gutzeit held a minority position together with Tampella. After 
concluding that the project was not profitable enough, the ownership was divested in 1972. 
(Ahvenainen, 2006) 
Enso-Gutzeit‟s larger and more costly conquest in North America was the so-called Eurocan 
project, in Kitimati, British Columbia, which started in 1965 and ended in divestment in 
1993, when Jukka Härmälä was already the CEO. (Ahvenainen, 2006) Looking at this project 
is therefore of special interest as it is likely to have affected managerial cognition of 
operating in the North American market and has also given experience to the management 
team responsible seven years later for the Consolidated Papers acquisition. 
This Eurocan project was a joint effort by several Finnish paper companies to take advantage 
of North Western Canada‟s immense forest reserves and serve American customers. The 
Finnish consortium consisted originally of Enso-Gutzeit, Tampella, Myllykoski (which 
withdrew already in 1966) and Kymi. The consortium built a mill complex in Kitimati, North 
Western Canada, which produced sawn timber, newsprint and later also kraft paper. The plant 
also had its own pulp mill. At the time of construction, raw material was thought to cost only 
a fraction of what it did in Finland, although labor costs were much higher.  (Ahvenainen, 
2006) 
According to Ahvenainen (2006), however, the project was problem-ridden throughout its 
existence: 
Finding competent and committed managers for the factory was troublesome, as attracting 
people to work in such a remote location proved difficult. As a result, the company had many 
Finnish directors on a temporary basis, and a lot of manufacturing craftsmen also had to be 
moved in from Finland. (Ahvenainen, 2006) 
The mill experienced severe technical problems right from its opening in 1971. Subsequently 
production targets were not met, destroying the benefits of scale advantage. 
The price of timber rose significantly, while the prices of the mill‟s products in international 
markets declined, making profitable production impossible. This led to an enlargement plan 
in order to achieve greater economies of scale and scope. (Ahvenainen, 2006) 
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Sierilä (2006), furthermore, mentions that some of Eurocan‟s problems boiled down to 
differences in culture: Finns were not familiar with the differing government procedures and 
labor market practices in Canada compared to Finland. 
The troubles with Eurocan were worrying, as the company did not see one profitable year in 
the 1970s. One by one, the Finnish members of the founding consortium pulled out, leaving 
Enso-Gutzeit as the sole owner from 1979 to 1981, during which time the company was 
mildly profitable for the first time. In 1981, Enso-Gutzeit found a new partner in West Fraser 
Timber Co. Ltd, a Canadian saw mill company. Towards the late 80s, Eurocan saw again 
some successful years financially, but the two owners‟ interests were different. West Fraser 
timber was more interested in developing the Eurocan‟s saw mill operations, while Enso-
Gutzeit was more preoccupied with the troubled paper mill part. This caused trouble between 
the personal relations of the two companies‟ management. At the same time, Eurocan came 
under reputation-threatening pressure from environmentalist movements. In the early 1990s 
Enso-Gutzeit was more and more preoccupied with major investments in Europe and the 
severe ongoing recession, and subsequently decided to sell its share of the company to West 
Fraser. (Ahvenainen, 2006) The key question that arises from the Eurocan case is how Enso 
management saw North America as an operating environment after the immense trouble it 
had with Eurocan.  
Stora Enso management interviewees dismissed the problems related to Eurocan as having to 
do with previous management generations‟ poor planning and preparation, the fact that the 
project did not have single responsible owner and that the mill was at such an unfavorable 
location.
114
 In fact, several management team interviewees acclaimed the CEO, Jukka 
Härmälä, for the skilful work he did in divesting Enso‟s share in the company and getting a 
reasonably good price for it. 
”The sale of Kitimati was a great and skilful operation on the part of Enso. It was very 
important because we wouldn’t have managed to invest in Sachsen Papier without selling 
Kitimati. Sachsen is still a unit in operation today. It was a skilful sale because there was a 
company called West Fraser as a minority shareholder, and they started to see the possibility 
of there coming a Japanese or another partner coming in, so they were willing to buy the 
whole company. So we managed to sell it at decent price, enabling the creation of Sachsen 
Papier.”115 
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The Eurocan project clearly underlined the problem with greenfield investments in foreign 
markets. One interviewee claimed to have completed an extensive study in the 1990s on what 
could be learned from Eurocan and similar problems could be avoided in the future. The 
effect of the Eurocan experience may have, in part, strengthened the choice of M&A as the 
method to enter the North American market again. Indeed, the problems encountered with 
Consolidated Papers compared to those in Eurocan were very different, and were managed by 
different management generations. 
When comparing Eurocan and Stora Enso‟s other North American experiences, however, 
there is a striking similarity between Eurocan and Port Hawkesbury. Port Hawkesbury was a 
venture that was inherited from Stora Kopparbergs aktiebolaget. Stora Enso management 
interviewees dismissed the rationale of Port Hawkesbury in no uncertain terms.  
It seems that Port Hawkesbury was Stora‟s equivalent of Enso‟s Eurocan, although the paper 
grades produced were different. Both were greenfield operations in a foreign continent. They 
were in unfavorable locations logistically speaking. Both suffered from severe troubles with 
labor unions. Neither was hardly profitable.  
5.2.2. A single paper mill concept in North America does not work 
Dimension: Company business structure 
Result: Yes, the Port Hawkesbury mill would not have succeeded on its own due to poor 
location  
Before the acquisition of Consolidated, Stora Enso‟s Port Hawkesbury mill in Canada was 
not profitable and its prospects were seen as grim by management. It was therefore seen as a 
liability unless it could be complemented by enlarged operations in the continent. Both 
divestment and expansion options were on the table, but the view of Stora Enso management 
members was that since Port Hawkesbury had just been expanded by Stora before the Stora – 
Enso merger, it had sentimental value to Stora‟s side of owners. 
An interviewee stated: “The factory had just been opened, with the Swedes there … 
celebrating, so the discussion on the board was far from neutral. It didn’t require a lot of 
reasoning to why we should see the expansion option to the end”116 
The development of this assumption is difficult to measure. It would require speculating on 
an alternative set of events where Port Hawkesbury would have stayed as Stora Enso‟s only 
production facility in North America. What is known, however, is that the Port Hawkesbury 
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mill was unprofitable throughout the 2000s.
117
 One interviewee questioned Stora‟s decision 
to build a new SC paper mill there as late as 1998, despite the mill‟s unfavorable location. 
Relations with trade unions were also difficult, leading to a 10 month closure in of the mill in 
2005-2006 due to a labor dispute.
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 Despite being SENA‟s newest capacity, Stora Enso 
management interviewees claimed that it consistently produced negative cash flow.
119
 
Stora Enso management also contemplated the idea of building their North American 
foothold by buying smaller units, even individual paper mills. This method, however, was 
deemed too slow to attain any synergies or generate value, especially as the mills for sale 
tended to be of very poor quality. Building a cost-efficient enterprise would have been very 
difficult.
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Market-related assumptions 
Since demand, supply and prices are strongly interrelated, corresponding assumptions are 
best analyzed by looking at the market situation as a whole. The three market-related 
assumptions are therefore first listed and explained, and then the development of the market 
is reviewed.  The assumptions of market development are critical in assessing the success of 
the deal. When Stora Enso North America was divested, Stora Enso chairman Claes 
Dahlbäck, blamed misjudged projections both in the US market and the USD/euro exchange 
rate, which according to him, led to the failure of the acquisition.
121
 Several other 
interviewees also raised two critical factors above others – market price development and 
foreign exchange rates.  
5.2.3. The United States magazine and fine paper market is still growing, although 
growth is slowing (as opposed to newsprint) 
Dimension: Demand 
Result: No, Growth stopped to a large extent when the IT bubble burst  
The decline in demand for newsprint in North America was clearly foreseen by management 
in 1999. It was ruled out as a serious option. “Investing in a declining market is not a viable 
option.”122  Interestingly, Stora Enso did offer to buy newsprint maker Donohue right before 
the Consolidated acquisition, but according to a management interviewee: “I think we never 
really wanted to have (Donohue), I think we just marked an interest and hoped to get a 
bargain, because Canadian newsprint makers, we were quite aware that they weren’t the 
best.”123 On the other hand, Stora Enso‟s packaging business was too small for it to get a 
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“front row” seat in the US market. Magazine and fine paper were still seen as areas of minor 
growth, which made them a suitable area in which to acquire a foothold. 
124
 These 
assumptions of growth proved wrong. The true development of these markets is described in 
more detail in the following section. On the other hand, buying a different target would have 
had little effect as practically all US-based pulp and paper companies, with the exception of 
consumer tissue producers, have faced disappointing financial results during the 2000s.
125
 
5.2.4. The development of the IT industry has a positive effect on the demand of 
paper  
Dimension: Demand 
Result: No, technological development has started to reduce paper consumption  
The general belief in the paper industry during the IT boom was that IT development will 
increase demand for magazine and fine paper.
126
 Firstly, the industry was a big advertiser and 
secondly, its development was expected to keep up strong and sustainable growth in the 
economy, which had traditionally also meant increasing demand for paper because of a 
reasonably stable correlation between economic growth and paper demand growth. Stora 
Enso management therefore assumed there was still growth in the magazine and fine paper 
market, although they were part of a mature industry. Growth, in turn, would keep up good 
price levels. Stora Enso‟s view on global growth for the demand of paper is presented in the 
following investor presentation slide.  It has been prepared using data supplied by Pöyry 
consultants: 
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Figure 14 Stora Enso management's view on paper growth communicated to 
investors in an investor presentation on 14-17 March 2000
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5.2.5. The competitive situation in the United States will not change markedly 
Dimension: Supply  
Result: No, Asian players increasingly entered the market, disrupting the balances between 
demand and supply  
The acquisition of Consolidated Papers was not expected to affect the competitive situation in 
the US market. Asian players were small in the US market at the time of the acquisition, just 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Their imports were not expected to grow to 
become shapers of price. In the United States, the consolidation trend in the industry was 
expected to continue.  Because local capacity was, on average, regarded as having low asset 
quality, it was estimated that US players would not significantly improve their 
competitiveness either.
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5.2.6. LWC and CWF prices in the United States will continue to be at a good level 
for at least two years, after which they will dip somewhat.  
Dimension: Prices 
Result: No, Prices fell strongly beginning in 2001 
At the time of the acquisition, the European paper industry had seen very good levels of 
profit for a couple of years.
129
 At the same time, the world‟s stock markets were booming 
along with technology sector stocks.
130
 Optimism about continuing economic growth was 
widespread, according to management interviewees. 
When carrying out the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, Stora Enso management 
anticipated that good prices in LWC and CWF papers would continue to be at a good level 
for at least a couple of years. This was crucial for the profitability of the large investment 
done in North America, because applying a cost of capital on investment calculations means 
that cash flows from the first couple of years are proportionally very important.
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This optimism in the market can be seen in a Stora Enso investor presentation given on 
February 8, 2000.  
 
Magazine paper 
Stable demand for LWC and SC is expected to continue. 
Producers' inventories lower than in the 1Q. 
European new capacity is not expected to have any major impact on 
prices. 
 
Newsprint 
The outlook is good. 
Producers' inventories below normal. 
Supply and demand balance is expected to remain good. 
No further increases in recycled paper prices are anticipated. 
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Market Outlook 
 
Fine paper 
The market is expected to keep firm. 
Order stocks 5-6 weeks. 
Further price increases may be expected in uncoated fine paper in the 
autumn. 
Figure 15 Stora Enso investor presentation 8 February 2000, quoted in SEC 
databases
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How did the market develop in the United States between 2000 and 2007? 
Demand 
When Stora Enso announced the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, the magazine and fine 
paper market were booming. Soon after in 2001, however, the United States entered a mild 
recession, which brought down paper demand.
133
 After that until 2008, GDP continued to 
grow very strongly, but paper demand remained stagnant.
134
 Interestingly, this change in the 
relation between economic growth and paper demand occurred right at the time of the 
Consolidated acquisition. This was not recognized by Stora Enso management interviewees 
at the time of the interviews in late 2009 / early 2010 when asked whether something 
fundamental had changed in the relation between economic growth and paper consumption. 
The change was, however, mentioned by an investment banking adviser who said that IT had 
caused the megatrend in paper usage to start declining. When asked about whether Stora 
Enso strategists had expected the rising IT industry to cause a decrease in magazine and fine 
paper consumption through the growth of “e-services”, a management interviewee answered 
that they had consulted several experts on the matter, but that this development had not been 
foreseen.  
The change in the level of demand was clearly visible two years after the acquisition in Stora 
Enso‟s demand projections communicated to investors. (Figures 15 and 16) Paper 
consumption had fallen sharply due to the falling demand of the end products. 
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Figure 16 Stora Enso US market forecast, presented in an investor presentation 27 
August 2002
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Figure 17 Stora Enso investor presentation slide on end use market indicators from 
2002
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The bursting of the IT bubble was a major reason for the decline in demand of magazine and 
fine paper. It is clearly visible in US stock market and economic macro data: 
27 August 2002 Profit Enhancement Plan/JH/HA/Mik8
End use market indicators for 
publication papers
Change over previous year (%) 1999 2000 2001 2002E
Magazine Ad Pages 5.2 10.1 -11.5 -3.2
Commercial Printing 1.0 1.5 -3.3 -1.5
Printing & Publication -1.0 1.5 -4.8 -4.9
Catalogues Mailed 2.3 6.3 -2.3 -2.4
Following a sharp decline in 2001, the development for 2002 is 
continuing to be negative.
Source:  RISI
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 Figure 18 The Nasdaq composite stock index 1994-2007 The time of making the 
acquisition of Consolidated Papers public is market with a dot.
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As can be seen in the above picture, (figure 17) the acquisition was made public right before 
the peak of the Nasdaq, after which the technology bubble burst. Asset values have still not 
recovered to their 2000 levels. 
US GDP growth also stalled right soon after acquisition was announced: 
 
Figure 19 Seasonally adjusted quarterly US GDP growth rate (annual basis) 1997-
2007
138
  
As can be seen, the Consolidated Papers acquisition was bought on top of the cycle. The 
economy started to slow down already during the deal process. 
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Traditionally, GDP growth had been a good indicator of paper demand growth in the United 
States. The link between paper consumption and economic activity, and the capital intensity 
of the industry have also made the industry very cyclical. 
Stora Enso management believed that the fundamental connection between economic activity 
and paper consumption would continue in magazine and fine papers. They assumed that the 
rise of IT would continue to increase paper consumption in the form of advertising. These 
assumptions are well depicted in a study Stora Enso carried out with a management 
consultancy in 2003. 
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Figure 20 A Slide from a Stora Enso management investor presentation from 2004, 
which reflects Stora Enso management thinking that electronic media does not reduce 
paper usage
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In reality, however, electronic and internet based services, as well as trends such as “paper 
free office” and reading publications online have gradually reduced the demand for paper.140 
The chairman of Consolidated Papers stated the traditional mindset of the industry well in an 
e-mail written to the author, but also notes the fundamental change that did occur, but was 
left unnoticed by many for a long time: 
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“During my active years as a paper industry executive, the consumption of paper, especially 
printing papers, pretty much followed the general economy, i.e. the "GNP" (the Gross 
National Product). This normally grew about 3-4% per year. Coated printing papers, such as 
we made, did a little better, maybe by 0.5% or so. 
This leads to two results: there was room for growth overall, especially coated. And we 
would periodically suffer a temporary fall in business during a recession, or even a flat 
economy. Our customers were always looking for weakness where they could negotiate lower 
prices… But, up to 1999-2000, we always pulled out and returned to a growth pattern. The 
"dot.com" crash (which, like all crashes, was based on debt and speculation) was seen as 
temporary, like all the others previously. 
This time, however, we were all wrong; paper consumption in Europe and North America 
was going to continue to drop.”141 
This fundamental change was experienced in many paper grades. NewPage, the owner of 
what used to be Stora Enso North America supplied investors with the following graph, 
showing that in coated (fine) papers, demand has stagnated, and that growth stopped around 
the time of the Consolidated Papers acquisition: 
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Figure 21 The development of coated paper deliveries and value 1970-2008
142
 
NewPage‟s statistics also well depict how economic activity no longer necessarily means 
increasing paper advertising in magazines. The amount of advertisements is a key indicator of 
magazine paper sales. 
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Figure 22 A NewPage investor presentation showing how, despite economic growth in 
the 2000s, magazine advertising hasn't recovered properly from its 2001 fall
143
 
 
Stora Enso was not the only company who faced stagnant demand with its product portfolio. 
An International Paper investor presentation shows that the link between uncoated free sheet 
paper 
144
 (office paper, classified as fine paper, a paper grade SENA did not produce) and 
GDP was broken in 2000. 
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Figure 23 The relation between GDP and UFS purchases in the United States
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Looking at the consumption of paper grades a bit more broadly, one can also see stagnant or 
falling demand during these years: 
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Figure 24 United States Printing and Writing paper production and net imports 
1998-2007 
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According to FAO statistics, pictured in Figure 23, demand for printing and writing papers as 
a whole was roughly flat during the period between 1998 and 2007. As can be seen, 2000 was 
a peak year after which there was a drop in consumption and a simultaneous rise in the 
market share of imported paper. The recession of 2001-2003 is clearly visible in these data. 
2004 was already a year when overall consumption was again higher than 2000, however. 
Demand for US domestic paper, however, was still lower than in 2000, as most of the growth 
between 2001 and 2004 was taken by imported paper. Between 2003 and 2007 US 
production remained stable, while net imports started to drop again. US production was, 
however, supported after 2006 by two factors:  the continuing weakening of the US dollar 
and trade restrictions put in place to curtail the growing presence of Asian paper 
manufacturers.
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Supply 
During 2000-2007, the competitive landscape among American players stayed largely the 
same. Interviewees agreed that the deal itself did not cause hostile competitor action.
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Foreign importers, however, started to play an increasing role in the American paper market, 
as shown in figure 23.
149
 
In 2000, importers covered only about 13% of the American printed papers market.  In 2006, 
however, this figure had risen already to about 22%.
150
 The reason for this substantial rise in 
imports was the rising influence of Chinese, South Korean and other Asian market players, 
who entered the US market with cheaper prices. 
The US market is geographically segmented due to high freight costs, and can be roughly 
divided into three areas, the East Coast, the Midwest and the West Coast.
151
 While one could 
argue that to a large extent, the US market operates very locally, prices are, according to one 
interviewee, spread throughout the USA.  There is always some extra tonnage that is shipped 
to another area. The Asian importers targeted the West Coast strongly, while SENA‟s main 
market was the Midwest and the East Coast. Asian producers caused price erosion throughout 
the country, because of nationally operating distributors. This was problematic for US 
producers, whose capacity was, on average, older and not as competitive as that of their 
Asian competitors. 
Stora Enso management did not see the Asians producers as a threat at the time of the 
acquisition. In 2000 it was, however, known that there is an oversupply of paper in Asia. This 
is depicted in Stora Enso‟s Q3/2000 results presentation as well an investor presentation. 152  
According to an interviewee, however, the Chinese, for example, were at that time dismissed 
as a potential market player. At the time, Chinese had obsolete capacity for their domestic 
market. After “poor years” between 1996 and 2000, the Chinese started to build capacity at a 
strong pace. In 2003 alone, the Chinese industry grew by 50 new paper and broad machines, 
bringing 4.1 million metric tons of capacity. 
153
 This is the equivalent of two new 
Consolidated Papers, except that this capacity was state of the art, efficient and with 
significantly lower labor costs. 
According to one interviewee, Chinese paper producers aimed at a 90% share of US West 
Coast fine paper markets, which they took within a couple of years by lowering prices. The 
interviewee added that many of the Chinese companies were small, privately held companies 
without similar return of investment targets as western public companies.
154
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Consolidated Papers, however, had noticed the problems Asian competitors were posing. 
This is evident in Consolidated Papers‟ chairman‟s speech held at the final Consolidated 
Papers annual general meeting in June 2000: 
Foreign paper came to our shores in abundance last year. And by the way, it continues 
unabated today. So much so that increased demand, the new business, created by the robust 
economy, was and is supplied by imports. On top of that, foreign paper has even taken away 
some of the domestic producers' long established business. 
The dollar was strong compared with foreign currencies, especially the Japanese yen and 
Korean won. American papermakers, Consolidated included, lost domestic market share to 
foreign competition. Here's an example: Through the 1970s and 80s, Consolidated Papers 
was the dominant coated paper supplier in southern California. Our market share of free 
sheet coated grades (grades we produce here in Wisconsin Rapids) was over 20 percent. 
Today, we estimate that Japanese, Korean and other foreign paper manufacturers have 85 
percent of the coated paper market in Southern California. Consolidated, Mead, SAPPI, 
Potlatch, Champion, and the other domestics are left to divide up the remaining 15 percent. 
Why? Because, we cannot compete with the Asian papermakers on our West Coast. Our 
delivered cost in 1999 and today is often higher than the purchase price of paper coming 
ashore from Japan and Korea.
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The increase in Asian and Chinese influence in the US paper markets can be assessed in 
further detail by looking at balances of trade. 
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Figure 25 The US balance of trade in coated papers with China, Asia and Finland $ 
MM
156
 
Looking at the US balance of trade with China, Asia overall and Finland between 1995 and 
2008 in coated papers, one can see that from 2000 onwards, the balance of trade with Asia as 
a whole has turned negative gradually. With China, the balance shifts radically between in 
2004-2005. It is worth noting that trade with China is much smaller than with Finland for 
example. The US balance of trade with Finland in 2008 is actually more negative in 2008 
than in 2003, in spite of the strengthening of the euro during this time. 
Products where Asians have been strong already in 1995 are notebooks, registers etc, which 
were the source of an anti-dumping filing in 2006.  
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Figure 26 The US balance on trade in notebook papers with China, Asia and Finland $ 
MM
157
 
Here, although the trade balance has constantly been negative, it has steadily grown since 
1995. In these products, however, SENA was not a competitor, and Finnish companies (Stora 
Enso, UPM-Kymmene) do not produce these products. 
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Figure 27 The US balance on trade in uncoated fine papers with China, Asia and 
Finland $ MM
158
 
In uncoated and various specialty papers we can see that Asians have managed to turn the 
balance of trade to their favor between 1995 and 2008. The differences in absolute monetary 
terms, however, are minor. Finland‟s trade with the US is much greater throughout the 
period. 
All in all, US based supply declined during 2001-2 and then remained stagnant. Hundreds of 
obsolete mills were closed.
159
 These closures, however, were compensated by an increase in 
supply, first from strong exports in Europe due to the weak Euro, and later from China and 
the rest of Asia. In absolute monetary terms, however, changes have been rather small except 
for in coated fine papers. Nevertheless, even small changes in the balance of demand and 
supply can be significant for prices in declining markets. 
Market prices 
The balance between supply and demand determines prices.  The rise of the IT industry, 
which had started in the early 1990s and continued throughout the decade, had improved 
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margins for magazine and fine paper products..
160
 Paper prices in the United States were 
considerably higher than in Europe, even after correcting for currency exchange rates. This 
can be seen well in the slide below, which shows a significant premium in US prices between 
1999 and 2001.  
 
Figure 28 Stora Enso investor presentation given when a major SENA restructuring 
was announced in August 2002
161
 
After the acquisition, however, the price differential diminished, and price levels deteriorated 
significantly. This can be seen in the following Stora Enso investor presentation slide: 
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Figure 29 Paper price development in the USA, taken from Stora Enso's 2007 Capital 
markets day presentation in 5 November 2007 by Jouko Karvinen
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With stagnate or declining demand, and increased competition from importers with a 
beneficial cost structure, prices were under a lot of pressure between 2000 and 2007. Figure 
28 shows that prices in CWF and LWC started falling around the same time as Stora Enso 
closed the Consolidated Papers acquisition on 1 September 2000. According to one 
interviewee, Stora Enso was such a large player in the North American market with a good 
reputation inherited from Consolidated Papers that it managed to slow down price erosion to 
some extent.
163
 
A consultant involved in the deal claimed that even in 2000, the expectation was that the 
general trend in printing paper prices would be negative.
164
 Stora Enso management was also 
aware that the high prices experienced in 1999 and 2000 would not continue forever. They 
expected the good cycle to last at least two more years.
165
 The speed at which the market and 
prices collapsed, however, took them by surprise. The steep decline continued until late 2002, 
when prices at last stabilized. Proper rises in prices were not seen until mid 2004, although 
the US economy had returned to the growth track already in 2002. 
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In 2007, prices in CWF reached acquisition time prices again. As for other relevant paper 
grades, SC and LWC, prices were almost at 2000 levels in 2006, but in 2007 eroded again. In 
late 2007, SENA was sold to NewPage. 
Overall in terms of market development, since 2000 many of the assumptions made by Stora 
Enso management turned out incorrect, and many fundamentals in the paper industry have 
changed. 
 The correlation between GDP and paper consumption is no longer positive.  
 The paper market in the United States became more global than it was at the time of 
acquisition. New market entrants from Asian economies disrupted the balance 
between supply and demand, and compensated for efforts to close obsolete US 
capacity. 
 While 2001 was still generally a rather good year for SENA, the September 11 attacks 
on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in New York caused a further slump in 
the economy, which entered a recession. The subsequent fall in demand and prices 
was a surprise to Stora Enso management, which had expected the cycle to continue 
strong at least another two years.  
5.2.7. Listing in the United States provides access to a more efficient debt capital 
market and hence more financing opportunities 
Dimension: Financial markets 
Result: Yes, Stora Enso was readily offered credit  
Although this was not one of the main reasons for the acquisition, Stora Enso management 
did assume that listing their stock in the New York Stock Exchange would give them access 
to more debt capital. The US debt capital market was deemed a lot deeper and more liquid 
than the European one. This assumption proved correct. As an example a Stora Enso 
management interviewee mentioned that when Stora Enso in 2001 tried to raise a $750 
million global note, they were in fact offered over ten times as much.
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5.2.8. Pulp and paper companies listed in the United States are worth more than 
their European counterparts  
Dimension: Financial markets 
Result: The valuation gap diminished during the 2000s  
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”One factor was that studies clearly showed that American companies had higher PE 
(multiples) than European ones. And so it was thought that if we can make Stora Enso at 
least in part American, it would be valuable.”167 
In conjunction with the merger with Consolidated, Stora Enso listed its stock in the New 
York stock exchange.
168
 This provided Consolidated‟s shareholders, which hence became 
Stora Enso shareholders, a market place for their stock. 
Stora Enso management knew that European companies that listed in the United States were 
usually rewarded with increasing valuations. There was, however, some controversy among 
interviewees whether this was a key factor in the decision to list in the United States. Some 
saw it as a necessary step to be able to finance the deal partly with equity, which was 
beneficial because it caused a smaller drain on the company‟s balance sheet. On the other 
hand, some interviewees regarded this as the primary method of increasing shareholder value 
in conjunction with the acquisition. Stora Enso already had a lot of American shareholders, 
and listing in the United States was thought to increase demand for the stock. 
To verify this assumption, we can look at contemporary literature, which shows that the so 
called “valuation gap” between US and foreign companies existed, but has since become 
smaller.  
Doidge et al (2003) show that companies that cross-list their shares in the United States “have 
higher valuations than other firms from their country that do not cross-list”. The reasons 
Doidge et al. present are that companies listed in the USA have better protection for minority 
stock holders and that growth opportunities are more highly valued for firms listed in the US. 
These are complemented by the traditional view that companies listed in the United States 
have easier access to US debt capital markets, where debt is more readily available and the 
market is more developed. Doidge et al.‟s results show, however, that for Finnish companies, 
the average premium for listing in the United States is negative, although the sample is very 
small. 
Forester and Karolyi (1999) show that foreign firms that cross-list in the United States earn 
cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year preceding the listing, but incur 
abnormal losses of 14 percent during the year after. For companies that simultaneously raise 
capital, however, the post listing decline is mitigated.  As reasons for the premium gained 
from listing shares in United States, Forester and Karolyi (1999) suggest: 
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 Lowering of risk premiums associated with investment restrictions, which are lowered 
when the companies‟ shares are more readily available to foreign investors 
 The expansion of shareholder base as this increases the number of shareholders 
sharing company risk 
 The increase in share liquidity as this reduces the liquidity discount priced in the 
company‟s shares 
Mittoo (2003) finds that the premiums arising from cross-listing in the United States have 
declined over the years as equity markets have become more globalised. This has also 
improved global access to debt capital markets, making the difference in being able to access 
US debt capital smaller. The effects, however, are still present to some extent. 
The effect of listing the stock to NYSE is difficult to separate from other effects on the stock 
price, making the follow-up of this assumption difficult. The stock was listed in conjunction 
with closing the Consolidated Papers acquisition, at a time when the general trend in prices 
had turned down. As the literature reviewed earlier suggests, however, the effect of this 
phenomenon was diminishing, and was therefore probably overestimated by Stora Enso 
management. 
5.2.9. STE’s biggest customers are American, and STE will benefit from being in 
their home market  
Dimension: Demand 
Result: Benefit difficult to quantify, but market share did grow in the beginning  
Customers expressed their wish that Stora Enso be present in more areas with local 
manufacturing capacity. The future seemed to go towards a single annual deal with major 
customers. These included large American publishers, such as Time, Murdoch etc. Local 
presence in the United States was thought to open up more business for Stora Enso also in 
their European sales.
169
 
This assumption is not possible to verify based on publicly available data because companies 
do not disclose their sales figures by customers. A Stora Enso management interviewee 
claimed, however, that this assumption proved to be correct. Having a North American 
foothold had helped the company get more orders from the global publishing houses and 
especially their subsidiaries in Europe.
170
 According to news articles, Stora Enso managed to 
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increase its US market share in the declining markets of 2002.
171
 This implies that this 
assumption would have been correct. 
5.2.10. The dollar – euro exchange rate will continue to fluctuate, with local 
manufacturing presence providing an efficient natural hedge.  
Dimension: Financial markets 
Result: Yes, the dollar-euro exchange rate fluctuated, and the strong euro made American 
production competitive from 2005 onwards. For the company as a whole, however, the dollar 
became too weak, making production optimization difficult. 
When acquiring Consolidated Papers, the US dollar was close to parity with the euro.
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When asked, Stora Enso management interviewees stated that they did not make any specific 
assumptions on how the dollar – euro exchange rate would develop. Rather, they assumed 
that it would continue to fluctuate. They depicted two scenarios, the risks of which the 
Consolidated acquisition was supposed to minimize. 
a) A strong US dollar increases the competitiveness of European imports. Previously 
such situations usually lead to good profits for Europeans at first, but there was 
always the risk of an anti-dumping law suit, which could potentially lead to tariffs, but 
even if it didn‟t, they still caused harm for business 
b) A weak US dollar made European imports very unprofitable. One Stora Enso 
management team interviewee vaguely remembered a situation in the 1980s where the 
dollar – Finnish Markka rate had been so bad that Finnish companies had had to pull 
out of deals. This, according to the interviewee, had caused significant and long term 
harm to customer relationships. “This is not an on-off business”173 where one can 
choose whether or not to deliver according to each situation, but rather one where one 
has to be a consistently reliable partner.
174
 
Since the acquisition, both scenarios were seen: 
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Figure 30 Quarterly euro / Canadian dollar / US dollar average exchange rates Q1/2000 
- Q1/2008
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Figure 29 shows that after the acquisition, the dollar strengthened against the euro. Since 
2003, however, the dollar has weakened and has on average stayed at weaker levels. 
Throughout the period, the Canadian dollar, relevant due to SENA‟s Canadian Port 
Hawkesbury mill, also strengthened against the US dollar. 
The United States balance of trade in all paper products during the same time period did not 
develop quite as currency development would suggest: 
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Figure 31 The US balance of trade in all paper products 1995-2008 with select regions 
and the world
176
 
Between 1995 and 2002, US exports of paper to Asia without China exceeded imports, but 
this changed in 2002. The role of imported Chinese paper has also grown strongly since 
2000, but especially since 2005. 
Between 2000 and 2007, the Euro zone managed to increase its paper exports to the US, 
despite the weakening euro. European producers sold more, despite getting a relatively 
smaller price for their products. Canada, on the other hand, has lost market share since 2000, 
coming down from a trade imbalance of over $6 Bn in 2000 to just over $4 Bn in 2008. 
US total net imports grew strongly between 1998 and 2006, after which they have radically 
been reduced. With a reasonably stagnant market, US producers have lost market share until 
2006, but since then they have regained ground. This is in line with FAO statistics cited 
earlier in figure 23, which showed a decrease in importer market shares. The biggest loser of 
market share has been the Canadian paper industry, not the European or Asian one, however. 
The implications of these developments are that Europeans have managed to sell more and 
more to the United States, but with diminishing margins, where as Canadians have lost both 
market share and margins. 
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In Asia, local producers have increasingly taken markets that were previously net export 
markets for the US, including Hong Kong and Singapore
177
, whereas countries such as 
Indonesia and South Korea have managed to increase imports to the US. 
Many synergies between Stora Enso and Consolidated Papers were based on the ability of the 
company to optimize its different production systems and to sell European paper in North 
America. 
Stora Enso “had to get to the North American market because … it was a great possibility to 
sell some of the qualities (it had), especially then in coated magazine paper … and the 
currency, the dollar was pretty high, compared to the Euro, and so it was interesting.”178 
 The weakening of the dollar helped make American production more competitive, and 
improved SENA‟s relative competitiveness with respect to importers. As the dollar weakened 
further, however, there was a negative effect as well. Firstly, Stora Enso‟s ability to profitably 
import paper from Europe was severely hampered. This in turn cancelled many of the global 
synergies envisaged, because production optimization was made more difficult. Secondly, 
Stora Enso was a euro-denominated company, meaning that the euro value of the dollar 
denominated cash flows brought by Consolidated Papers declined. Stora Enso‟s currency 
hedging policy covered all dollar-denominated fixed assets, so this partly mitigated the effect 
of the weakening dollar. All future revenue streams, however, were not hedged at the time of 
acquisition. Therefore, the dollar‟s weakness caused some of the benefits sought after with 
the acquisition to be missed, and caused a major part of the losses when the company was 
divested as the euro value of the company‟s future cash flows had weakened. This issue, 
however, divided Stora Enso management interviewees. 
Some interviewees strongly supported the position that since the Consolidated deal acted as a 
natural hedge, the weakening of the US dollar was indifferent for Stora Enso, because it made 
local US production more competitive. This view is justified if one only thinks about the 
company‟s value in US dollars. Thinking about the company as a whole, however, one may 
conclude that the US dollar weakened too much. 
179
  
In the 2008 annual general meeting, when SENA had been divested, the chairman of the 
board Claes Dahlbäck said: 
“A weakening US dollar pushed our revenue down, and the dollar has continued falling this 
year. Our North American business was becoming a heavy burden.”180 
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In other words, the weakness of the dollar was a problem for Stora Enso as a whole, although 
it helped the competitiveness of SENA‟s US-based production. Upon divestment, SENA was 
no longer regarded as just a hedge with which to ensure access to US markets despite the 
weak US dollar. Rather, the revenue it brought was being thought of in euro terms. The 
weakening of the dollar caused SENA‟s revenues in euros to tumble, and hence decreased the 
Euro-value of SENA. It also hampered the sale of products from other Stora Enso‟s 
production facilities to North America, causing harm to the performance of the company as a 
whole.  
A relevant question is whether there was something in SENA‟s operations that led to poor 
performance from 2004 onwards, despite the protection provided by the weakening dollar 
against imported products from Europe. One major problem was spiraling costs of 
employment. This development is further discussed in chapter 5.3.7. 
5.2.11. The United States government will continue to set up trade barriers against 
European paper importers if the dollar strengthens.  
Dimension: Government officials 
Result: Yes, strong euro caused no need for barriers against European producers, but 
antidumping suits against Asians have been seen  
Stora Enso management interviewees cited previous experiences with the United States pulp 
and paper industry, which called for trade barriers in the form of anti-dumping regulation 
every time the United States dollar was trading at a rate favorable to European producers. 
Management thought that by becoming a United States-based player in the market, these 
actions could be either prevented or Stora Enso would be protected from their effect. Stora 
Enso could be able to sell to the market at favorable terms whatever the United States dollar – 
euro exchange rate is.
181
  
A Stora Enso management interviewee speculated that if Stora Enso and some other 
European companies had not had such a strong presence in the North American market, 
competitors would have tried to push for trade barriers against Europeans as well. Now, local 
producers focused their efforts on hampering Asian imports instead.
182
 Despite taking a lot of 
market share, the Chinese fine paper producers avoided major trade barriers of this kind 
between 2000 and 2007, making it easier for them to access the US market. Some minor trade 
barriers, however, have been set but these have only dealt with a limited range of products 
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and arrived only late in the inspection period. These actions have probably in part caused the 
stagnation of Chinese and other Asian imports, presented in figures 24-26: 
 2007 Coated Free Sheet Paper – Import tariffs set against certain companies in China, 
South Korea and Indonesia on grounds of dumping and government subsidized 
production. This action was initiated by NewPage corp. 
 2006 Liner paper - Import tariffs set against certain companies in China, India and 
Indonesia on grounds of dumping and government subsidized production. 
 2005 Tissue paper – China on grounds of dumping and government subsidized 
production. 
 2004 Crepe paper – China on grounds of dumping and government subsidized 
production.
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Furthermore, on 25 September 2009, NewPage, SENA‟s acquirer, filed an anti-dumping 
complaint against Chinese and Indonesian producers of coated paper. At the time of writing, 
the complaint is still pending.
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5.2.12. By obtaining a local manufacturing footprint in the United States, Stora 
Enso is better able to optimize its production and exports from Europe to the 
United States 
Dimension: Company business structure 
Result: No, Customers were used to receiving Consolidated‟s paper, and did not equally 
value European paper  
Stora Enso already had significant exports to the United States before acquiring Consolidated 
Papers. By obtaining local production, management assumed that Stora Enso could better 
take advantage of changes in foreign exchange rates and produce always in an area which is 
advantageous in terms of cost. Before the acquisition, Stora Enso was vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the US dollar / euro exchange rate as well as local government trade 
barriers.
185
 
The logic of the synergies between local and imported products is well depicted in a 
management presentation to investors from the time: 
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Figure 32 Stora Enso management presentation describing logic behind the 
Consolidated Papers acquisition from 16 May 2001
186
 
This assumption turned out to have been rather optimistic. By acquiring Consolidated Papers, 
Stora Enso increased its presence in its major customers‟ home market. It could offer both 
paper produced in the US and in Europe. Customers, however, were unwilling to accept 
European paper delivered as an alternative to the Consolidated “quality” paper they were 
used to.
187
 In this sense, there were not so many transatlantic capacity management synergies, 
because Stora Enso‟s products were not completely interchangeable in the eyes of customers. 
5.2.13. Stora Enso could not continue expanding through M&A in its home market, 
Europe, due to governmental anti-trust action 
Dimension: Government officials 
Result: Correct, the EU commission has since limited M&A action in the industry  
In 2000, Stora Enso was Europe‟s largest pulp and paper company, and in many products and 
in many markets such as Finland and Sweden, it was a dominant player.
188
 The management 
of the company thought that buying any larger European companies was out of the question, 
as market share in certain products and certain markets would have become so large that anti-
trust officials would have interfered.
189
 
Overall, this assumption is difficult to verify, as Stora Enso has not attempted to carry out any 
major M&A transaction in Europe since the Consolidated merger. UPM-Kymmene, a 
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company of similar size, however, acquired German paper manufacturer Haindl.
 190
 The EU 
commission studied the deal thoroughly and as a condition to approval, UPM had to sell two 
of Haindl‟s six mills to Norske Skog.191 Stora Enso had also been interested in Haindl, but 
according to management interviewees, they would have faced similar, if not worse, 
difficulties in carrying out the acquisition. 
”We no longer had the possibility to buy Haindl because we were too large a player, 
especially in the Central European magazine paper market.”192 
M-Real (previously Metsä-Serla) was allowed to purchase Modo paper in August 2000 and 
several other companies
193
. The EU competition agency cannot be said to have had a 
generally negative attitude towards pulp and paper industry consolidation. On the other hand, 
Stora Enso was one of Europe‟s largest pulp and paper companies at the time, and had had to 
fulfill several terms and conditions in conjunction with the Stora – Enso merger two years 
earlier. These included divestments of some business units.
194
 
 
5.3. Assumptions made when choosing Consolidated Papers as the merger target  
 
Figure 33 The assumptions about the target company made by Stora Enso management. 
While stating whether an assumption proved correct or not is not always clear-cut, the 
color coding depicts their general correctness – If the assumption proved correct, it is 
marked green, if it failed, it is colored in red. 
Assumptions made about Consolidated 
Papers as an acquisition target
Did hold
Did not hold
Assumption Dimension Outcome
Company 
competencies
Company 
competencies
Demand
Demand
Prices
Supply
The main owner is selling because he sees CPI is too small and due 
to lack of successor
The capacity of CPI is the best in its industry and runs efficiently
The target must be a good location and it must be an established 
brand
STE can segment its customers according to location and deliver 
products from different regions optimally
STE can sell its premium quality products to its customers at a 
premium price
There are other buyers interested in buying the company as well
Yes, but also due to declining performance and a lack 
of belief in the market
Performance gap between CPI and new Asian players 
grew large, causing need for significant investments
SENA held its positions rather will, and managed to 
exert some control over prices
Customer synergies were not realized to their full 
potential
Premiums were not obtained to a significant extent 
even though European paper was of better quality
Yes, There were 6 interested companies, two of 
whom presented final bids
Employees
Unlike in the Eurocan project, employee relations are not likely to 
pose a problem
Employees accepted the new owner, but trade unions 
managed to obtain significant additional benefits
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5.3.1. The target must be at a good location and it must be an established brand 
Dimension: Demand 
Result: Correct, SENA held its positions rather well, and managed to exert some control over 
prices 
Enso‟s previous experiences with the North American market signified to Stora Enso 
management that being at a good location in relation to both customers and raw material is 
very important. Location was also important in recruiting good personnel. In the Eurocan 
project (talked about in further detail in chapter 5.2.1), this had clearly been a problem: 
”And then we also noticed that getting staff to that area (Kitimati, British Columbia, Canada) 
was a central problem as it is located 1000km north of Vancouver … Getting families to 
move there is just impossible.”195 
As previously mentioned, the choice for Stora Enso was either to build the foothold in the 
United States by buying one mill at a time or to buy a large company with an established 
operation. By buying an established operation, it could use the existing operation‟s 
management in continuing the expansion further. Furthermore, individual mills for sale were 
often of poor quality. Therefore, it was felt that Stora Enso needed to buy a company that 
would act as a solid base.
196
 
In executing its strategy and building a North American foothold, however, Stora Enso 
succeeded well and in this respect, the assumption can be said to have proved correct.  The 
assumption is rather difficult to assess, because the alternative scenario, buying individual 
mills in poor locations did not realize, neither are there good comparable cases. In a declining 
market, however, maintaining such an operation viable would probably have been even more 
difficult. The problem with Consolidated Papers was not its operations as such, at least in 
comparison to its American competitors, but rather the unfortunate fact that its price was too 
high in comparison to its performance in the years following the acquisition.  
5.3.2. The main owner is selling because he sees that Consolidated is too small on 
its own, because of his will to retire and no successor to continue leading the 
family business 
Dimension: Company competencies 
Result: Yes, but also due to declining performance and a lack of belief in the market  
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According to Stora Enso management interviewees, when buying Consolidated Papers they 
had the impression that the main owner, the Mead-Witter family was selling the company 
mostly because there were no successors in the family to follow George W. Mead, then aged 
72, in the paper business. In addition, Stora Enso management assumed that Consolidated 
Papers and its chairman George W. Mead ”had come to the conclusion that they would not 
succeed on their own, but that they would have to join something”.197 
 According to the owner, these were indeed the reasons. There were no successors within the 
family to succeed George W. Mead in managing the company. In addition, Consolidated 
Papers had experience declining profitability already for several years. A couple of years 
earlier, it had acquired a couple of old paper mills from the troubled Repap USA. These, 
according to George W. Mead, had not cost much but were not profitable either. Hence, in 
1999, the company had hired Goldman Sachs to investigate options to stop the decline of the 
company - whether to grow organically, acquire other companies or put the company up for 
sale. The result of this analysis had been that because there were so many larger paper 
companies interested in growing through M&A, selling the company would be the best 
option for shareholders. According to George W. Mead, it was not only the company‟s 
business model that was declining, there were problems in the market as well. In an interview 
with the author, to the question whether he felt at the time of the acquisition that the 
American market would still stay strong, George W. Mead replied: “It wasn’t, you know, if it 
was as strong as it had been, then we wouldn’t have been looking around for a buyer.198 
At the same time Stora Enso management still thought that the North American market had 
room to grow: “When it comes to growth, we believed that there would still be growth there 
(In the USA)”199  The buyers obviously thought that their competence in reading the market 
was better than the seller‟s. Furthermore, they and the local seller viewed the future of the 
local market in clearly different ways. 
An interesting question is why buyers were willing to pay such a high price for Consolidated 
Papers even though its operations were clearly in decline. In the Q3/1999 earnings report 
Consolidated Papers reported smaller profit margins which it attributed to: 
“Reduced selling prices, less-than-optimal product mix and periodic downtime partially 
offset by improved cost of sales. The periodic downtime was caused by global over-capacity 
and a continued high level of imports.”200 
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Consolidated therefore acknowledged that the markets were global, and that imports were 
hurting its margins already in 1999. The company‟s sales were also down, and profits had 
been in steady decline since 1995. 
 
 
Figure 34 Consolidated Papers sales EBIT and EBITDA margins 1991-1999¨
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There also seems to have been a difference in the cash flow forecasts that the buyer and seller 
had made. At the time of the deal, Goldman Sachs projected Consolidated‟s cash flows 
including merger synergies so that its value would vary between $3,34 billion to $5,47 billion 
depending on the cost of capital used. The corresponding range used in the calculation was 
8,0% to 12,0%.
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Although the relationship between the cost of capital and the value of the company is not 
linear, an inverse linear approximation may be used, at which the $4,8 billion acquisition 
would be value neutral for Stora Enso if its cost of capital were about 8,4%. This is 
significantly lower than Stora Enso‟s weighted average cost of capital of 9,3%. There is 
differing information available on what cost of capital Stora Enso used to evaluate the 
company. A Stora Enso management interviewee stated that the deal was value neutral, 
suggesting that cash flows would have been evaluated at a cost of capital of 9,3%.  An 
adviser involved in the deal was of the opinion that the deal did meet a hurdle rate cost of 
capital defined for acquisitions, which was higher than the cost of capital. Stora Enso‟s 
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investor presentation following the announcement of the acquisition declared that the deal 
exceeded the cost of capital of 9%, taking into account synergies and performance 
improvements that had already been decided upon. 
While the 0,9% difference between the buyer‟s and the seller‟s estimations for the estimated 
return on investment is small as a figure, the corresponding difference in Consolidated 
Papers‟ value is over $400 million. This analysis is “quick and dirty”, but it shows that Stora 
Enso and Consolidated Papers‟ assumptions on the future of the business differed somewhat 
already at the time of acquisition. 
5.3.3. The capacity of Consolidated Papers is the best in the industry and runs 
efficiently. Stora Enso, however, has the needed know-how to make 
Consolidated Paper’s operations more efficient and more profitable. 
Dimension: Company competencies 
Result: Despite efforts to improve performance, the performance gap between Consolidated 
Papers and new Asian players grew large, causing need for significant investments. 
According to an interviewed consultant involved in the deal, Stora Enso aimed to find an 
acquisition target whose capacity would be in good and competitive condition - It should not 
require major further investments in the years following the acquisition.
203
 In 2002, two years 
after it acquired Consolidated Papers, however, Stora Enso announced major restructurings in 
its North American division. These included mill closures which caused one-time expenses, 
as well as investments in more productive mills.
204
 All in all, Stora Enso managed to bring 
down employee headcount by about 35% while keeping production stable. This was stated by 
several interviewees, both among management and implementers. According to a 
management interviewee involved in the acquisition, it was known that improvements could 
be done already at the time of the acquisition. It was part of the value-add that Stora Enso 
could bring, and most of the calculated cost reduction synergies were based on implementing 
best practices. The same interviewee also said, however, that the extent of the work needed to 
put the company in order came as a surprise. 
205
 Another interviewee claimed even that: 
“The plants weren’t at all as good (as the board had been told)… they were older and didn’t 
work as well and were not of the quality (Stora Enso had been told)”206 
Stora Enso representatives did not get to do a proper due diligence on the company at the 
time of acquisition because it was a public company. They did get to see the mills, but only 
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briefly. This, according to an interviewee, was not enough to get a feeling of how efficiently 
operations were running. On the other hand, according to a consultant involved in the deal, it 
does not take long for an expert in the paper industry to see how efficiently operations are 
being run, if one has access to certain performance metrics.
207
 
According to another interviewee, the question of asset quality has more to do with the 
condition of the markets: 
“In a very good market you can look upon this as a very good quality asset because you can 
earn a lot of money on these machines  ... But they became very quickly obsolete when the 
market came down ... They were kept in as good shape as they could be given their age and 
size, but … many of them were too old and too small for a market where costs became 
everything.”208 
The fact that the paper market collapsed hastened and magnified the need for restructuring 
investments. As prices came down, previously profitable mills went below the profitability 
threshold, and increased efficiency was needed to operate profitably. A competitor 
interviewee explained that the major investments done on paper capacity in Asia increased 
the performance gap between these new state of the art mills and American ageing capacity. 
This gap led to the need for significant investments in order to keep mills competitive. Stora 
Enso management had not foreseen the steep rise in Asian capacity, the aggressive 
competition of which facilitated price erosion. This is one of the reasons management may 
have underestimated the need for investments in their newly acquired capacity.
209
 
The main cause of the surprise probably didn‟t arise from ignorance concerning what Stora 
Enso had bought, but rather from a change in the company‟s external environment. There was 
also over-confidence in how well Stora Enso management could turn Consolidated Papers‟ 
declining performance around. 
5.3.4. There were other potential buyers interested in buying the company as well 
Dimension: Supply 
Result: Yes, There were 6 interested companies, two of whom presented final bids 
Stora Enso management was aware of the fact that there were not the only ones bidding for 
Consolidated Papers. Signals of this came from many directions. The investment bank hired 
to advise Stora Enso had been approached by another company interested in giving a mandate 
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to handle acquiring Consolidated Papers. Stora Enso management had heard market rumors 
of the existence of competition and ranges of the competitors‟ offers.210 
In the SEC filing following the publication of the deal, Consolidated Papers claimed to have 
interested over ten players, of which six had presented indicative offers. In the final stage, 
two binding offers had been submitted, one from Stora Enso and the other from a major US 
pulp and paper company.
211
 According to a consultant involved in the deal, the other offer 
had been very close to that of Stora Enso. Market rumors following the acquisition suggested 
that there were two other companies that had been significantly interested in Consolidated 
Papers, one of which was one of the largest US pulp and paper companies, and the other was 
another major Nordic player. UPM-Kymmene was not, however, interested in Consolidated 
Papers as it was tied up with trying to merge with Champion International. 
In other words, had Stora Enso offered less than it did, it most likely would not have 
succeeded in buying the company. Stora Enso management interviewees had mixed 
sentiments about whether they had felt certain haste about realizing the deal. While some said 
that they had not felt hurried in the deal, others thought that because Stora Enso had 
previously lost many bids, management felt urged to make sure that this time would succeed. 
According to one management interview, the price offered was not changed during the 
process, as they did not want to start haggling over the price. Instead, Stora Enso “crafted the 
highest possible justifiable offer”212. This leaves room to ask, how much of the value creation 
potential of the deal was ever possible to be retained by Stora Enso‟s shareholders. For 
further discussion on shareholder value, please refer to chapter 6.5. 
5.3.5. Stora Enso can segment its customers according to location, and deliver 
products from different regions optimally 
Dimension: Demand 
Result: Partly correct, but customer-related synergies were not realized to their full potential 
The United States paper market is rather segmented, and operates locally. Due to large inland 
freight costs, operating close to the customer brings significant benefits. At the time of the 
acquisition, Stora Enso already imported a lot of paper to the East Coast of the United States 
by sea, both from Europe and its Canadian mill in Nova Scotia. The amounts of paper 
brought from Europe, however, were rather insignificant compared to the production capacity 
acquired in the Consolidated Papers deal. 
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The rationale behind buying a significant player from the Midwest was that Stora Enso could 
optimize its delivery costs by segmenting customers according to location – East Coast 
customers would receive more paper from Europe, whereas Midwest customers would 
receive paper produced in Wisconsin.
213
 This would also enable optimizing production and 
sales to clients in all market conditions. Gaining access to Consolidated Papers‟ client base 
would also enable selling them more paper produced in Europe.  
The problem with this thinking, according to a management interviewee, was that clients 
were more country loyal than Stora Enso management had expected.  Consolidated‟s 
American major customers located on the East Coast were used to receiving paper from the 
Midwest, and did not want to buy paper from Europe. Stora Enso was unable to transfer the 
good reputation of Consolidated Papers to cover its imported papers, and hence the 
anticipated sales synergies largely failed to realize.
214
 
5.3.6. Stora Enso can sell its premium quality products to its customers at a 
premium price. 
Dimension: Prices 
Result: Premiums were not obtained to a significant extent even though European paper was 
of better quality 
European fine paper was, according to one interviewee, slightly different than American 
paper and was considered a premium product. In the American market, Stora Enso 
management assumed that Stora Enso could sell European style paper to Consolidated‟s 
customers in the US and receive a premium compared to competing paper grades.  
This assumption, however, did not prove correct. According to a management interviewee, 
American customers were willing to accept European style paper, but were not willing to pay 
extra for it. Furthermore, the quality premium Consolidated Papers had previously managed 
to charge its customers for magazine and fine paper became smaller, because new market 
entrants from China proved capable of producing good quality paper. They could deliver 
reliably, offer good customer service and sell with cheaper prices. For Consolidated Papers 
and SENA, quality and reliability were therefore no longer sources of competitive advantage 
to the same extent they had been previously.
215
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5.3.7. Unlike in the Eurocan project, employee relations are not likely to pose a 
problem 
Dimension: Employees 
Result: Employees accepted the new owner, but trade unions managed to obtain significant 
additional benefits  
A typical problem in post-merger integration is relations with the target company‟s 
employees. In this case, however, the need for drastic employee reductions was not at first 
seen, because Consolidated‟s old headquarter functions were going be kept to a large extent, 
as Stora Enso lacked these functions in the United States. Scandinavian management style 
was also not deemed to differ too much from the American style, and management assumed 
that cultural clashes could be avoided. According to a Stora Enso management interviewee, 
Scandinavians and Americans shared the same Christian cultural heritage, making integration 
a lot easier than for example if the counterpart had been Asian.
216
 
In practice, integration between the two companies went well. When profitability started to 
decline shortly after the acquisition, mill closures and employee reductions were 
announced.
217
 According to the former owner, however, the sentiment among employees did 
not put the blame for the drastic measures on the new owners. 
218
 
An adviser involved in the deal and familiar with US pulp and paper industry mentioned that 
spiraling healthcare costs were a major problem in the United States for all industries 
throughout the 2000s. In his opinion, the paper union was strong enough to hold on these 
benefits, despite the weak performance of the companies. The cost of employment in the pulp 
and paper industry rose strongly between 2000 and 2004, an effect felt also by Stora Enso 
North America. According to management interviewees, this was because Consolidated 
Papers had agreed to a long-term employment contract with very favorable towards 
employees in 1999, which Stora Enso had to obide with until 2006-2007.
219
 The results of 
personnel reduction were therefore meager due to the simultaneously rising costs of 
employment. It is likely that this trend has continued, although it is still unclear how the 
Obama administration‟s attempts to reform health care insurance will affect the situation.220 
This development was mostly unforeseen by Stora Enso management at the time of the 
acquisition. The situation is well depicted in a Stora Enso investor presentation slide shown 
below:  
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Figure 35 Stora Enso investor presentation 3 March 2004
221
 
 
5.4. Where did the assumptions come from? 
The interviews with Stora Enso management and advisers show that the assumptions, made 
before the transaction was carried out, were formed through a number of influences. 
Six primary sources have been identified, including external advice, informal advice and 
rumors, Stora Enso sales force contacts, previous experiences, bias due to cultural differences 
and the effect of the media. In the following sections, the effect of each area is explained 
more thoroughly. 
5.4.1. External advice 
Stora Enso used a lot of external advisers during the acquisition process. According to 
interviewees, the idea of expanding to the United States came from management itself, but 
after that, both investment bankers and consultants were frequently asked to present their 
ideas. Stora Enso management met with representatives of several investment banks. They 
pitched their ideas on which US market players would be suitable and available acquisition 
targets. Then, Stora Enso management had two separate formal studies done. One, done in 
collaboration with the Citibank investment banking division, analyzed all potential 
acquisition targets in Northern America. The second one was done by Pöyry and it analyzed 
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the physical condition of North American pulp and paper capacity.
222
 According to the CEO 
of Stora Enso of the time, he also had private discussions with a pulp and paper industry 
analyst. A short while before deciding whether to make a final offer or not, he presented the 
situation and the terms of the deal to the analyst, who looked at them. 
“I asked what he would do in the situation, he said that the idea was correct, but the price 
was rather high. Overall, however, he would take the risk.”223 
This said, the extent of the drop in Stora Enso‟s share price came as a surprise to the CEO.224 
Some Stora Enso management and implementer interviewees brought up the role of the 
external advisers in the stirring up the deal. They questioned whose interests investment 
bankers actually look after, as their compensation is often purely based on whether the deal 
goes through or not.
225
 The seller also brought up the role of investment banks in managing to 
stir up a lot of M&A transactions in the 1990s by pitching their ideas to growth-hungry 
corporate managers.
226
 On the other hand, Stora Enso can be considered to have been an 
enlightened buyer of professional services. The company‟s CEO was a former banker 
himself, the chairman was an adviser to investment bank Goldman Sachs and the director in 
charge of this particular M&A deal had had a long career in management consulting before 
joining Stora Enso. 
5.4.2. Informal advice and rumors 
Management team members also had private discussions with their more informal contacts 
about the acquisition case in addition to the ones on the board and executive management 
teams. Management heard rumors about the existence of a competitive bidder. These signals 
together with signals coming from Stora Enso‟s investment banking adviser, Citibank, 
indicated to management a certain price level under which the deal would not go through. 
5.4.3. Stora Enso sales force contacts and discussions with customers 
As mentioned in chapter 5.2.9, Stora Enso managers heard their customers express their wish 
that Stora Enso could deliver locally produced products in the United States. Customers 
expressed their wish to Stora Enso management, which in part made them feel that local 
presence would be important to harness good relations with important customers. This 
influence on managerial cognition might have been an intentional effort by big customers to 
try and further squeeze their paper suppliers. 
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5.4.4. Previous experiences 
Stora Enso‟s management team was a group of senior executives who had taken part in 
Enso‟s previous acquisitions in the 1990s as well as the Stora – Enso merger in 1998. As 
mentioned in chapter 5.1.5, this previous experience gave them confidence in the company‟s 
ability to successfully carry out large acquisitions and integrate the targets to the group. For 
example, the merger between Stora and Enso was described as very challenging due to large 
perceived differences in company cultures. International mergers in general were found more 
difficult than domestic ones.
227
 Enso had a lot of experience in both, however, and most of 
the recent transactions had been carried out by the same top management team that was to 
handle the Consolidated Papers deal. This prior experience and success was mentioned as a 
primary reason for choosing M&A as the method for growth by the interviewees. 
Management did not feel that failure in integrating the two companies would pose a major 
risk to the success of the Consolidated Papers acquisition.
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5.4.5. Bias due to different corporate culture backgrounds 
The Stora Enso management team, which consisted mainly of Finns, was very much in favor 
of continuing acquisitions and growing aggressively. After the Stora - Enso merger, Stora 
Enso had two very different alternatives in America: to divest of to expand. The lone factory 
in the North America built by Stora, Port Hawkesbury, was unprofitable. The choice was 
either to divest it, or expand business on the continent and in doing so, also try to enhance the 
profitability of the Port Hawkesbury mill. The mill at Port Hawkesbury had just undergone 
major investment prior to the Stora – Enso merger in 1998. Therefore, according to the 
management team member, it would have been difficult to persuade the board, dominated 
mostly by Swedes, to divest it, especially when the opening of the mill had just been 
celebrated. It was therefore easy to persuade the board to a policy of expansion in the United 
States.
229
  
5.4.6. The effect of the media 
According to a competitor interviewee, the media has played a significant role in determining 
the direction of the Finnish pulp and paper industry. As a reflector of public opinion, the 
media has looked at different companies and management groups in a different light 
depending on their current strategy, or the success of their past actions. The interviewee 
called for stronger boards of directors and CEOs that could better withstand pressure from the 
public.
230
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Although one cannot draw the conclusion based on one interview that the media has been 
able to influence the industry, it is still a good idea to look at the attitudes of the media from 
different periods. This might help to assess what the general feeling surrounding the industry 
at the time was. This may have influenced the managements of paper industry companies as 
well. 
At the time of the acquisition of Consolidated Papers, Stora Enso along with the whole 
industry was doing well. There was a general “feel good” atmosphere both in the media and 
the industry. 
The results of a news search done on the Stora Enso – Consolidated Papers acquisition, 
development and divestment shows that the media was positive or somewhat positive towards 
the deal in the beginning. Later on, however, the deal has been criticized, showing a late 
comprehension or an inconsistency in its treatment. 
Around the time of the announcement, many Finnish journalists had a favorable attitude 
towards M&A transactions in the pulp and paper industry, especially ones where Finnish 
companies were the buyers. In the Stora Enso – Consolidated Papers case, most articles 
written at the time in Finnish newspapers
231
 commended the deal, although concerns were 
raised about the price. There were even elements of a “Finnish invasion”, with text that 
portrayed a nationalistic or patriotic tone. A good example is Taloussanomat‟s article which 
looks at the acquisitions of US companies made by Stora Enso and UPM-Kymmene: 
“The position of Finnish companies has changed dramatically within a week. Only a few 
weeks ago they had a rather modest foothold in the world’s largest paper market. After the 
megamergers, Finns have risen to become the dominators of the American market in their 
strong paper grades.”232 
Helsingin Sanomat wrote: 
“Who would have thought a week ago that among the world’s three largest pulp and paper 
companies, two would be Finnish ... At last we can harvest Finnish attempts to increase 
value-add and to build wider machines. The road to M&A is quickly open because the 
companies’ return on shares has evened out on different sides of the Atlantic, and stock is 
accepted as a method of payment.”233 
In another article, a Helsingin Sanomat journalist wrote: 
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 “Champion and Stora Enso’s new, larger size guarantees that Mr. Härmälä and Mr. 
Niemelä (CEO of UPM-Kymmene) will expand the picture of Finland as a modern country of 
know-how and a dynamic population. Nowadays Finland has a broad sphere of 
internationally renowned names. The country is known for other things than reindeer 
milk”.234 
The price paid for Consolidated Papers included a much higher premium than for Champion 
international. This is one of the reasons why many journalists looked at UPM-Kymmene‟s 
deal under its original terms more favorably. When UPM-Kymmene withdrew from the deal, 
the media treated the decision in different ways. Suomen Kuvalehti, for example, wrote: 
“The world is treating Finnish pulp and paper companies in very different ways. UPM-
Kymmene is suffering a major blow and will most probably have to withdraw from the USA. 
In front of UPM lies thinking about new acquisition targets, as International Paper probably 
will take over Champion International. Stora Enso’s American conquest is, on the other 
hand, going according to plan”.235 
Helsingin Sanomat wrote:  
“Although UPM-Kymmene has failed in its efforts to expand in recent years, Niemelä is not 
feeling sorry for himself, pointing out that he is the head of the best company in the field., He 
does concede, however, that losing Champion was a disappointment, as it involved a good 
deal of work, travel and long discussions.”236 
Kauppalehti wrote during the bidding war for Champion: “The dismantling of the offer 
(UPM’s offer for Champion) can’t be seen as a personal loss in prestige for CEO Juha 
Niemelä. There is a lot to acquire also outside of Champion, and only a few companies have 
as easily managed to make 1,3 billion Markkas which UPM is getting as compensation. In 
addition, UPM would surely be left undisturbed for a long time by competitors such as 
IP.”237 
Despite criticism of the high price, Stora Enso‟s deal was treated rather positively.  After 
SENA‟s first impairment charge in 2002, and especially after the divestment, however, Stora 
Enso‟s management and board received heavy criticism from the media. In 2002, Helsingin 
Sanomat wrote: 
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“The acquisition was not a strategic mistake if a global pulp and paper company is 
considered a sensible target. But the timing of the deal was a failure, and it cost too much ... 
At least for now there has been no evidence to support the benefits from global 
operations.”238 
In 2007, the same journalist Jyrki Iivonen wrote: 
“The main ones responsible for the North American catastrophe are Jukka Härmälä who 
planned and executed the Consolidated Papers acquisition in the spring of 2000. Härmälä is 
not the only guilty one...(The article also mentions) Claes Dahlbäck, Marcus Wallenberg and 
Jan Sjöqvist.
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Taloussanomat wrote “The great American erroneous acquisition, Consolidated Papers, 
caused a multi-billion euro loss for Stora Enso. In recent years, the closest competitors have 
not made equally large mistakes, as they have only succeeded in executing midsized 
erroneous investments.”240 
Although these articles were just a sample, it is clear that the media was quick to criticize and 
find culprits for both the unsuccessful merger and the direction in which the pulp and paper 
industry was going. It is likely that journalists felt free to criticize Stora Enso because a large 
part of it was controlled by the Finnish government. It is difficult to show whether or not 
these changing opinions have had an effect on corporate decision making. 
As an adviser to the deal said, however, M&A is a “confidence game”, meaning that 
corporate management needs to feel confident in the future in order to want to carry out 
M&A transactions.
241
 Public opinion surely has its effect on how confident boards and CEOs 
feel about deals they are about to undertake. In this case, public opinion was in favor of 
making large deals, and there was public support for them. Once problems emerged, this 
public support faded and turned into strong criticism. In such a climate, further expansion to 
the United States could have been more difficult. 
The agency theory in M&A also supports the effect of public opinion on corporate decisions, 
because a part of the self-interest managers have in M&As is increasing personal prestige. 
Making deals which are not unpopular are not a good way to doing so. Management was 
blamed for wasting taxpayer‟s money in their “American conquest”.242 The media, however, 
have not presented proper analysis of how much Stora Enso actually lost as a result of the 
deal.
243
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6. Discussion: What actually caused Stora Enso’s losses? 
 
In this section, the results obtained are analyzed further. This includes looking at the 
interdependence of the assumptions and the link between the assumptions and the valuation 
of the target company.  The most critical assumptions in terms of the final losses for Stora 
Enso are identified. Furthermore, the potential for shareholder value creation foreseen at the 
time of the acquisition , Stora Enso’s alternative investment prospects at the time as well as 
the final cost of the transaction for Stora Enso are assessed.. 
6.1. Interdependence of assumptions 
It is clear that the assumptions made by Stora Enso management in conjunction with the 
Consolidated Papers acquisition are not independent. Rather, the assumptions and their 
correctness are closely linked to one another. In this section, their interdependence is 
assessed, with the aim of building a model that depicts the sensitivity of the acquisition to 
changes in its environment. 
The interdependence of assumptions is assessed by combining them into chains. Assumptions 
belonging to the same “chain” are interrelated. In addition, the correctness or incorrectness of 
some assumptions is also linked to other chains. Hence we have a model that describes 
factors affecting the correctness of the assumptions and depicts the causality of these factors. 
By interdependence, we mean, for example: 
 The assumption “M&A are preferential to greenfield investments because the risk is 
smaller” is linked to the assumption “Stora Enso had vast competency within the 
organization in pulling mergers through” because they both have to do with 
management‟s attitude towards different strategic options.  
 On the other, these two assumptions are not linked to the assumption “The capacity of 
CPI is the best in its industry and runs efficiently, because the latter has to do with 
Consolidated Papers operations on their own, while the formers ones have to with 
Stora Enso‟s management attitudes towards strategic actions. 
The interdependencies of each factor are described in more detail in section 7.3, the 
assumption chains. 
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6.2. The link between the assumptions and the value of the target company  
In an M&A transaction, the value of a company is typically calculated using several different 
methods. These include comparing the company to its peers by looking at valuation multiples 
to see how attractive the company‟s valuation is compared to its peers. When calculating the 
value of a company to an acquirer, however, the most typical valuation method is the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF), which is the sum of all future cash flows brought by the 
target to its parent discounted with the parent‟s demanded rate of return for the investment. 
The formula for DCF is as follows: 
Present value of future cash flows =  
The present value of future cash flows is the sum of all future cash flows, but this can be 
simplified so that the free cash flow of the first year is used as the base assumption, after 
which the following cash flows are estimated using a constant growth term (g). R signifies 
the rate of return demanded for the investment, and in the simplified case, it is assumed to be 
constant to perpetuity. 
The formula for free cash flow calculation can be further separated. By definition, free cash 
flow is defined as follows: 
 FCF = Net income + Depreciation/Amortization – changes in working capital – 
Capital expenditure 
In other words, the free cash flow term is roughly equal to: 
 Revenues – Costs – Investments. 
In the paper industry, revenues can be approximated by multiplying the volume of paper sold 
by its average price, i.e. Revenues = Volume * Price 
 Costs, on the other hand, can be divided into variable and fixed costs, i.e. Costs = 
Volume * Variable cost + Fixed costs 
Therefore, our approximation for free cash flow in a given year is: 
 FCF = Volume * Price – (Volume * variable cost + Fixed costs) – Investments 
The growth term can also be broken down further in a similar manner. 
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 Growth = Growth in price * Volumes + Growth in volumes * Price 
For the purpose of the model, we may therefore divide the assumptions made into six 
categories: 
 Volume and growth in volume 
 Price and Growth in price 
 Variable costs 
 Fixed costs 
 Investments 
 Weighted average cost of capital 
These are further interlinked so that investments may affect growth in volume, growth in 
price (in case of R&D investments where products are improved), variable and fixed costs. 
For each of the six factors, we may now identify assumptions and outcomes of events that 
correspond. By doing so, we may link the acquisition assumption model to the DCF valuation 
model. 
 
6.3. The assumption chains explained 
In this section, the rationale for each assumption chain as well as the links to the valuation 
model are presented and elaborated.  
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Figure 36 Assumption interdependencies and their link to the discounted cash flow 
valuation model 
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Chain 1 – The seller’s situation 
 
The assumption that the seller was selling due to his own personal circumstances rather than 
a desire to exit the market because of foreseen poorer market conditions is closely related to 
there having been competition over Consolidated Papers. It seems that most bidders for the 
company must have had a more positive outlook on the market than the seller did. The six 
bidders were interested in the company because of the condition of its capacity, its reputation 
in the market as well as the desire to increase market power by consolidating the industry. 
This links this chain to the chain “2 – Consolidated Papers‟ competitive position”. 
Furthermore, the deal was carried out with buyer assuming healthy future market 
development, while the seller saw it increasingly grim. This links the chain mostly to price 
and growth in price in the DCF formula. It also links this chain to chain 3 – The operative and 
strategic integration of SENA. 
 
Chain 2 – Consolidated Papers’ competitive position 
 
Consolidated Paper‟s competitiveness and the competitive environment form the second 
chain of assumptions. The assumption of Stora Enso management was that CPI‟s operative 
efficiency was at a good level and that its capacity was competitive in comparison to other 
US paper producers. This assumption was supported by the premium prices Consolidated 
Papers was able to receive due to its good quality and good customer service. It was not, 
however, supported by Consolidated‟s financial performance which showed strong 
deterioration between 1995 and 1999. 
When the market declined, this efficiency helped SENA, formed by combining Consolidated 
Papers to Stora Enso‟s existing Port Hawkesbury mill, to protect and even gain in market 
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
The main owner is selling because he sees CPI is too small and 
due lacking successor
Yes, to some extent but also because the market 
outlook was seen increasingly grim
1 3
Price and 
Growth in price
There are other buyers interested in buying the company as well 
Yes, There were 6 interested companies, two of 
whom presented final bids 
1 2
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
The capacity of CPI is the best in its industry and runs efficiently 
Performance gap between CPI and new Asian players 
grew large, causing need for significant investments 
2 Investments
The target must be a good location and it must be an established 
brand 
SENA held its positions rather will, and managed to 
exert some control over prices 
2
Price and 
Growth in price
STE can sell its premium quality products to its customers at a 
premium price 
Premiums were not obtained to a significant extent 
even though European paper was of better quality 
2 3
Price and 
Growth in price
The competitive situation in the United States will not change 
markedly
Asian players entered the market, disrupting the 
balances between demand and supply 
2
Volume and 
growth in 
volume
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share. The prices overall as well as the price premiums obtained by SENA, however, 
diminished due to increasing competition from Asian players that also caused significant 
price erosion. 
The increasing presence of Asian players to the US market caused the assumption of the 
competitive field remaining unchanged to be incorrect. The Asian player‟s state of the art 
production capacity also helped prove wrong the assumption of the efficiency of 
Consolidated Papers‟ production capacity. According to a competitor interviewee, an 
increasing performance gap was formed between Asian players and US paper producers, 
causing part of the poor profitability of the Americans. Asian players not only produced good 
quality paper, but their customer service was also at a high level, eroding price premiums 
obtained previously by leading American producers. In addition to the entrance of Asian 
players, supply and demand has also been affected by American producers‟ attempts to close 
down production. A good example of this is SENA‟s major restructuring attempts. According 
to a competitor interviewee, however, these measures have not been successful, because 
capacity has been closed at the poorer end, while good quality capacity continues to increase 
its efficiency. In effect, the reduction in supply is hence less substantial, lessening its effect 
on the imbalance of demand and supply. 
This chain of events also destroyed Stora Enso‟s assumption that it could sell its European 
“premium products” at a premium prices. American customers did appreciate the good 
quality, but were not willing to pay for it as Stora Enso‟s management had assumed. 
American customers were used to American paper, and preferred that even after the 
acquisition, when Stora Enso attempted to optimize its deliveries from its production 
facilities in the United States, Canada and Europe. This chain of assumptions is significant to 
the valuation of SENA, because it has a strong effect on the price factor, which in turn plays a 
key part in determining revenues. 
The assumption behind Stora Enso‟s customer management links this chain of assumptions to 
the chain “3 – The operational and strategic integration of SENA” 
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Chain 3 – The operational and strategic integration of SENA 
 
This chain of assumptions has to do with how well Stora Enso managed to integrate its North 
American operations. The basic assumption of Stora Enso management was that there was a 
vast competency within the company to pull through large mergers. This assumption was 
based on Stora Enso‟s previous experiences which were perceived successful by 
management. While overall Stora Enso management still feels that the operational integration 
of Consolidated Papers went well, the scene on the customer side was different. Competence 
in this field affects the amount of fixed costs the company is able to eliminate. 
According to Stora Enso management and implementer interviewees, the sales culture 
between Consolidated Papers and Stora Enso was different, causing some challenges in the 
sales front. Customers took advantage of these difficulties. This limited Stora Enso‟s ability 
to exploit its increased market power. Furthermore, customers were unwilling to accept Stora 
Enso‟s attempts to optimize its deliveries from its different locations. This affected the 
variable costs factor. The assumption that Stora Enso would be able to exploit local presence 
also in relation to European production did not prove correct in this market. Some benefits 
were attained, however, because Stora Enso was able to serve its American customers‟ 
European operations due to its local presence in the US. On the other hand, according to a 
competitor interviewee, size can also be a negative characteristic if customers have 
purchasing policies that restrict the amount bought from one supplier. This aspect of 
customer management affects the volume term of the valuation model. 
Related to this issue is the alternative course of events that could have taken place if Stora 
Enso had instead decided to invest in greenfield projects instead of buying an established 
player. In declining markets, this would have been a very risky project, as a newcomer would 
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
STE can segment its customers according to location and deliver 
products from different regions optimally 
Customer synergies were not realised to their full 
potential 
3 Variable costs
With a local mfg footprint, STE can optimize its deliveries from 
Europe 
Customers were used to receiving CPI paper, and did 
not want European paper 
3 Variable costs
STE’s biggest customers are American, and STE will benefit from 
being in their homemarket 
Benefit difficult to quantify, but market share did 
grow in the beginning 
3
Volume and 
growth in 
volume
M&A are preferential to greenfield investments because the risk 
is smaller
With declining prices and falling US dollar, greenfield 
would only have made markets worse 
3 5
Weighted 
average cost of 
capital
Stora Enso had vast competency within  the organisation in 
pulling mergers through 
Operational intergration of CPI went well 3 Fixed costs
Customers are becoming bigger and bigger, and they negotiate 
with fewer suppliers 
Customers became larger, but still kept many 
suppliers onboard 
3
Volume and 
growth in 
volume
Unlike in the Kitimati project, employee relations are not likely 
to pose a problem
Employees accepted the new owner, but trade 
unions managed to obtain significant additional 
benefits
3
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have had to fight for market share with price in the absence of a good reputation. A more 
risky project would have required a higher cost of capital attached to it. This assumption also 
links the chain of assumptions to the chain “5- Pulp and paper industry characteristics”. 
 
Chain 4 – Market development 
 
In a growing market, making greenfield investments is more lucrative because of the 
possibility to obtain state of the art capacity. In 2000, Stora Enso management did not deem 
this option to be viable, however, because only limited growth was foreseen. Nevertheless, 
the good prospects of the printed and fine paper markets caused inflated asset prices, linking 
this chain to chain 1 “the seller‟s circumstances”.  
The growth of the paper market was expected due to the assumption of continued strong 
economic growth, which the United States has seen during the 1990s. The growth was largely 
attributed to the growing IT industry, which was causing a decline in newsprint, but a surge 
in printed paper demand in the form of increased advertising. The IT bubble burst in 2000, 
which was a partial reason for an economic downturn, reflected strongly also in the paper 
market. Prices were down both because of declining demand, but also due to the entry of 
Asian players, linking this chain also to chain 2. In 2000, the fundamental correlation 
between economic growth and paper consumption was broken. This can be partially 
attributable to the gradual shift in advertising away from printed media to the internet as well 
as trends to reduce paper consumption in offices as a means to help the environment. This 
chain can be considered significant in determining the value of SENA, because it effects both 
growth and volume figures. 
 
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
US magazine and fine paper markets are still growing, although 
growth is slowing down 
Growth stopped to a large extent when the IT bubble 
burst 
4
Price and 
Growth in price
The development of the IT industry has a positive effect on 
paper demand 
Technological development has started to reduce 
paper consumption 
4
Volume and 
growth in 
volume
LWC and CWF prices will remain at good levels for at least two 
years 
Prices fell strongly beginning in 2001 4 2
Price and 
Growth in price
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Chain 5 Pulp and Paper industry characteristics 
 
This chain of assumptions looks at assumptions that have to do with industry fundamentals. 
A key fundamental that was believed is that economies of scale and scope bring significant 
benefit in the pulp and paper industry. This in turn led to the idea that having only one paper 
mill, Port Hawkesbury, is useless because there are few synergies obtainable. Furthermore, it 
was believed that the industry was strongly consolidating, with larger players becoming 
larger, and smaller players disappearing from the market. Stora Enso wanted to be a 
consolidator and therefore actively sought M&A opportunities. This was part of their official 
and public strategy, endorsed by the board. It was also assumed that growth is a key value 
driver. As one management interviewee said “basic valuation models require a growth 
term”244 as has been shown in the beginning of this section. Several of these assumptions 
have failed to realize during the last decade. First of all, there are both small and large pulp 
and paper industry companies that have managed to be successful. The consolidation trend of 
the industry has practically stopped, because the benefits of consolidation have been difficult 
to realize in a declining market. According to a competitor interviewee, size, which 
traditionally has brought benefit in the form of better market power towards customers and 
suppliers, as well as increased internal efficiency, has not brought these benefits during the 
last decade as expected. Companies involved in mega-mergers, such as Stora Enso with 
Consolidated Papers, and International Paper with Champion have seen their acquisitions 
form a considerable drain rather than a profit driver. On the other hand, smaller players such 
as Hollmen in Sweden or Myllykoski in Finland have managed to stay viable, and have at 
times seen even better profit margins than their larger competitors.
245
 In other words, value 
creation has not demanded growth, but rather growth at high asset prices has destroyed value. 
While it is true that Stora Enso‟s lone paper mill in Canada was an unprofitable concept, the 
reason was probably not the size of the unit alone. 
The board of directors, which in 2007 still had the same chairman and one other member, as 
at the time of the acquisition, has since lost its belief in the need to operate globally. To 
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
Having one paper mill in the US is useless 
Yes, the Port Hawkesbury mill would not have 
succeeded on its own due to poor location 
5 Variable costs
Economies of scale and scope yield competitive advantage in the 
P&P industry 
Examples of both large and small succesful 
companies exist 
5 2 Fixed costs
The P&P industry is consolidated with big players increasing 
market share 
2001 marked the end of the consolidation trend for 
now 
5
The owners and board of directors are in favour of STE’s growth 
strategy through M&A 
Yes, to begin with but later board rejected global 
strategy and divested SENA 
5
Value creation demands growth 
M&As in the industry have generally not proven to be 
very succesful 
5
Growth in 
Volume
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succeed Jukka Härmälä, they chose Jouko Karvinen, who has made it clear that profitability 
is his key priority, even if it means downsizing the company significantly. The board is 
therefore currently endorsing an opposite trend in order to maximize profitability. The 
reversal in this trend is significant, and could be one of the reasons why Stora Enso lost faith 
in its North American division and sold it. Originally, the time horizon for the Consolidated 
Papers acquisition was much longer than the seven years the company was owned by Stora 
Enso. 
According to an adviser involved in the deal, the halting of the consolidation trend was to be 
expected after market prices for paper fell. For smaller players willing to divest mills or to 
merge with larger players, it was impossible to get the prices for assets that were hoped for. 
The larger players, on the other hand, seem to be waiting for smaller players to go out of 
business.
246
 In a declining market, capacity closures would be needed to improve price levels 
and see to it that operative capacity attains sufficient usage. The so called free rider problem 
has caused even large players to have severe difficulties in getting price increases through. A 
good example of this is NewPage, the company that bought SENA, which has a leading 
market share in many of its products
247, but, according to an adviser interviewee, still hasn‟t 
managed to affect prices positively due to smaller players who keep in hampering the 
market.
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This chain of assumptions links to several parts of the DCF model, the growth in volume 
term, the variable and fixed cost terms, and can be considered a significant chain for the value 
creation resulting from the acquisition. 
External, independent assumptions 
This group of assumptions is by nature independent and affects the picture in different ways. 
 
Assumption Outcome Grouping Link to
DCF term 
affected
Enso’s previous experiences in NA were different and mistakes 
irrelevant here 
Yes, problems with SENA did not have to do with 
location nor trade unions 
6
US govt will continue to set up trade barriers 
Yes, strong Euro caused no need against Europe, but 
antidumping suits against Asians have been seen 
6
Volume and 
growth in 
volume
STE could not expand through M&A in Europe due to antitrust 
regulation 
Yes, it seems likely 6
Listing in the US provides access  to a more efficient debt capital 
market 
Yes, Stora Enso was readily offered credit 6
Weighted 
average cost of 
capital
The dollar-Euro rate will continue to fluctuate and local 
manufacturing presence will provide natural hedge 
Yes, Dollar-Euro fluctuated, and strong Euro made 
American production competitive from 2005 onwards 
6
Prices and 
volume
Pulp and paper companies listed in the United States are worth 
more than their European counterparts 
The valuation gap diminshed during the 2000s 6
Weighted 
average cost of 
capital
 112 
 
The listing of Stora Enso in the NYSE was part of the deal structure, but it also meant that 
Stora Enso could have better access to debt capital markets and perhaps obtain cheaper credit. 
This assumption can be considered to have held during the time Stora Enso was listed there 
(until 2008) this has affected the valuation of SENA positively, as it has lowered the 
company‟s cost of capital. 
The assumption that the US government would set up trade barriers for trade in case of a 
strong US dollar is one which increased the value of the target company, because setting up 
trade barriers helps secure more revenues for domestic manufacturers. Although the 
weakness of the US dollar against the euro led to no need for such barriers against European 
companies, Asian manufacturers have been targets for such government action during 2000 - 
2007 several times, as seen in previous sections. 
The fluctuation of the US-dollar euro exchange rate was a factor which was deemed 
completely unpredictable by Stora Enso management. With a weak US dollar, local US based 
capacity was more competitive than European imports, so in this sense, the weakening of the 
US dollar helped SENA‟s local operations somewhat. The general poor price development, 
however, mitigated the positive effects of this. Only 2006 onwards, the general good price 
development has helped secure positive operating margins in dollar terms for US paper 
manufacturers. 
 
6.4. Identification of the most critical assumptions 
Looking at the list of over 20 assumptions gathered and analyzed, it is clear that they have not 
all been equally important in determining the value of the target company for Stora Enso. To 
answer the primary research questions of this report, why Stora Enso bought Consolidated, 
and which factors hindered attaining the preconceived benefits of the acquisition, the most 
critical assumptions must be identified. This leads us to a list of four key lessons that show 
what developments Stora Enso management failed to foresee when acquiring Consolidated 
Papers. 
Out of the five assumption chains and the group of independent assumptions, three seem to 
be most critical. They are market development, Consolidated Papers‟ competitive position 
and the US dollar / euro exchange rate. 
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Market development 
By buying Consolidated, Stora Enso management bought a front row seat in a market 
perceived to be growing. The investment calculation was based on hope that demand was to 
remain strong and prices steady. Instead, the bursting of the IT bubble led to a recession in 
the United States, and demand for paper fell. The paper industry did not manage to control 
supply sufficiently, which led to a long lasting slump in paper prices. Stora Enso management 
had failed to foresee correctly this development. What was also crucial was that paper 
consumption trends were changing, and the relation between GDP growth and growth in the 
consumption of many paper grades was broken. The change in demand is probably the factor 
that most harshly affected the value of Consolidated Papers for Stora Enso, leading us to the 
first lesson: 
1) Stora Enso management failed to foresee that the economic cycle would turn so 
suddenly and that the structure of demand for paper was fundamentally changing. 
 
Consolidated Papers’ competitive position 
Stora Enso bought Consolidated Papers because it was supposed to have the best capacity in 
the industry. Its machines wouldn‟t require heavy investment. While demand for paper in the 
United States started to fall, the American paper industry was facing issues with its own 
competitiveness against increasing Asian and especially Chinese competition. These players 
were able to produce good quality paper inexpensively and presented a challenge to US paper 
manufacturers who operated with older capacity and had higher labor costs. The increasing 
presence of Asian players had already been noticed by Consolidated Papers, whose 
profitability had weakened dramatically between 1995 and 1999.
249
 This development was 
probably one of the reasons why Consolidated Papers main owners were willing to exit the 
paper industry. Lesson number two is therefore: 
2) Stora Enso management failed to see the increasing presence of Asian paper 
manufacturers as a market disrupting threat 
One key rationale behind the deal for Stora Enso was that they thought they would be able to 
further improve the operational efficiency of Consolidated Papers. As mentioned, 
Consolidated Papers‟ profitability had constantly weakened since 1995, and Stora Enso 
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management assumed they could stop and even reverse this trend.
250
 Yet, the value of these 
synergies was modest compared to the premium paid to Consolidated Papers‟ shareholders, 
and furthermore, the level of operational synergies targeted was not attained. In fact, 
Consolidated Papers‟ employee costs spiraled despite heavy layoffs.251 The premium, on the 
other hand, would have been justified only if Consolidated Papers‟ profits and cash flows 
would have significantly improved. This leads us to the conclusion that: 
3) Stora Enso management was overconfident in its ability to turn Consolidated Papers 
weakening profitability trend around. 
 
The US dollar / euro exchange rate 
A further reason for the acquisition was that Stora Enso could gain a stronger foothold in the 
North American market, also for its products produced in Europe. To begin with, the strong 
US dollar made exporting paper to the US from Europe very profitable, and Stora Enso could 
inherit North American customer relationships from Consolidated Papers to its benefit. In the 
years that followed, however, the US dollar weakened significantly, making selling European 
paper in the United States a lot less profitable. Stora Enso management had assumed that the 
dollar / euro exchange rate could fluctuate, but did not expect such a radical weakening of the 
US dollar. The weakening did make SENA‟s own production more competitive, but on the 
other hand hampered production optimization. It was an important reason why Stora Enso‟s 
euro denominated losses as a result of the acquisition and divestment of Consolidated Papers 
were so large, as euro-denominated cash flows were coming down. Stora Enso had hedged its 
physical assets against currency risk, but not its future cash flows. The adverse development 
of the US dollar was one of the reasons why SENA was divested – chairman Dahlbäck called 
it “a burden”252 because euro-denominated revenues, and hence the euro value of North 
American business were falling so much. This leads us to our fourth lesson: 
4) Stora Enso management showed insight in creating a natural currency hedge but did 
not expect the US dollar to weaken as much as it  did 
All of the lessons boil down to how difficult it is to predict the future accurately. In this case, 
Stora Enso management had a seemingly overoptimistic view on the development of their 
environment. All but one of these factors were beyond the control of Stora Enso – The only 
way management could influence the outcome was to control the acquisition price. With a 
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lower price, on the other hand, Consolidated Papers would have been sold to someone else. In 
other words, in order to want to make the acquisition, one had to have a rather rosy picture of 
the future. The heavy bidding for Consolidated Papers, furthermore, suggests that this view of 
the future was shared by many throughout the industry – with the support of boards of 
directors and the financial markets. 
 
6.5. The question of shareholder value 
Acquisitions generally aim at increasing the short term or long term value of the acquiring 
company. In many cases, however, the key benefactors are the target‟s shareholders. (see, for 
example Bruner, 2002)  In this section, the acquisition‟s prospects of increasing shareholder 
value to Stora Enso‟s pre-deal shareholders are discussed. 
There is no doubt that the management of Stora Enso thought that the Consolidated Papers 
acquisition would bring benefit to the company. The strategic rationale in light of the 
information available was clear, although there was some overconfidence in how much Stora 
Enso could improve Consolidated Papers‟ performance. Yet the same rationale was seen by 
many other competing companies too. This caused the price of obtaining the strategic 
benefits to rise dramatically – It was a seller‟s market. Given the high price, how was the 
Consolidated Papers acquisition meant to benefit Stora Enso shareholders? Answering this 
question requires assessing Stora Enso management views on what shareholder value actually 
is. 
At the time of the acquisition, Stora Enso had a publicly communicated target for return on 
capital employed of 13%. Historically, this was a high figure for a pulp and paper company, 
but in 1999-2000, the market was very favorable for the industry and these figures were being 
met both by Stora Enso and many of its competitors including UPM-Kymmene.
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Return on capital employed (ROCE)
254
 was a measure being followed widely in the 
industry.
255
 The significance of the 13% ROCE target in day-to-day management, however, is 
questionable. A Stora Enso management interviewee said: 
“I never really understood where that target rate came from … If you own forest or 
hydroelectric dams, attaining 13% is very difficult because they usually yield a return of 
around 5%. The return is stable but rather moderate.”256 
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In Stora Enso‟s calculations, the price offered for Consolidated Papers was deemed high. Yet, 
according to projected price calculations, the forecast rate of return for the acquisition met a 
hurdle rate set for acquisitions. According to an adviser involved in the deal, the rate of return 
forecast was higher than the company‟s cost of capital. According to a management 
interviewee, the deal was “value neutral”, in other words, it was not supposed to neither 
create nor destroy shareholder value significantly for Stora Enso.
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The synergies anticipated between Stora Enso and Consolidated Papers were supposed to 
amount to approximately $110 million a year. Using Stora Enso‟s weighted average cost of 
capital of 9,3%,
258
 the synergies were valued to be at around $1,2 billion. When the equity 
price offered for Consolidated Papers was $3,6 billion, representing a 69% or approximately 
$1,5 billion dollar control premium compared to the share price right before the acquisition 
was publicized, it is clear that the Consolidated Papers shareholders received more than 100% 
of the theoretical value created in the deal. Stora Enso‟s cash flow projections therefore 
assumed that the market was undervaluing the standalone company before the acquisition. 
Since Stora Enso‟s and the equity market‟s perception of the standalone value of 
Consolidated Papers differed significantly, it is hardly surprising that Stora Enso‟s share price 
reacted negatively when the deal was made public, dropping around 15%. 
According to an investment banker, a drop of around 10% was expected, due to the dilution 
of shareholding in the company and the high price. For Stora Enso management, the extent of 
the drop was more of a surprise. Generally, however, they knew that markets usually react to 
acquisitions negatively, as it takes time for the market to understand the value creation logic 
of such a large transaction.
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Given that the value created from synergies was transferred to the target company 
shareholders and that there were several uncertainties involved including the creation of 
synergies, the taking through of a savings program at Consolidated Papers, and the success of 
post merger integration, it is fair to ask whether the deal ever had any chances of creating 
shareholder value all other factors remaining equal. According to a consultant involved in the 
valuation process, the price paid significantly exceeded their valuation of the company, but 
said that the valuation and the price paid can differ significantly when dealing with an 
auction. As mentioned, Stora Enso had “crafted the highest possible justifiable offer”260 for 
Consolidated to tackle competing bidders. It was therefore a well known fact by all relevant 
parties that the price paid was high. 
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Stora Enso‟s rationale, however, was that the acquisition was the first step in their North 
American strategy. 
”We saw that this (Consolidated) on its own, its ROCE would stay somewhere around 8%, 
clearly less than what it in principle should have been. But then our thought was that, to lift 
the ROCE, we’d use our foothold and then we could by single pieces which would then start 
improving the whole. We didn’t intend to stay at that return level or that entity.”261 
While this deal was “value neutral”, its price could be compensated for by buying smaller 
units in North America and integrating them to SENA, which, according to Stora Enso 
management, had a strong management team in place. These additional units could even have 
been individual mills without management teams in place. Using the North American 
platform in such as way would have enabled creating value by enabling the combination of 
local synergies between North American mills to the global customer and production 
optimization synergies attained from combining North American and European operations. 
This rhetoric was repeated often in Stora Enso‟s publications, a good example of which is an 
R&D conference where CEO Jukka Härmälä presented the following slide. An adviser 
involved in the deal, however, stated clearly that any continuation plans and gains thereof 
were not factored into the valuation.
262
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Table 6 Two slides from a Stora Enso hosted R&D conference in February 2001
263
 
An adviser to Stora Enso said that the board had discussed the price for a long time. They 
were aware that it was a very high price to pay. In the end, it boiled down to a bet concerning 
market prices for the paper products involved. In hindsight, one can say that since the prices 
declined so heavily, the bet failed. A key question that had been particularly addressed by 
Stora Enso management, stated both by the adviser and a management interviewee, was 
whether the company can survive having done the deal. The adviser involved said that Stora 
Enso management was well aware of the fact that many acquisitions done when the economy 
is “hot” and when asset prices are high can lead to serious trouble, especially when financed 
with debt. Stora Enso also had the possibility to finance the whole deal with debt and was 
prepared to pay the price fully in cash in case they wouldn‟t have managed to list their ADR 
in the NYSE by a given time.
264
 Instead, however, Stora Enso took a more conservative 
approach and financed the deal with equity. This significantly lowered the risk of the 
acquisition, and has probably helped the company keep afloat even as its markets deteriorated 
both in the United States and Europe. This, according to the adviser, was a sign of 
management insight from Stora Enso‟s top management team and board.265 
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In addition to the above mentioned continuation plans, an issue discussed by management at 
the time was the so-called valuation gap between US and European stock prices. Stora Enso 
management was aware of the fact that foreign companies that list in the United States tended 
rise in value following the listing, due to a broader access to potential investors and better 
availability of financing. This was mentioned as a key value creation driver by some 
management interviewees, although others said that while they were aware of this, it was not 
a reason for the acquisition.
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Other reasons stated were that, given that the industry was consolidating, this acquisition 
meant that Stora Enso would become a global leader in its industry. An adviser close to the 
deal said the acquisition made Stora Enso a “consolidator rather than a consolidatee”267. 
“International Paper could no longer be mentioned without also noting Stora Enso”268, 
which had previously suffered in the eyes of investors from its large government and family 
ownership. His personal view was that, had Stora Enso not carried out the deal, it probably 
would have been acquired itself at some point. Other, non-quantifiable benefits are the 
customer synergies Stora Enso allegedly received from the deal. A management interviewee 
claimed several times that the deal gave access to the European operations of such customers 
as Time Inc, which previously had not bought from Stora Enso.
269
 The additional revenues 
and profits resulting from this are not publicly available, making this statement difficult to 
verify. 
On the whole, however, it is a fair question to ask whether the main benefactor from the 
acquisition was meant to be Stora Enso as a company or its shareholders. In the Finnish pulp 
and paper industry, there has been a long history of prioritizing growth before profitability. 
(Lamberg, 2007) This has been shown several times in the history of the Finnish pulp and 
paper industry, and was mentioned as a key trait of the industry by a competitor interviewee. 
For Enso, this has been a particular issue, because of its government ownership. The Finnish 
government had used its companies for other means than shareholder value maximization as 
well, including supporting its regional employment politics.
270
 Large scale investments had 
been made with very low returns on investment. (Lamberg, 2007) The CEO Jukka Härmälä 
was not a pulp and paper industry veteran when he joined the company in 1993. Instead, his 
background was in banking. The interviewees mentioned that in the 1990s, shareholder value 
and the pricing mechanisms of shares were on the table frequently, and were an important 
issue. Yet, with such a legacy, and many management team members that had managed the 
company also in times when shareholder value was not that important, was the Consolidated 
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Papers acquisition really meant to maximize shareholder value? From a strategic perspective 
it seemed like the right thing to do at the time for the company, but the benefits were given 
mostly to Consolidated Papers shareholders already beforehand, in the form of cash and a 
significant portion, 18%, of Stora Enso stock. Stora Enso shareholders were left with a risky, 
but yet “value neutral deal.” 
On the other hand, one may ask who would have benefited if Stora Enso itself had been 
acquired. Statistically, the largest gain would most likely have come to Stora Enso‟s 
shareholders as is the case with most M&A transactions. (See for example, Bruner, 2002) 
Another question is whether the new owner would have regarded keeping production in 
Finland and Sweden as being that important. 
The question of shareholder value can be summed up rather well in the words of an adviser 
interviewee who said: “Does Stora Enso management regret doing the deal – Probably yes, 
but did the company survive? Yes, and did it make it a significant global player in the 
market? -  yes”271 
 
6.6. The effects of the deal on Stora Enso’s other operations – What else could Stora 
Enso have done? 
When a company with sales of 10,6 billion euros in sales (1999)
272
 invests 3 billion euros in 
cash, and 5 billion counting equity, such an investment is bound to have an effect on the 
company‟s other prospective investments. 
When SENA was divested in 2007, Stora Enso was simultaneously dealing with the issue of 
closing its Kemijärvi pulp mill. This became a heated political debate in Finland, with many 
demanding that the government, the major stockholder in the company, take action to prevent 
this and other closures. There was also speculation in the press that the failed investment in 
the United States was a reason behind closing the Kemijärvi mill. At the time, Helsingin 
Sanomat, a leading Finnish newspaper wrote “According to Stora Enso country manager 
Aulis Ansaharju, the reason for the closure of the mill is not bad profitability, but the rising 
price of raw material. The workers at the factory, on the other hand, think they have to pay 
for, for example, the unprofitable America-venture Stora Enso had taken part in”. 273 At the 
same time, a left wing Member of Parliament was quoted saying “The American adventure is 
now being charged from other units” while referring to the closure of Kemijärvi. 274 
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Stora Enso, however, had acquired Consolidated Papers with rather conservative deal terms. 
While it could have financed the whole purchase with cash and debt, it chose to pay 50% of 
the equity price by issuing new stock. This considerably decreased the risks involved with the 
deal, even though the market turned down. This is well depicted by looking at Stora Enso‟s 
debt / equity ratio in the following chart, which remained at sustainable levels throughout the 
holding period 2000-2007. In fact, according to the former CFO, owners demanded 
additional payouts, after which the company acquired and cancellation a substantial amount 
of its own shares. This was meant to prevent the company‟s balance sheet from becoming 
sub-optimal.
275
 These additional payouts were carried out even when SENA was still very 
unprofitable. It is therefore not fair to say that the SENA “venture” would have been the 
reason for other closures. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
-20 %
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Eu
r 
B
N
Stora Enso Market Cap, ROCE and Debt/equity 
ratio
Market capitalisation at year 
end BN
Overall Return on Capital 
Employed
Debt/Equity ratio
Figure 37 Stora Enso market capitalization, return on capital employed and debt/equity 
ratio 2000-2008
276
 
When asked the question, what alternative scenarios Stora Enso had at the time, Stora Enso 
management interviewees gave differing answers. These included buying something else in 
the United States or investing in a joint venture in Asia. Investing heavily in China, however, 
was not considered a viable option at the time. 
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“I’ve sometimes thought that if we had proposed giving up the US deal and hence not going 
to the World’s largest paper market, and instead we had suggested putting a billion into 
China, it would never have been accepted. I’m positive about that.”277 
South America and China had been identified as strong areas in the future, but first the 
company had felt the need to secure its home market position in the United States. In doing 
so, Stora Enso would have two solid home markets. It could then use cash flow from both 
markets to fund its more risky investments in emerging markets.
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“We would anyway have had to use the money (from hydro electric power plants) on 
something”279, stated one interviewee. Therefore a large scale payout of dividends would 
have been unlikely. As can be seen from Stora Enso‟s overall profitability during this time, 
the money invested would not very likely have obtained a satisfactory rate of return even if it 
had been invested somewhere else. In general, investing in the pulp and paper industry in 
2000 has been a poor investment. It is also possible that Stora Enso might not have sold its 
power plants. In this case, Stora Enso would have been a lot more profitable, as owning the 
power plants has since been very profitable for the buyer Fortum.
280
 A comparable example 
is UPM-Kymmene, which failed in its attempt to take over Champion International. As a 
result, it paid an extraordinary dividend, and acquired a smaller Canadian operation, Repap 
Canada. It has later regretted the acquisition in Canada and closed down the mills it bought. 
UPM-Kymmene has also been an active player in both South America and Asia. UPM did 
not sell its power plants, and in recent years, a large part of its profits have in fact come from 
electricity sales.
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In retrospect, one could think that investing in new efficient mills in China would have been a 
sensible course of action since it has later on proven to be one of the best places to make 
paper profitably. China and South America were in Stora Enso‟s plans, but first the idea was 
to build a strong home market in North America.
282
 It is unfair to say, however, that the 
Consolidated Papers acquisition and the fact that its cash flows were weaker than expected 
would have severely hampered Stora Enso‟s ability to invest in interesting ventures. This 
claim is supported by the fact that Stora Enso began acquiring its own shares to optimize its 
capital structure.
283
 In other words, it was seen wiser by the board to pay out a significant part 
of the balance sheet than to invest it. 
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6.7. What was the extent of Stora Enso’s losses as a result of the acquisition and 
subsequent divestment of Consolidated Papers and Stora Enso North America? 
In the media, Stora Enso has been heavily criticized for the losses it incurred by first buying 
Consolidated Papers in 2000 for a high price and then selling it in 2007 for a considerably 
lower price. The deal has, for example, been chosen in a newspaper poll as the worst deal in 
Finnish corporate history.
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Estimates of the final cost of the whole North American excursion vary between one and six 
billion euros. The calculations have been done with variable rigor. 
The aim of this section is to give a fair representation of the cost of the transaction, and to 
identify factors that have to be assessed. The section consists of four parts. In the first part, 
we look at estimates presented by others, and assess their reliability. In the second section, we 
calculate losses by comparing cash flows in the acquisition and divestment processes as well 
as during ownership. In the third section, we provide another calculation by assessing 
accounting profits, while in the fourth section, we look at the effects of the acquisition on 
Stora Enso as a company, and consider how to treat the equitized deal structure so that pre-
deal shareholders are adequately compensated for their diluted stockholding. 
 
Previously presented analyses of the cost of the Consolidated acquisition 
The primary analysis to be considered is the one presented by Stora Enso‟s current CEO 
Jouko Karvinen at the 2008 annual general meeting, right after closing the divestment of 
SENA. 
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He presented his calculation while saying that it is meant to be as simple as possible. It 
should therefore be treated as Stora Enso‟s view on the order of magnitude of the cost. 
 
 
Figure 38 Slide from Jouko Karvinen's presentation at 2008 Stora Enso AGM that 
estimates losses from SENA between 2000 and 2007
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According to the calculation, the total loss that occurred to Stora Enso was around 2,0 billion 
euros. There are, however, some problems in the calculation: 
 Cash flow has been calculated by subtracting capital expenditures from earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA – CAPEX, however, is 
not the same figure as operating cash flow less investments. There are major 
differences in the two figures that owe to, for example, taxation of operational profits 
and changes in net working capital. Without further calculation, the effect of this 
difference is difficult to quantify. 
 The treatment of Port Hawkesbury is problematic. Port Hawkesbury‟s cash flows 
have been left out of the operational cash flows. Port Hawkesbury is not part of the 
initial investment either, because it had already been built by Stora earlier. Yet, in the 
sale price, Port Hawkesbury was included. According to Stora Enso management 
team interviewees, Port Hawkesbury‟s operational cash flows were negative 
throughout the period and its value was negative at the time of divestment, because it 
was expected to be closed, which would have incurred costs. If this was the case, then 
the loss calculated is in fact too large. 
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 The positive taxation effects of making a loss have not been included 
 The calculation does not take into account the time value of money. 
 
Shortly after Karvinen presented his calculation, Taloussanomat, one of the leading economic 
dailies in Finland, criticized Karvinen‟s calculation for giving an over-optimistic picture of 
the true losses. 
Taloussanomat‟s calculation was based on Karvinen‟s but it added a significant cost of 
capital of 6,4% to the investment. The journal itself admits its calculation to be imprecise as it 
assumes that all annual cash flows to be of equal size. Nevertheless, the adding of the cost of 
capital naturally increases the magnitude of the losses, to about 4,5 billion euros.
286
 This 
calculation could be criticized for adding a cost of capital that is too large. There is no risk 
involved in historical cash flows, so why discount them at a rate that assumes uncertainty? 
This calculation does not address problems with the treatment of Port Hawkesbury, nor does 
it take into account the positive taxation effects of making a loss. 
In other calculations, the extent of the losses vary between 0,9 billion euros and 6 billion 
euros, depending on what rate of return one uses, and especially which currency one does the 
calculations in.
287
 It can therefore be assumed that making a calculation is not 
straightforward. They may be biased and make different assumptions. 
A calculation of the extent of the losses carried by Stora Enso – Cash Flow method 
In this section, a calculation is presented in a step by step manner. As many factors as 
possible have been taken into account. Naturally, some assumptions also have to be made. 
The aim of this is to provide a transparent and understandable calculation. This calculation 
has been shown to various parties, including former Stora Enso management team members 
and a consultant close to the paper industry, who was an adviser both in the acquisition and 
divestment processes. They have provided suggestions on how to correct the calculation, but 
care has been taken not to include any biased views on the matter. The steps of the analysis 
are: 
 Establishing the final acquisition and divestment prices in dollars 
 Calculation of the operational cash flows in dollars during ownership 
 Assessing the correct cost of capital 
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 Calculation of the losses in US dollars 
 Using appropriate adjustments, calculation of the losses in euros 
 Calculation of losses to pre-acquisition Stora Enso shareholders 
 
Establishing the final acquisition and divestment prices in dollars 
When the deal was announced, the price per Consolidated Papers share of $44 was based on 
Stora Enso‟s share price at the time of announcement, in February 2000. This gave 
Consolidated Papers a total price of about $4,0 billion in addition to about $ 0,9 billion in 
assumed debt.  Since part of the deal was financed, however, using Stora Enso equity, the 
acquisition price was also subject to variation. When the deal was closed on September 1, 
2000, Stora Enso‟s share price had fallen so that in total, equity value was $3,564 billion and 
assumed debts had fallen to about $800 million due to Consolidated Paper‟s good 
profitability between February and September 2000. 
 
Table 7 Final terms of the acquisition
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The company was sold, in term, in a deal that included cash, a vendor note given by Stora 
Enso to the buyer, NewPage, as well as a 20% holding in NewPage corp. At the time of 
making the deal public, these were valued as follows: 
 
Table 8 Terms of the Divestment
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The vendor note had a face value of $200 million, and in fact both the value of the vendor 
note and the ownership in NewPage have since been valued at zero due to NewPage‟s 
financial difficulties.
290
 For the sake of the calculation, however, the values estimated at the 
time of the transaction are used because what happened after that was a separate decision and 
no longer had to do with the original acquisition. 
Acquisition $ MM
Cash 2034
Stora Enso ADRs 1530
Assumed debt 800
Total EV 4364
Sale $ MM
Cash 1526
Stock 370
Vendor note 171
Assumed debts 450
Total EV 2517
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In conjunction with the divestment, the value of Port Hawkesbury is problematic. Some Stora 
Enso management interviewees claimed that the value of the mill was negative at the time of 
divestment, because of the constant negative cash flows it produced. On the other hand, 
Swedish journal Affarsvärlden estimated that the value of Port Hawkesbury was significant, 
because it was in fact SENA‟s newest mill.291 In the Finnish economic journal Kauppalehti, 
Port Hawkesbury was recognized as a liability after the divestment. “Port Hawkesbury‟s 
closure will cost NewPage $500-600 MM”.292 To this day, however, Port Hawkesbury has 
not been closed, however. It is therefore probably a fair assumption that a mill constantly on 
the border line of positive cash flows is worth zero, because while it earns some cash flow 
now, its future closure will come at a cost. 
 
Calculation of the operational cash flows in dollars during ownership 
 
Figure 39 SENA operative cash flows and investments 2000-2007. Note 2005-7 
figures calculated based on euro cash flows converted using yearly average exchange 
rates
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As can be seen in the above picture, Stora Enso North American managed to obtain positive 
cash flows from operations throughout the period. In 2003 and 2004 total cash flows were 
negative due to heavy investments. These values do not take into account any financing costs, 
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or gains from currency hedges. In total, the cumulative operative cash flows during this 
period were $1543 million, investments $724 million, the divestment of forest assets in 2002 
for $142 million, giving a total of $961 million. 
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One can also see that in terms of cash flow, 2006 and 2007 were rather good years. 
Operationally, 2002 was in fact the best year, although heavy investments brought total cash 
flows down significantly. 
In order to keep calculations simple, we have assumed that cash flows from Port Hawkesbury 
were zero throughout the period. The reason for this is that according Stora Enso 
management interviewees, Port Hawkesbury‟s cash flows were negative throughout the 
period. This is supported by the fact that, for example, during 2005-2006, the mill was closed 
due to profitability challenges, signaling negative cash flows.
295
 This was at a time when 
prices had already picked up. Yet in 2002, in conjunction with the SENA profit enhancement 
plan, the mill underwent expansion investments, signaling that there was still faith its 
machines. 
 
Assessing the correct cost of capital 
The question of which rate of return would be appropriate for adjusting cash flows is 
difficult. On one hand, there is no uncertainty associated with historic cash flows. This would 
mean that the correct rate of return to be calculated would be a risk-free rate in US dollars, 
such as a treasury bill rate. Yet on the other hand, Stora Enso has had to pay interest on its 
debts and its shareholders have had a certain return on equity they would have expected to 
gain. This thinking, in turn leads to what many analysts and journalists have used, the 
WACC, or weighted average cost of capital. 
Yet, one could think of the matter in terms of how much shareholders have lost if the money 
invested had been spent on something else. In such a case, Stora Enso could have paid off its 
debts, given the money out as dividends or invested it in its other activities. In this case, one 
could use the interest paid by Stora Enso in its debt, again the risk free rate, or Stora Enso‟s 
ROCE during 2000-2007. 
The ambiguity of this matter is probably one of the reasons for the large spread in estimates 
of the total losses. 
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In this calculation, however, the risk free rate has been used. In this way, the losses can be 
calculated from a shareholders perspective. 
The discount rate has been searched in such a way that for cash flows of a given year, the 
time left to the end of 2007 is calculated, and then the appropriate rate is looked up from the 
yield curve valid at the end of the given year. Note that cash flows of a given year have been 
set to occur at the end of each year. 
 
Table 9 US treasury bond rates in different years and at different points in the yield 
curve
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Calculation of the losses in US dollars 
 
Table 10 Table of cash flows
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In the table above, the investment and divestment prices and cash flows have been discounted 
using the method previously explained to present value at the end of 2007. This gives a total 
cost in US dollars to the venture about $2,6 Billion. Without any time value of money taken 
into account, the extent of the losses is $885 million. 
 
Using appropriate adjustments, calculation of the losses in euros 
Next, the losses in US dollars are converted into euros, as Stora Enso is a euro based 
company. In some previous calculations, yearly cash flows have been converted into euros 
using exchange rates for each year. This method, however, does not take into account any 
currency hedges or dollar based debt that has been raised to fund the investment. According 
to Stora Enso‟s CFO at the time, the acquisition was in fact fully hedged against changes in 
Cash Flow Year Point in Yield Curve Yield curve rate in given year Discount factor
2000 7 5,16 % 1,42
2001 6 4,61 % 1,31
2002 5 2,78 % 1,15
2003 4 1,84 % 1,08
2004 3 2,75 % 1,08
2005 2 4,37 % 1,09
2006 1 5,02 % 1,05
2007 0 0,00 % 1,00
$ MM 2000 4 mo 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Cash flow from operations 122,0 282,0 293,0 61,0 143,0 212,0 244,9 185,9 1543,8
Investments -4391,0 -71,0 -155,0 -182,0 -204,0 -22,8 -59,9 -2,3 -5088,0
Divestments 0,0 0,0 142,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2517,0 2659,0
Cash flow post investments -4269,0 211,0 280,0 -121,0 -61,0 189,2 184,9 2700,6 -885,3
Value end of 2007 -6071,3 276,5 321,1 -130,2 -66,2 206,1 194,2 2700,6 -2569,0
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the USD-euro exchange rate. This data can be verified by looking at Stora Enso‟s annual 
reports. In 2004, the annual report of Stora Enso states that “Group policy for translation risk 
exposure is to minimize this by funding assets, whenever possible and economically viable, in 
the same currency, but if matching of the assets and liabilities in the same currency is not 
possible, hedging of the remaining translation risk may take place.”298 
The amount of losses accumulated from depreciation of dollar based assets and the gains 
from the hedging thereof can be found in Stora Enso‟s annual reports under the section “CTA 
and hedging thereof”. CTA stands for cumulative translation adjustment, and is a technical 
term used in the IFRS accounting system for valuing foreign currency based assets to their 
true value. The CTA comes from changes in value arising from changes in the foreign 
currency, not from other factors that affect an asset‟s value. Stora Enso‟s currency hedge 
policy stated that all foreign currency-based assets must be hedged either by matching them 
with liabilities in the same currency, with any remaining mismatches to be hedged with other 
hedging instruments. 
As stated in the annual report of 2007, “Exchange differences, arising from the translation of 
equity, results and dividends for foreign subsidiary and associate undertakings, are 
aggregated with the financial instruments hedging these investments and the net is recorded 
directly in shareholders’ equity as CTA; this is expensed through the Income statement on the 
divestment of a foreign entity.”299 In other words, it is enough for us to look at the CTA and 
the hedging thereof at the end of the ownership period, when these differences are realized. 
“At the time of the SENA disposal, CTA losses and hedging gains for the divested operations 
amounted to EUR -509.7 million and EUR 640.3 million respectively. The Canadian 
currency movements and hedging gains came to EUR 33.9 million and EUR 65.4 
respectively, and for the USA, EUR -543.6 million and EUR 574.9 million. The net currency 
gain of EUR 130.6 million mainly represented currency gains in the earlier years of the 
SENA operations before the Group implemented a comprehensive equity hedging regime in 
North America. In the period 2002 to 2007, when full hedging was in place, CTA losses 
amounted to EUR 590.3 million against which equity hedges generated gains of EUR 600.4 
million, an overall gain of EUR 10.1 million, being +1.7% of the exposure”300. However, the 
hedge gain was taxable where as the CTA losses being hedge were not tax deductible. This 
led to a net tax cost of 189,3 million euros, of which the pro rata USA share is 170,0 million 
euros. 
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Therefore, the overall gain from currency hedging of US based assets was 404,9 million 
euros. 
Total euro losses 
Now that the currency hedges have been taken properly into account, we may now convert all 
cash flows into euros using either the year end or the year average rate. This gives the total 
loss in euros to which we add the gain from currency hedges. 
 
Table 11 Stora Enso’s total after tax losses for existing shareholders 
Calculation of total losses in euros 
As we can see, the pre-tax total losses now lie at around 3,4 billion euros, which is more than 
the loss in dollars using the 2000 year end rate (approximately 2,75 billion euros). 
We may therefore conclude that while the losses in dollars constitute only about 2,0 billion 
euros at 2007 end exchange rates, an additional 0,7 billion euros comes purely from the 
depreciation of the divestment value during the ownership period, despite the hedging of the 
assets. 
We also notice that the time value of money constitutes a considerable sum in this 
calculation. Without taking that into account, the pre-tax euro losses are around 1,5-1,6 
billion euros, while the time value adds an additional 1,8 billion euros. 
 
Correction for taxes and shareholding dilution as a result of the acquisition 
When calculating the losses from a pre-acquisition Stora Enso shareholder point of view, the 
dilution of shareholdings that occurred in conjunction with the deal must be taken into 
account. The merger resulted in the creation of 167 million new shares, on top of an existing 
stock base of 760 million shares. This means that pre-acquisition shareholders received 82% 
of the merged company, meaning that 18% of the losses were incurred in theory by 
Consolidated Papers‟ shareholders. 
EUR MM (year average rate) 2000 4 mo 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Cash flow from operations 132,1 315,0 309,9 53,9 115,0 170,3 194,9 135,6 1426,7
Investments -4756,3 -79,3 -164,0 -160,8 -164,0 -18,3 -47,7 -1,7 -5392,0
Divestments 0,0 0,0 150,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1835,8 1986,0
Realised equity hedging gains 404,9 404,9
Cash flow post investments -4624,1 235,7 296,2 -106,9 -49,0 152,0 147,2 2374,6 -1574,4
Value end of 2007 -6576,3 308,9 349,1 -117,1 -54,7 172,8 162,3 2374,6 -3380,4
Tax benefit multiple assuming 28% marginal income tax 0,72
Consolidated's Shareholders' share of loss (18%) 0,82
After tax losses for pre-deal shareholders -1995,8
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In addition, to look at the deal from a shareholder perspective, we must take into account 
taxes. An estimated 28% tax rate is used, which is based on Stora Enso‟s tax rate from on 
continuing operations, which has varied between 25-33% during 2000-2007. 
This leaves the total loss in cash to about 0,9 billion euros without the time value of money, 
and to about 2,0 billion euros adjusted with the risk free rate.¨ 
Isolation of the effect of the weakening US dollar 
During the ownership period, the US dollar weakened dramatically. It is therefore an 
interesting question how much of the losses were caused purely by changing currency rates. 
The sales price, $2517 million, equaled approximately 1712 million euros using the end of 
2007 exchange rate, whereas it would have equaled about 2735 million euros using the 
average exchange rate of 2000, $0,92 / euro. The difference is therefore approximately one 
billion euros, from which we must deduct the positive hedging gains of 405 million, as well 
as the taxation and ownership dilution effects. The total effect of the exchange rates was 
approximately 365 million euros, a significant part of the losses. In addition one may argue, 
however, that the weakening US dollar made North American production more competitive, 
reducing losses. On the other hand, one should also take into account the loss of synergies 
caused by Stora Enso not being able to sell its European paper to the same extent. Both of 
these effects are difficult to quantify. 
 
A calculation of the extent of the losses carried by Stora Enso – accounting profit 
method 
In order to validate the results of the cash flow method, an alternative method can be used. 
The accounting loss is calculated by looking at SENA‟s earnings before interest and taxes 
during the ownership period. These figures must include all depreciation, amortizations, 
impairment charges as well as goodwill amortization. This method has the additional benefit 
of being able to more accurately assess the after tax losses incurred by Stora Enso. 
Based on information available in annual reports and investor presentations, EBITDA and 
EBITA figures have been gathered in euros wherever possible. In a couple of cases, figures 
have only been available in US dollars. There, the figures have been converted into euros 
using year-end rates. The figures include CTA adjustments, hedges thereof, and the extra tax 
cost mentioned. These add up to a total loss of about 140 million euros market for 2007. In 
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addition to this, information on goodwill impairments and amortizations has been searched. 
These are listed in the following table: 
 
Table 12 Accounting profit calculation of the Consolidated Papers acquisition and 
divestment
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As we can see from the table, the accounting loss arising from the ownership period of 
Consolidated Papers amounts to about 1,8 billion euros. Port Hawkesbury has been treated 
here so that the depreciation on Port Hawkesbury assets of 364 million euros during 2000-
2007 has been subtracted from the loss. In addition, it has been assumed that Port 
Hawkesbury has not provided any EBITDA during this time. This can be assumed because it 
was reportedly suffering from profitability problems during the whole time, and was even 
closed for a long period. Then, on the other hand, it can be assumed to have made somewhat 
positive EBITDA margins at least when prices were at higher levels, because otherwise it 
would most likely have been closed. 
The question of time value of the assets invested is approached differently in this method. 
The idea is to gather data on how much capital employed there has been in the United States 
in each year. As the figure is the highest in 2000, when no amortizations had yet been made, 
this value carries interest throughout seven years. Any capital freed during this time receives 
interest on up until the end of 2007. This interest is subtracted from the one on the original 
sum. The interest rate used is again the US risk free rate at the appropriate point on the yield 
curve in each given year. However, in order to calculate how much maintaining this capital 
has cost the company, a margin on 0,8% is added on top of the interest rate, to make it 
correspond to the interest paid on debt. In this sense, we get a sense of how much accounting 
loss has been caused by maintaining the additional capital on the balance sheet. 
EUR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
EBITA 79,20 -23,28 -164,00 -163,00 -103,41 -180,20 -5,70 162,60 -397,79
Non recurring items -36,00 -238,70 -24,60 -74,10 -373,40
Total 43,20 -23,28 -402,70 -187,60 -177,51 -180,20 -5,70 162,60 -771,19
Goodwill amortization/impairment 0,00 -33,00 -992,80 -33,10 -29,70 -8,00 0,00 -158,90 -1255,50
Total 43,20 -56,28 -1395,50 -220,70 -207,21 -188,20 -5,70 3,70 -2026,69
Other items
Cumulative translation adjustment (USA) -543,60 -543,60
Hedging thereof 574,90 574,90
Extra tax cost -170,00 -170,00
Total loss without time value of money 43,20 -56,28 -1395,50 -220,70 -207,21 -188,20 -5,70 -539,90 -2165,39
total loss w/o  PH (assuming PH EBITDA on ave. 0) -1800,99
Capital employed in the USA 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Usa 4781,20 4741,30 2654,00 2143,00 2079,00 2085,00 1729,00 422,00
Difference y/y 4781,20 -39,90 -2087,30 -511,00 -64,00 6,00 -356,00 -1307,00
Years to divestment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Change in assets in the USA 4781,20 -39,90 -2087,30 -511,00 -64,00 6,00 -356,00 -1307,00
Actualization factor - 1 0,50 0,37 0,19 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,06 0,00
Interest gathered assuming debt 2388,99 -14,83 -401,35 -56,14 -7,06 0,64 -20,72 0,00 1889,52
Total loss for company pre tax -3690,51
Tax benefit multiple assuming 28% marginal income tax 0,72
Consolidated's Shareholders' share of loss (18%) 0,82
Total loss for pre deal shareholders after tax -2178,88
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The total cost of capital during the ownership period is about 1,9 billion euros, making the 
total accounting loss add up to about 3,7 billion euros. This figure is well in line with the 
figure obtained using the cash flow method, which was around 3,4 billion euros. 
Again, we may subtract from this figure 18%, which have theoretically been carried by new 
shareholders. In addition, we may subtract an estimated 28% in taxes, because interest on 
debt amortizations and impairments are tax deductible. In this way, the loss carried by Stora 
Enso pre-acquisition shareholders adds up to about 2,2 billion euros. 
 
The treatment of the equitized deal structure 
As a third method to calculate the total losses incurred by Stora Enso management, a method 
is used that separates cash flows to and from Stora Enso plc. and those between Stora Enso 
plc. and its shareholders. This is done in order to explicitly account for the fact that 50% of 
equity sale price was paid in Stora Enso stock. This, according to some interviewees, was a 
result of Stora Enso management insight and conservative approach to taking risks. The 
calculation also serves as a good verification for the two calculations shown previously. 
The method of calculation is otherwise the same, except that in the initial investment, only 
the assumed debt of Consolidated Papers, and the cash part of the sale price are taken into 
consideration. This considerably reduces the negative cash flow incurred as a result of the 
deal. Pre-deal shareholders of Stora Enso are compensated for the stock issued the company 
by taking the portion of the new shareholders into account when calculating payouts and the 
company‟s end value after the SENA divestment. Hence, 18% of dividends and share 
repurchasing proceedings paid out between 2000 and end of 2007 are calculated as a loss for 
Stora Enso shareholders. In addition, 18% of the company‟s equity value on the approximate 
time of closing the SENA divestment, 31 December 2007 is calculated as a loss for Stora 
Enso shareholders. This is because without the deal, this 18% would be under their 
ownership, all other factors remaining equal, which they could have theoretically bought 
back. 
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Table 13 Cash flow to shareholders calculation of the Consolidated Papers acquisition 
and divestment 
This method gives slight higher loss figures as a result. The approximate loss to pre-deal 
Stora Enso shareholders after loss-related tax benefits calculated with an assumed corporate, 
dividend and capital gain tax rate of 28% is around 2,7 billion euros. This difference arises 
from other factors, namely the difference in valuation of Stora Enso‟s other assets between 
2000 and 2007. Between 2000 and 2007, the optimism of the European paper industry was 
turning into an increasingly grim outlook. Nevertheless, this method yields a loss figure that 
is around 500 million euros higher than the calculated after tax share of accounting losses of 
pre-deal shareholders, which was 2,2 billion euros. This method can naturally be contested 
due to the rather harsh assumption of when the 18% stock should theoretically be bought 
back. This is due to the rather large fluctuation in value of Stora Enso stock during the 
closing of the divestment. We may hence conclude, that without the acquisition, all other 
factors remaining equal, and with the assumption of the alternative cost of capital used, Stora 
Enso‟s pre-deal shareholders would have been about 2,0 – 2,7 billion euros better off without 
the buying and selling of Consolidated Papers. 
 
Other factors that affect the calculation 
The figure stated above is an estimate of the extent of the losses to Stora Enso‟s shareholders 
based on all publicly available quantified data. There are, however, other factors which are 
difficult to quantify based on data available. These may have a minor effect on the total 
losses, and hence act as limitations to the calculations presented. 
Stora Enso still retains some minor holdings in the United States. When Stora Enso sold 
SENA, it retained its holdings operated by Corenso, its packaging business. Corenso still 
owns a core board machine in Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin which used to be part of 
Consolidated Papers. According to the former CFO of Stora Enso, the factory‟s book value is 
around 20-30 million euros. 
EUR MM (year average rate) 2000 4 mo 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Cash flow from operations 132,1 315,0 309,9 53,9 115,0 170,3 194,9 135,6 1426,7
Investments -3099,0 -79,3 -164,0 -160,8 -164,0 -18,3 -47,7 -1,7 -3734,7
Divestments 0,0 0,0 150,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1835,8 1986,0
Realised equity hedging gains - extra tax 404,9 404,9
Cash flow post investments -2966,9 235,7 296,2 -106,9 -49,0 152,0 147,2 2374,6 82,8
Value end of 2007 -4219,4 308,9 349,1 -117,1 -54,7 172,8 162,3 2374,6 -1023,4
18% of dividends paid out + sharerepurch. 0,0 -109,4 -124,3 -127,2 -103,4 -127,8 -65,8 -63,9 -721,8
Value end of 2007 0,0 -143,3 -146,5 -139,4 -115,2 -145,3 -72,6 -63,9 -826,2
18% of equity value 31 Dec 2007 -1278,0 -1278,0
Total loss to shareholders (pre tax) -3766,6
Assumed corporate, dividend + capital gain tax 28% 1054,6
Total loss to shareholders (after tax) -2711,9
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SENA data did not include sales in the USA that originated from the company‟s European 
operations. While Stora Enso already had sales to the USA before the Consolidated Papers 
acquisition, the increased presence on the continent also allowed for additional sales from the 
company‟s European mills to the USA. This data is difficult to quantify based on publicly 
available data. 
There is contradiction over whether Stora Enso‟s increased presence in the USA also allowed 
for increased sales to US companies‟ European operations. According to the CEO, major 
customers such as Time Inc. did not previously order from Stora Enso in Europe, whereas 
this benefit from global operations was not seen by other Stora Enso management 
interviewees. 
By listing in the United States and by having a large proportion of ownership there, Stora 
Enso gained access to more capital, perhaps at cheaper interest rates. This effect is also very 
difficult to quantify, but might have had a positive effect on the company‟s results 
On the other hand, there were significant costs related to the listing in the United States, 
arising from complex accounting policies. The United States was increasingly viewed as a 
difficult place to list shares due to the tightening regulation that followed the Enron scandal 
in 2001, such as the introduction of the Sarbanes – Oxley act in 2002. 
Overall, the non-quantifiable side effects of the increased presence in the United States can 
be estimated to have had a somewhat positive effect on results. With an estimated 100 million 
euros (after tax) coming from these side effects, the total loss to Stora Enso shareholders is 
approximately 1,9 billion euros in cash, and 2,6 billion euros, assuming pre-deal shareholders 
would have bought back the new shares issued at the end of 2007. It is interesting to note, 
that purely from the company‟s point of view, the venture was in fact one which generated 
positive cash flows. 
 
6.8. The Stora Enso – Consolidated Papers acquisition in the M&A literature 
context 
Overall, it seems like the acquisition of Consolidated Papers was a rather typical acquisition, 
at least when compared to the findings from M&A literature in chapter 4. 
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The decision making process of the deal seems to have gone in the order predicted by the 
assumption framework. First, the company management had thought about its next step in 
general, deciding that M&A is the preferable course of action in the industry which already 
had enough capacity. Secondly, it was decided that the US market was the primary target, 
because the Chinese and South American markets did not seem like viable options quite yet 
for major expansion. Thirdly, the target was sought with Consolidated Papers coming on the 
top of the list of good candidates to buy. 
In terms of deriving the assumptions, the deal process has followed many elements found in 
literature. Imitation of other companies was present as a factor. This can be seen in the large 
number of deals involving US pulp and paper companies and the high level of interest shown 
towards acquiring them. It seems also that management‟s past experience in M&A played a 
significant part in coming to the idea that M&A would be the preferable course of action. 
This is, however, slightly contradictory to the board‟s position, many of whose members had 
warned about poor results with M&A, especially in the United States.
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Most of the rationales for the deal were synergistic. These included financial synergies, such 
as the possibility to take advantage of differences in cycle in different parts of the world. 
(Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000) The deal was also supposed to yield economies of scope by 
enabling the optimization of production between the US and Stora Enso‟s European paper 
mills. Economies of scale were supposed to be attained by buying additional production units 
in the US later on. Market developments, however, prevented this from taking place. (Walter 
and Barney, 1990) 
In terms of cross border synergies, “exploitation of cross border synergies quicker than 
through organic investment” was clearly a factor. Stora Enso wanted to start to sell more of 
its products in the US, but needed Consolidated‟s competencies in sales and marketing to do 
so. Using its excess resources (i.e. overcapacity in Stora Enso‟s European mills) was also one 
of the key rationales. Furthermore, value was  supposed to be created through the transfer of 
know-how – i.e. Stora Enso‟s best practices in producing magazine paper to Consolidated 
Papers to increase efficiency. (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000) In terms of Trautwein‟s (1990) 
valuation theory, Stora Enso tried to take more advantage of imperfections in the currency 
markets. The strong dollar attracted many European producers to find better prices for their 
products in North American market. 
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In addition to the synergistic benefits, elements of agency-related motives were also present. 
By buying Consolidated Papers, Stora Enso bought a “ticket” to the US paper market, and 
knowingly overpaid for it. The rationale behind was to buy Stora Enso a chance to be among 
the leading shapers of the industry globally. To get the first proper foothold in North 
America, Stora Enso had to overpay, raising concerns whethershareholder value was ever the 
primary goal. There are elements of both Mueller's (1969) growth (as opposed to value) 
maximization subject to profitability boundaries. An implicit part of the deal may also have 
been a defense against takeovers, a motive suggested by Gorton, Kahl, Rosen (2005).  By 
becoming one of the shapers, Stora Enso avoided being the target of other “consolidators” in 
the market. 
Knowingly overpaying for Consolidated Papers gives rise to the idea that there might have 
been “CEO hubris” involved too. Stora Enso management was overconfident in its ability to 
turn around the declining performance of Consolidated Papers, and also misjudged its ability 
to continue consolidation activity in the North American paper industry. A key argument 
behind the high price was that by offering less, the deal would never have happened. This, 
again, is in line with Roll‟s 1986 hubris theory, where managers are equally likely to under 
and over-estimate synergies, but only succeed in takeovers when they over-estimate them. 
The case provides evidence for many of the other M&A related factors presented in literature. 
Öberg and Holtström‟s (2006) theory that mergers are a response to similar action among 
customers is supported by this case. Serving global customers, which had themselves 
consolidated significantly was one of the rationales. The Consolidated Papers exhibited Stora 
Enso‟s repetitive momentum in mergers and acquisitions. Previous experiences had proved 
positive, and hence supported continuing growth through further mergers and acquisitions. 
Many of the merger success factors also found support in the case. In seems that the presence 
of competing bidders caused a “winner‟s curse” for Stora Enso, as suggested by Varaiya and 
Ferris (1987). The winner of the auction ended up losing the most. 
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7. Conclusion: What can we learn from this acquisition? 
 
The reason why Stora Enso bought Consolidated Papers is well in line with previous 
literature on merger motives. These included market power, synergies, and empire building to 
some extent, as well as “CEO Hubris”. Stora Enso management wanted to create a company 
with a global reach. Growth and size were thought to be beneficial per se, but as Stora Enso‟s 
growth options in Europe were limited, its acquisition target had to be abroad. Stora Enso 
therefore chose the United States, the world‟s largest paper market, as an area where it also 
wanted to become dominant. Having a global reach was to enable profiting from global 
synergies, including the ability to offer a “one stop shop” to major customers, as well as 
protection from economic cycles. The reason why Stora Enso chose Consolidated Papers was 
that it had a product portfolio that was well in line with that of Stora Enso‟s. Consolidated 
had a reputation for good quality products that enabled charging a price premium. This made 
it a good base on which to add other companies, and hence partake in the consolidation of the 
US pulp and paper industry. Acquiring a major US player such as Consolidated could also 
protect Stora Enso itself from being acquired. 
In addition to identifying the strategic benefits of acquiring Consolidated Papers, Stora Enso 
management made well over 20 different implicit assumptions about the future development 
of various factors. Out of these, we have identified four critical factors, the development of 
which Stora Enso management failed to foresee correctly. These are the main causes why the 
strategic benefits of the acquisition failed to realize.  
The paper market is cyclical and management surely knew that it would continue to be so in 
the future as well. The sudden turn of the cycle, however, surprised management. 
Furthermore, management was overconfident in its ability to turn around Consolidated‟s 
weakening performance. Efforts to improve Consolidated‟s operational efficiency were 
hampered by the increasing entry to the market of Asian players with a better cost structure. 
This development could be seen already in 1999, but it was mostly left unnoticed by Stora 
Enso. The US dollar weakened significantly, cancelling part of the deal‟s strategic rationale 
of geographic cross-selling. These developments severely hampered cash flows generated by 
the newly formed Stora Enso North America and brought down its value, causing the major 
losses incurred by Stora Enso. The case is a prime example of how difficult it is to predict the 
future. 
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For the paper industry, the slump in demand and prices that began in 2001 was no ordinary 
slump. In 2001, significant changes in the dynamics of the whole industry started to evolve. 
Firstly, the overall fundamental demand in Northern America for paper started to stagnate 
and drop; The negative effect of computers and electronic data handling on paper 
consumption that had been talked about for 30 years started to take effect. Stora Enso had 
therefore bought a foothold in a market that was fundamentally declining. In addition, the 
focus of the pulp and paper industry started to strongly shift away from its traditional markets 
in the western world. North America and Europe were ridden with slowing demand and 
structural overcapacity. Earlier overflow production could be sold to emerging markets. In 
the early 2000s, however, increased investment in emerging countries such as a China started 
to show so that first, the export market dried up, but then trade flows were also reversed so 
that Chinese and other Asian producers started to export their high quality products to the 
United States and now even Europe. 
Consolidated Papers was not as highly profitable in 1999 as it had been. Its profitability was 
in fact declining severely despite overall growth in the market. Yet, the premium paid for the 
company was very high, and by far exceeded the value of the synergies calculated. The price 
was based on future growth expectations that didn‟t realize and the possibility for Stora Enso 
to act as a shaper of the industry in the future. There was also over-confidence in Stora 
Enso‟s ability to further improve Consolidated Papers‟ performance.  
The strong weakening of the US dollar between 2003 and 2007 made it difficult for Stora 
Enso to sell its European products profitably to its new customers in United States, cancelling 
part of the strategic rationale of the deal. While it did help improve the competitiveness of US 
production, it brought down the euro denominated value of SENA, forming a significant 
reason why Stora Enso‟s losses when divesting SENA were so high. 
Overall, Stora Enso undertook the deal using market forecasts that were largely based on the 
assumption of the fundamentals of the industry staying the same. Given the information at 
hand, the acquisition of Consolidated Papers looked like it had the potential of making Stora 
Enso one of the dominant global pulp and paper companies. The risks and price, however, 
were high because Stora Enso was not alone in its aspirations to take a leading position in 
controlling the huge but slowing North American paper market. This is illustrated by the 
large number of other deals that took place in North America at the time. Most of them, 
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however, failed to yield the results that had been anticipated, which is why the strong 
consolidation trend going on at the time largely slowed down after 2000-2001. 
The Stora Enso – Consolidated, as well as the International Paper – Champion acquisitions 
occurred very late in the cycle, at the peak, at a time when mergers and acquisitions are 
usually the most common but also usually the most unprofitable. Only half a year later, such 
asset prices would have been impossible, because already between announcing and closing 
the Consolidated Papers acquisition, pulp and paper industry stock prices had started to fall 
strongly. In this sense the timing of the deal was unfortunate. For Stora Enso, the timing was 
due to mainly the fact that only in 1999-2000 was the company ready to take on such a large 
step in further growth, as the company was still in the process of integrating Stora and Enso, 
following the merger in 1998. Secondly, and in part due to the high asset prices, there were 
also a lot companies for sale in late 1999 / early 2000.  
The price paid for Consolidated was already seen as a problem by many at the time of the 
acquisition. It was thought that a larger unit size was needed to stay competitive in the 
industry and in that sense price premiums were justifiable. Stora Enso, however, was 
primarily not after synergies, but was rather looking to keep Consolidated Papers running 
mostly as it was. On the other hand, the chairman of Consolidated Papers saw that the 
company‟s current business concept was not going to work very well in the long-term. Stora 
Enso grew larger on a global scale, but on a North American scale the Consolidated Papers 
production system only grew by one unit. For the other bidder that was a large North 
American paper producer, the value of the synergies obtainable was surely higher. In the final 
stage of the deal, the options for Stora Enso were to a) admit that Consolidated Papers 
provides a good position to take part in future industry restructuring but that its price is 
unjustifiable. In this case it would have been sold to a competitor and the possibility to gain a 
leading position in the US reorganization of the industry would probably have been lost, or b) 
take the risk and pay a bit too much, but trust that future actions enabled by a front seat in the 
consolidation trend would make up for the value possibly lost in acquiring Consolidated 
Papers. 
Stora Enso chose the latter. The risks, however, realized and in this light, buying 
Consolidated Papers at that price was a mistake. Instead of making North America a steady 
cash flow generator with which Stora Enso could manage its currency and economic cycle 
exposure and fund its growing investments in emerging regions, Stora Enso had to put a lot 
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of effort and investment into upgrading its North American operations to make them 
competitive once again. By 2005-2006, the effects of this work were already starting to show, 
and the cash flows generated improved significantly. They were not enough to bring the 
acquisition as a whole “to the black” because the cash flows of the first two-three years are so 
crucial, but overall, the business was running with rather good margins again. This did not 
show in accounting profit due to heavy asset depreciation and impairments, but cash flows in 
dollars were almost as strong as at the time of acquiring the company. In September 2007, 
however, the company was sold to NewPage after Jouko Karvinen had taken over as CEO 
following Jukka Härmälä‟s retirement. Without interest taken into account, pre tax positive 
cash flow arising from the acquisition and divestment of Consolidated and SENA totals about 
$640 million dollars or 177 million euros including gains from equity hedges for the 
company
303. For the company‟s shareholders, however, when the loss in shareholding and an 
alternative cost of capital is taken into account, losses account to about 2-2,7 billion euros, 
depending on one‟s calculation method. Due to the financing of the deal in part with equity, 
the acquisition did not endanger the survival of the company, despite the large losses 
incurred. 
From an M&A literature point of view, the study has argued that it is not enough to look 
purely at the explicitly anticipated benefits of M&A when assessing the success of deals. 
M&A motives portray assumptions that are directly linked to the fit between the target and 
the acquirer. As has been seen, corporate management that performs M&A transactions also 
makes dozens of assumptions that may not directly be related to the target company. Rather, 
they have to do with the external environment, and indirectly affect the outcome of the deal. 
Predicting the future is always difficult. When attempting to do so, however, it makes sense 
to explicitly list the assumptions one makes. The M&A assumption framework created works 
as a good decision making tool for managers, who should discuss these assumptions widely 
among themselves and assess the future prospects of the assumptions rigorously. The 
assumptions made are most often not independent of one another, but rather the proving of 
one assumption to be correct or incorrect may also affect that of another one. Therefore the 
assumptions listed should be put into “chains” such as the ones that have been modeled in 
this study. This will yield a model with which management can build various scenarios and 
therefore assess different outcomes of the M&A transaction in question. This might help 
improve decision making quality, as assumptions are explicitly shared and discussed, and the 
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connections of seemingly irrelevant factors to the outcome of an M&A transaction may be 
found. 
The assumption framework and the modeling that has been done in this study is the first 
attempt of such a method. Future studies can surely develop this idea further. Ideas for future 
studies include, for example, looking at a sample of M&A deals and assessing which 
assumptions made by management have been the most critical in determining the success of 
the deal. Such analysis could show whether there are some assumptions that management 
should be particularly wary about making. 
Another further avenue of study specific to the case study would be to study the sensibility of 
divesting SENA. On one hand, the company was joined together with another large local 
manufacturing system in the hope of creating value through synergies. Stora Enso still holds 
a 20% stake of the newly formed company. On the other hand, according to many former 
Stora Enso management interviewees, SENA‟s capacity was of much better quality than that 
of its main competitors, including the acquirer NewPage. Currently, NewPage together with 
SENA as a whole claims to be the cost leader in the industry.
304
 According to interviewees in 
this study, SENA could have well competed in the market and continued to generate good 
cash flows. Local manufacturing capacity could service customers with rather good margins 
in dollar terms. On the other hand, 2008 and 2009 were recession years in the United States, 
seeing asset values generally coming down strongly and paper demand further decreasing.
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This again makes the decision to divest SENA look like a good one in the short term, as the 
price obtainable for it later on would have likely been lower. 
In a couple of years, it will be interesting to see how SENA‟s acquirer NewPage will do, 
facing continuous pressure from Asia, whether the US paper demand will start to recover and 
how the US dollar / euro exchange rate will develop. These factors will shed new light on 
whether the decision to divest was the right one. The years to come will also show which of 
the world‟s paper manufacturers will survive, and in which form. Are they the ones with 
global reach and the ability to service global customers, or is it purely regional cost 
leadership that matters? 
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